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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between social networks and economic life in rural 
Zambia. The motivation for the study lies in the crucial role played by social context and social 
networks in exchange behaviour in rural sub-Saharan Africa, and inherent difficulties in 
formalising market transactions in this context within a standard neoclassical economics 
framework.  
 
The study examines the role of social networks in rural production systems, focusing on crop 
market participation. It is based on analysis of findings from social network research 
conducted by the author in three predominantly Bemba villages in Northern Province, Zambia. 
Data collected using quantitative and qualitative methods are used to map social networks of 
individuals and households. Variables are constructed capturing network characteristics, and 
incorporated into transactions cost models of commercialisation. 
 
The overarching question is: do social networks play a role in determining farming success in 
settings with little variability between households on assets and endowments – land, labour, 
inputs – and where markets are incomplete or missing? Do social networks mediate market 
and resource access, helping to explain socio-economic differences between households? 
 
The research finds rural life is characterised by diverse networks with multiple, overlapping 
functions. Much economic exchange takes place on reciprocal or kinship bases, rooted in social 
norms and reflecting community structures.  How social networks are measured matters. 
Different network attributes are important for different people, and relationships between 
networks and outcomes depend on the measure used. Controlling for endogeneity, estimation 
results suggest larger networks have a negative effect on crop incomes whereas having a 
greater proportion of kin in the network has a positive effect, implying that in this context 
strong ties are key. Qualitative research suggests the nature of people’s networks and their 
positions within them play an important role in the command over labour: “the famous always 
get their work done”. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Context 
 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between social networks and economic life in rural 
Zambia. The social-embeddedness of economic decision-making in rural sub-Saharan 
Africa is well documented. A person‟s social network can mediate access to markets 
and resources in environments characterised by an absence of functioning credit and 
insurance markets, cash constraints and a lack of assets. The motivation for the study 
lies in the crucial role played by social context and social networks in exchange 
behaviour and the inherent difficulties in formalising market transactions in this context 
within the standard neoclassical framework. 
 
The empirical study examines the role of social networks in rural production systems in 
three predominantly Bemba villages in Northern Province, Zambia, focusing on 
agricultural commercialisation and market participation. Social network analysis 
techniques are used to construct variables capturing characteristics of people‟s social 
networks, from data collected during household surveys in three study sites in Northern 
Province, Zambia. These are incorporated into models of commercialisation based on a 
transactions cost approach (Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; Key et al, 2000; Goetz, 1992).  
 
The main objective of the research is to uncover the ways in which smallholder farmers‟ 
social networks are important in enabling them to participate in crop output markets, in 
the context of remote rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa with restricted access to markets 
and institutions. Do networks facilitate smallholder farming households‟ engagement 
with crop output markets? Is there value in terms of economic outcomes of being able to 
access resources through personal social networks? Does this lead to better economic 
outcomes for households in the form of higher crop sales, through reducing transactions 
costs and mediating access to markets?  
 
Social networks are analysed in relation to respondent attributes to explore whether or 
not the way we measure social networks matters. For example, do particular kinds of 
people have large networks, or networks containing many kin members, and what does 
this potentially mean in relation to what different kinds of networks may allow people 
2 
 
 
 
to access or achieve.  For some, a large proportion of kin in the network may bring 
dividends for example in access to labour or other resources, for others this may 
constitute a higher level of obligation and more demands on resources. The social 
networks variables are included in a model of household agricultural commercialisation 
with transaction costs. The research is informed by in-depth qualitative material 
gathered during extended stays in the study sites. While many studies have been 
conducted of social networks in the context of technology, information diffusion, and in 
migration, social networks are still relatively under-researched in the area of agriculture 
and commercialisation
1
. The thesis potentially contributes to the methodological 
literature: how we conduct research on social networks and how important it is to think 
about the nature of social networks when attempting to examine the effect of 
“connectedness” on economic decisions. The research also offers some interesting 
empirical insights into the extent to which connectedness matters. 
 
The research finds the way social networks are measured matters: different kinds of 
people have different kinds of networks, and relationships between social networks and 
outcomes depend on the measure used. This has implications for the kinds of resources 
people can access through networks. While there are potential benefits of networks in 
terms of outcomes there may also be drawbacks or costs. Social networks can be an 
important conduit for accessing markets and resources, as well as social support and 
friendship. However, obligations to social network partners can act as a drain on a 
household‟s resources or lead to non-optimal economic behaviour. Although the sample 
in the research is by no means nationally representative, the case studies presented here 
yield insights applicable to other smallholder farmers living in similar conditions and in 
similar ways. These contributions have implications for a number of research areas, for 
example in microfinance where social networks underpin lending models, in social 
capital and in migration and remittance research. 
 
This chapter locates the thesis research in the context of agricultural development and 
commercialisation in Northern Province, Zambia, and the way social relations have 
played a role historically, and still feature prominently, in production systems, markets 
and decision-making of smallholder farmers. The chapter sets out first the choice of 
                                                     
1
 This will be examined in the literature review in Chapter 2, and returned to in Chapter 4. 
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location for the study (Section 1.1) before turning to agricultural commercialisation and 
the importance of markets for smallholder farming households in rural sub-Saharan 
Africa (Section 1.2). Section 1.3 describes the role of social institutions in people‟s 
economic decisions and livelihood strategies in rural sub-Saharan Africa. The 
economic, geographical and policy context for the study focusing on Zambian 
smallholder agriculture and that of Northern Province in particular are set out in Section 
1.4. 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The background to the research is a project investigating rural labour markets and 
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa at the Institute of Development Studies, UK. The project 
was funded by the UK‟s Department for International Development and conducted in 
partnership with the University of Zambia, the Zambian Ministry of Labour and 
RuralNet Associates, a Lusaka-based rural development consultancy, who provided 
important logistical and fieldwork support. Motivation for the project stemmed from an 
apparent dichotomy between the importance of rural populations in poverty figures and 
the availability of data reflecting a true understanding of the workings of rural labour 
markets. This is a surprising gap given that a major way for poor rural people, who are 
not directly engaged in markets, to benefit from pro-poor growth is through working for 
those who are active in markets.
2
 While the DPhil research was linked to the project, 
the study here, including methods, analysis and conclusions, is all my own. 
 
The choice of country in which to conduct the DPhil research was determined by 
coverage of the rural labour markets project. Zambia was chosen as the country of 
interest for a number of reasons. First, there were sufficient links with the University of 
Zambia to allow ease of collaboration with in-country partners. Second, Zambia has a 
significant smallholder agriculture sector, with labour the most important factor of 
production on smallholder farms, but differs from other countries in the region in that 
the former dominance of copper mining encouraged much internal migration suggesting 
                                                     
2
 See: White H, J Leavy, M Mulumbi, G Mulenga, Venkatesh Seshamani (2005) Rural Labour 
Markets in Africa: a channel for pro-poor growth? Preliminary findings from a research 
project in Northern Province, Zambia. Discussion Draft. IDS Mimeo; White, H, J Leavy, J and 
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that remittances may have increased monetisation of the rural economy. Northern 
Province in particular had traditionally been thought of as a labour reserve for the 
Copperbelt mines, with much circular migration between the two regions. Third, there 
was a clear information gap – the most recent Zambian Living Conditions Monitoring 
Survey at the time of the research (LCMS III, 2002), contained no detailed information 
about rural labour exchange patterns and behaviour; neither are there any explicit social 
networks data for Zambia
3
. Fourth, a long anthropological tradition in the Central-
Southern African region provided a rich secondary source of documentation about the 
lives of rural people, from the work of earlier anthropologists such as Audrey Richards‟ 
famous study “Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia” (1939), to monographs of 
the „Manchester School‟ of anthropologists and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute4, 
encompassing the work of J. Clyde Mitchell on social networks, A. L. Epstein (1969; 
1981) on organisations, kinship and social relationships, Norman Long (1968) on social 
change, and more recent studies, for example Moore and Vaughan‟s „restudy‟ of 
Richards‟ seminal work (1994).5 
 
A single province, Northern Province, was chosen as a further focus, first, due to its 
location. It was felt to be important to go further afield than areas close to the capital 
that tend to be easier to access and therefore more researched (so-called „pro-road 
bias‟). Second, again there are many classic and modern anthropological studies of this 
region and its people, particularly the Bemba, the dominant tribe, which provide a good 
back-drop to rural economic life (see Richards, 1939; Moore and Vaughan, 1994; 
among others). This wealth of secondary data helped to inform the conceptual 
framework of the thesis research and to design the data collection instruments, as well 
as in contextualising and deepening understanding in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
V Seshamani (2005); 'Agricultural Development in Zambia's Northern Province: Perspectives 
from the Field Level', IDS Bulletin 36.2:132-138, Brighton: IDS. 
3
 There have been three subsequent rounds of the LCMS, in 2004, 2006 and 2010. 
4
 Renamed „The Institute for African Studies of the University of Zambia‟ following Zambian 
independence. 
5
 See Magubane (1971), Mafeje (1976), among others, for criticisms of early anthropological 
work in the region.  See also Poewe (1978, 1979). 
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1.2 Commercialisation and Household Crop Market Participation 
 
The agricultural commercialisation literature offers a number of definitions of 
„commercialised‟ in relation to smallholder farming households. At the centre of many 
of the definitions of agricultural commercialisation is the degree of participation in 
output markets, focusing on cash incomes. These range from simple measures of 
volumes or values of crops sold to indices of crop sales, for example measured as a 
proportion of all output (see for example Strasberg et al, 1999). Commercialisation can 
also mean commercialisation in input use, captured as the degree to which the 
household uses purchased inputs or non-household labour, or at its broadest, the degree 
to which the household is integrated into the cash economy, thus going beyond purely 
agricultural activities to consider all market activity (for more discussion see: Leavy and 
Poulton, 2007; Pingali, 1997; von Braun, 1995; von Braun and Kennedy, 1994).  In the 
context of the research, agricultural commercialisation means that household crop 
production does not just meet family subsistence needs, but the household is also (or 
solely) producing for local, national or international markets. Agricultural 
commercialisation can be seen to be a crucial part of the broader development process, 
forming the basis for agricultural growth. Marketing problems have been identified as 
the most binding institutional constraints to increasing agricultural productivity, 
whereas connecting small, isolated communities into larger markets - at local, national 
and global levels - stimulates demand for farmers‟ output. This, in turn, should generate 
demand for inputs (World Bank, 2008; World Bank, 2002: 32). 
 
Markets and the private sector are important for pro-poor livelihood development and 
poverty reduction. Most poor people depend for their livelihoods on being involved in 
“a range of markets as private agents or as employees” (Dorward et al, 2003: 320). For 
smallholder farmers in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa, crop sales are an important 
part of livelihoods strategies, as a source of cash income and for productivity, especially 
when there are weaknesses in many other rural markets – for example credit, insurance 
and, in some cases, labour. Micro-level studies of farmers who had recently made the 
transition from subsistence or semi-subsistence to commercialised farming find that 
commercialisation of agriculture benefits the poor because it directly generates 
employment and increases agricultural labour productivity. There are direct income 
benefits, both for „commercialising‟ households and for agricultural labourers, with 
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important implications for the way higher average incomes are distributed within a 
community among various economic and social groups (von Braun and Kennedy, 
1994). 
 
There are also links between commercialisation, nutrition, and poverty. Market 
participation („commercialisation‟) that impacts favourably on farm household income 
can improve welfare, food security and nutrition levels, especially nutritional status of 
children in the household (see studies contained in the volume by von Braun and 
Kennedy ed. 1994; von Braun, 1995). Another nutrition-focused literature argues that 
commercialisation has in fact a detrimental impact on the welfare of poor people. For 
example, two Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) nutrition studies in the 
mid-1980s in Northern Province, Zambia, found that while the more commercialised 
farmers tended to grow more maize and millet both for household consumption and for 
sale, the net impact on household nutrition was negative (Table 1.1). 
  
Table 1.1 Nutritional Status of Children under five years of age by farmer category
6
 
Category of farmer Number of 90kg bags of maize 
sold to provincial marketing 
union 
% adequate 
nutrition 
% mild 
malnutrition 
Subsistence 0 70 26 
Emerging 1-30 52 41 
Commercial 30+ 50 44 
Source:  IRDP (Serenje, Mpika, Chinsali Districts) Nutritional Impact Study (March 1985 and 
June 1985) – cited in Moore and Vaughan, 1994: 180. 
 
However, reviews consider studies such as these to be flawed and one cannot generalise 
in asserting that commercialisation is bad for poor people in terms of household food 
consumption and nutrition (see Longhurst, 1988; von Braun and Kennedy, 1986). Many 
such studies are based on very small and potentially biased samples, and conclusions 
reached may not apply to all groups in all places and at all times. There is also a 
tendency to make simplistic comparisons of nutritional status with and without cash 
crops, without taking into account that incomes are not a sufficient condition of 
nutritional adequacy. Other things matter, for example: policy bias against poor 
households, especially credit and extension; risk and other barriers to adopting 
productivity-enhancing technology; input supply policy especially seed and fertiliser for 
subsistence crops; the importance of morbidity and especially health and sanitation. 
 
                                                     
6
 Data are for a sample of 205 households with a total of 166 children aged between 6 months 
and 5 years (Moore and Vaughan, 1994: 180). 
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Markets play a crucial role in livelihoods development and poverty reduction of 
smallholder farmers. In poor, remote areas, markets are key in linking the local 
economy to wider regional, national and global economies. Inter-market linkages are 
important and there are often mutually reinforcing relationships when accessing markets 
for different things. For example, access to financial markets can increase (terms of) 
access for the poor to assets in other basic markets, and vice-versa (DFID/OPM, 2000). 
However, market access can be a problem for smallholder farmers. In remote rural areas 
markets are often absent or do not function well and are associated with high 
transactions costs and increased risk. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
Smallholder farming households face many constraints that hamper market 
participation. First, while markets can be a highly effective mechanism in exchange, co-
ordination and resource allocation, they often fail. Poor people often identify problems 
with markets as a major impediment to successful livelihoods activities, and these 
problems may relate to both the absence and the effects of markets (Dorward et al, 
2003:320). For example, when food markets are absent households need to be self-
sufficient in food, which in turn constrains their ability to reallocate land and labour to 
„cash‟ crops. This may be exacerbated by margins between a high buying price and a 
low selling price (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). Where the effects of markets are 
concerned, the increase in competition that comes with greater participation in markets 
can be a double-edged sword as prices are driven down and some producers are unable 
to compete. Productivity gains need to be high enough to offset income lost through 
lower prices. 
 
Second, not only may the risks and costs of participating in markets be too high, but 
also there may be social or economic barriers to entry. Poor people and others, for 
example particular ethnic groups, may be unable to gain access or are otherwise 
excluded. Markets can discriminate against poor people because they lack economic 
assets, political or institutional rights or the right social connections. Regulations and 
social norms, for example via gender proscribed roles and other rules governing 
property rights or labour market participation, may be biased against poor people and 
supportive of more powerful players (see OECD, 2006; IFAD, 2001). 
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Given there are potential barriers to entry, what influences households‟ decisions to 
participate as sellers in the market for agricultural products? The direct benefits of 
markets – that is, profit-making and thus potentially higher incomes - create incentives 
to participate with direct benefits outweighing costs. Participation depends on ability to 
overcome costs of participating caused by thin or missing markets. This is often 
achieved through informal channels and institutional arrangements such as contacts and 
networks, enabling people to access markets and to potentially achieve better terms in 
markets. Social context and relationships therefore are key, and pose significant 
challenges for conceptualising and modelling economic relationships. The concept of 
social capital in economics goes some way towards this, and the thesis explores this 
literature in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
There are also underlying processes of development and change in agriculture. As 
economies grow, farming systems are transformed from „informal‟ subsistence 
consumption and production to more formal, exchange-based systems. Economics tells 
us that this process engenders rising opportunity costs of family labour because of 
increased off-farm opportunities, and increased market demand for food and other 
agricultural products triggered by urbanisation and/or trade liberalisation. This is closely 
linked to processes of diversification, from staple food production and subsistence 
agriculture into diversified market-oriented production systems, due to “rapid 
technological change in agricultural production, improved rural infrastructure, and 
diversification in food demand patterns” (Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995; p172). Although 
the research considers output marketing only in the short term, not agrarian 
transformation, these processes are relevant. The snapshot of the three villages 
presented here is embedded within these longer-term processes and the bigger picture of 
an increasingly more globalised, dynamic and changing agri-food system. 
 
 
1.3 Social Institutions, Economic Decisions and Livelihood Strategies in Rural sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
The role of social institutions in people‟s economic decisions and livelihood strategies 
in rural sub-Saharan Africa has been well documented in the social sciences. These are 
often crucial in mediating access to resources and economic opportunities where 
economies are under-developed, characterised by cash and credit constraints, and the 
majority of people are poor with few or no assets and limited access to markets. Early 
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anthropological studies document the way social networks, relations and norms can be 
central to decisions around participation in labour exchange, markets and migration (see 
Richards, 1939; Watson, 1958; Long, 1968; Harries-Jones and Chiwale, 1962). There is 
also clear theoretical support for the role played by repeated social interactions in 
reducing transactions costs, solving free-rider problems and curbing opportunistic 
behaviour. Even criticisms of the social capital literature have not questioned the 
importance of the social context per se, but rather its treatment within the social 
sciences (see Durlauf, 2002a, 2002b; Fine, 2001). 
 
The many ways that people in African societies enhance their standing in networks thus 
improving access to resources and assets are documented in various studies, see for 
example Glazier‟s 1985 study of the  Mbeere or  Parkin‟s classic study of Giriami 
community near the coast of Kenya (1972). More recent institutional analyses find 
labour exchange and markets to be heavily embedded in social structure and, 
historically, networks, social institutions and social relations have been key to control 
over resources and accessing labour and goods markets in rural Africa (Berry, 1986; 
1989; 1993): 
 
 “People‟s ability to generate livelihoods or increase their assets depends on their access 
to productive resources and their ability to control and use resources effectively. Access 
depends, in turn, on participation in a variety of social institutions, as well as on 
material wealth and market transactions…Since pre-colonial times, Africans have 
gained access to land, labour, and capital for agricultural production both through 
exchange and through membership and status in various social units. Rights to occupy, 
hunt, administer or cultivate land, for example, were often contingent on membership or 
status in a compound, descent group or community”. 
(Berry 1989: 41) 
 
Well documented, too, is the role social networks play in allowing migrant workers to 
access opportunities and resources and as a source of social support, through kin or 
other contacts, in both urban and rural areas (De Haan et al, 2002; Berry, 1989). The 
decision to migrate, where to migrate and how to cope in a new location can be 
influenced greatly by the ethnic, kinship and friendship networks in which people are 
involved, both at the origin location and destination, via network information effects 
(Dasgupta, 2000; Lucas, 1997. See also Iversen et al, 2009; and Iversen, 2006 on South 
Asia). 
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A comparative study of four societies (Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia) shows that 
status or influence within a network depend on “frequent demonstrations of one‟s 
ability to command a following”. This makes it easier for people to mobilise labour 
through the network, and make claims on fixed assets including land (Berry, 1993: 
147). Actions to enhance social standing, and thus the ability to call on elders, include 
investing in ceremonies, community organisations and human capital. Contributing to 
community groups and projects (for example cooperatives, village maintenance groups, 
religious associations, and self help groups), investing in the careers of dependents and 
advancing those of kin and clients not only expand someone‟s following but also 
demonstrates commitment to the network, and further strengthens prestige (Berry, 
1985:82).  
 
In Ghana and Nigeria, prestige may be enhanced by building a house in one‟s ancestral 
village, used either for rental capital or as a form of „symbolic capital‟, always ready for 
dependents and guests, and a sign of commitment to kin and community thus giving the 
owner the right to make claims on the loyalty and resources of relatives and kin (Berry, 
1985: 78, 181-182; Okali, 1983: 174). Investing in public goods, such as community 
services and infrastructure, can also create opportunities to access resources outside the 
immediate locality. 
 
In rural Zambia, existing social relations and social constructions of the meanings of 
work and obligation provide the context for mobilising labour and negotiating 
employment terms. For example, Gatter‟s (1990) anthropological study of a village 
economy in Luapula Province in Northern Zambia finds kinship to be the foundation for 
economic life, alongside a range of formal institutions. However, social underpinnings 
are not confined to kin. Group membership also provides access to other people‟s 
labour – especially important in farming communities where seasonality and the scale 
of land preparation mean labour-intensive tasks need to be carried out in a relatively 
short time period. Participating in work groups and group labour can also provide 
access to information. A study of Mambwe people, also in Zambia, describes the way 
women join non-reciprocal work groups on the farms of influential men in order to 
network with other women to exchange trading and market information (Pottier, 1988: 
127). However, while there can be positive benefits from engaging in agricultural work 
groups, in some cases they can serve to reflect and reinforce inequalities between richer 
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and poorer farmers. This is particularly the case in locations where most farmers tend to 
grow the same crops. Those with relatively low status and influence and thus less 
command over labour, i.e. „worse‟ social networks, can find labouring for others 
conflicts with work in their own fields, that the timing of their own cultivation suffers 
and, as indicated in one study of North-Eastern Zambia, “their share of rising 
agricultural proceeds lagged behind their contributions to increased output” (Berry, 
1993: 155). 
 
Network Fluidity and Commercialisation 
 
Social networks and network boundaries, by their nature, are fluid, changing and 
negotiable. People can increase their social memberships over time, or limit the size of 
their network for example by closing „borders‟ of networks.  Migration and internal 
movement also impact on network size and composition. Historically, in Northern 
Zambia when households and villages split up inhabitants would scatter among new 
settlements rather than moving as a group (Richards, 1939). The Zambian “village is not 
a permanent social entity but rather an institution through which a large and varied 
company of people pass at different speeds” (Kay, 1966:33 cited in Moore and 
Vaughan, 1994). Networks also tend to be organised along different lines, for example: 
kin and descent groups; location of origin; religious affiliation; occupation; education 
level; shared political interests. People switch their focus from one network to another 
as circumstances demand and may also react to a deterioration of their position in one 
social network by joining another, creating new networks or multiplying their 
memberships. 
 
Agrarian transformation, commercialisation of rural economic activity, and investment 
in education, have altered fundamentally the nature of rural social networks in Africa, 
particularly in transforming the meaning of seniority. Headmen in North-Eastern 
Zambia, for example, found their „followings‟ becoming less stable because of 
increased availability of alternative status symbols that act as a means by which people 
can acquire a following and exert influence, for example education, church affiliation 
and imported goods (Kay, 1967 cited in Moore and Vaughan, 1994).  
 
The way smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa acquire and use productive 
resources have also altered over time, affected by commercialisation processes, 
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population growth, and social, economic and political factors. For example: “in many 
rural areas commercialization has been accompanied by relative dispossession of 
women with respect to agricultural capital” (Berry, 1993: 163). The role of social 
networks as channels of access to resources (land and labour) has also altered. These 
processes combined have brought about changes in agricultural production, though 
implications for patterns of agricultural change, notably in access to labour and thus 
agrarian class formation, vary by location: 
 
“…while access to land, and fixed capital goods remained closely linked to membership 
in social networks, access to labor has become increasingly individualized. Because 
land, labor and capital are combined differently in different processes of production and 
exchange, the effects of farmers‟ investments in social networks have varied from one 
locality to another”. 
(Berry, 1993: 166). 
 
Increased marketisation of agricultural production would suggest a shift towards hired 
labour through more formalised, market arrangements away from „network‟ labour of 
family, kin and other network partners, bound by social norms such as reciprocity and 
obligation. However, empirical evidence suggests there has been no clear, definitive 
transformation of family into market labour. Berry‟s institutional analysis found in 
Ghana and Nigeria a shift to hired farm labour in the process of commercialisation of 
smallholder farming, and “modest upward mobility among farmers and farm workers”. 
By contrast, while the processes of resource access through social channels operated in 
similar ways to the West African cases, with farmers continuing to invest in networks 
for resource access, in Central Kenya and North-Eastern Zambia agricultural 
employment historically appeared to continue to be differentiated by class and gender, 
remaining less „commercialised‟ in the market sense (Berry, 1993:180). 
  
The next section locates the thesis research in the context of Zambia‟s economic 
development and agriculture sector development, drawing on historical literature on 
commercialisation in Zambian smallholder farming. 
 
1.4 The Study Area 
 
This section describes the geographical and policy context for the study, including: 
economic development, the character and extent of poverty, and agricultural policy and 
development in Zambia, before focusing on the background to smallholder agriculture 
in Northern Province incorporating both economic and sociological perspectives. 
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1.4.1 Economic Development and Agricultural Commercialisation in Zambia 
 
Econometric analyses in the research use data collected during the 2002/2003 growing 
season, a time when Zambia was experiencing renewed economic growth following a 
period of economic reform, low growth and increasing poverty levels throughout the 
1990s. This section sets out the historical background to the study period, focusing on 
economic policy, poverty profile and agricultural development. 
 
Economic policy and economic development 
 
Rich in mineral resources, Zambia was relatively prosperous at independence in 1964 
by virtue of copper income. The post-colonial government centrally managed the 
economy, focusing on nationalisation, subsidising major industries including 
agriculture, with import substitution and infrastructure investment sustaining the 
economy. With a thriving economy, growth prospects were good: over the first 8 years 
following independence GDP grew by an average of 4.2 per cent (World Bank, 2007). 
 
However, global crises impacted sharply on Zambia‟s copper-dependent economy. The 
1973 oil price shock, followed by a slump in copper prices in 1975 led to aggregate 
economic decline. The Zambian economy was beset by high and variable inflation; 
chronic budget deficits; falling export earnings; deteriorating balance of payments; and 
a constant decline in GDP growth per capita. GDP per capita fell by 15 per cent 
between 1976 and 1979 and external debt per capita grew by almost 60 per cent 
between 1975 and 1979 compared with a 27 per cent increase over the period 1970-
1974 (UNDP, 2003; World Bank, 2007). The unstable macroeconomic environment 
was compounded by the state‟s increasingly chaotic management of the economy and 
Zambia‟s role in regional opposition to apartheid in South Africa (Wood and Shula, 
1987:300-6). 
 
By the mid-1980s the international financial institutions pushed Zambia to restructure 
the economy under a structural adjustment programme (SAP). However, reforms were 
only partially implemented. By 1990, Zambia‟s income per capita had fallen to almost a 
third of its level at independence. Following elections and a new government led by the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991,  reform efforts were renewed 
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and implemented more systematically and extensively, focusing on privatisation and 
deregulation in a bid to stabilise the economy and foster economic growth. Reforms 
included: privatisation and parastatal reform; removal of exchange controls; trade 
liberalisation; liberalisation of the banking sector; decontrol of interest rates; maize and 
fertiliser marketing liberalisation and decontrol of agricultural prices. 
 
However, reforms did not halt, much less reverse, Zambia‟s decline as expected. The 
1990s overall were characterised by poor economic performance and high levels of 
poverty. Over the period 1990-1999, the average annual growth rate was only 0.4 per 
cent, compared to the sub-Saharan African average of 2 per cent (Figure 1). GDP per 
capita declined by an average of 2 per cent per year between 1990 and 1999 period 
(Figure 2), and population growth was high, averaging 2.4 per cent per annum between 
1990 and 2000. High and unsustainable levels of external debt meant that by the mid-
1990s Zambia was one of the most highly indebted countries in the world at US$720 
per capita in 1996 compared to the Sub-Saharan African average of US$385 per capita 
(World Bank, 2007). Poor economic performance was further compounded by the 
effects of major droughts on the agricultural sector in the 1991/92 and 1995/96 growing 
seasons and poor rainfall during the 2000/01 and 2001/02 seasons (UNDP, 2003). 
 
Figure 1.1: GDP growth (%) – 1961-2010 
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Figure 1.2: GDP per capita – 1965-2010 
 
Zambian smallholder agriculture 
 
During the period of the empirical study, agriculture was the mainstay of Zambia‟s 
economy, providing 70 per cent of total employment, 23 per cent of total GDP and 25 
per cent of total exports (World Bank, 2007; Govereh et al, 2006). The latest available 
sectoral employment figures (2004) put agricultural employment at 85 per cent, and 
industry and services at 6 per cent and 9 per cent respectively
7
. As well as providing the 
most important source of income and employment for the rural population there are also 
important linkages to other sectors of the economy and urban populations through 
multiplier effects and food prices. There is thus a strong connection between 
agricultural development, rural growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, agricultural 
growth is the main conduit for poverty reduction and increasing rural incomes in 
Zambia.  
 
Subsistence agriculture is Zambia‟s biggest private sector employer. With a population 
of just over 11 million people in 2002 (11.1 million, World Bank, 2007), 2 million 
                                                     
7
 CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/za.html; Last accessed 12
th
 September 2011. 
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people were estimated to be subsistence farmers. Table 1.2 below sets out a typology of 
agricultural producers in Zambia. 
 
Table 1.2 Typology of Agricultural producers in Zambia 
 Approximate 
Number of 
Producers 
Approximate 
Farm Size 
Technology, 
Cultivation 
Practice 
Market 
Orientation 
Location  Major 
Constraints 
Small-scale 
Farmers 
800,000 
households 
< 5ha (with 
majority 
cultivating 2 
or less ha of 
rain-fed land 
Hand-hoe, 
minimal inputs, 
household 
labour 
Staple foods, 
primarily 
home 
consumption 
Entire 
country 
Remoteness, 
seasonal 
labour 
constraints, 
lack of input 
and output 
markets 
Emergent 
Farmers 
50,000 
households 
5 – 20 ha Oxen, hybrid 
seed and 
fertiliser, few 
with irrigation, 
mostly 
household 
labour 
Staple foods 
and cash 
crops, 
primarily 
market 
orientation 
Mostly line-
of-rail 
(Central, 
Lusaka, 
Southern 
`provinces) 
some 
Eastern and 
Western 
provinces 
Seasonal 
labour 
constraints, 
lack of credit, 
weak market 
information 
Large –scale 
Commercial 
Farmers 
700 farms 
 
50 – 150 ha Tractors, 
hybrid seed, 
fertiliser, some 
irrigation, 
modern 
management, 
hired labour 
Maize and 
cash crops 
Mostly 
Central, 
Lusaka and 
Southern 
provinces 
High cost of 
credit, 
indebtedness 
Large 
Corporate 
Operations 
10 farms 100 ha and 
more 
High 
mechanization, 
irrigation, 
modern 
management, 
hired labour  
Maize, cash 
crops, vertical 
integration 
Mostly 
Central, 
Lusaka and 
Southern 
provinces 
Uncertain 
policy 
environment 
Reproduced from Alwang and Siegel (2005): Source: World Bank (2003, p.66 – 67), Francis, et al., 
(1997, p.13). 
 
Using nationally representative data from the PHS and associated supplementary 
surveys, Zulu et al, (2007) examine crop production and marketing patterns of Zambian  
small and medium-scale farmers, including regional patterns and comparisons between 
poor and non poor producers, for the 1999/00 and 2002/03 growing seasons – 
coinciding with the period of empirical study of the thesis. For the sample as a whole, 
crop production made up 72.5 per cent of household income during 2002/2003, with the 
remainder comprising animal products (5.1 per cent) and off-farm income (21.7 per 
cent). Over one-third of crop production (35.1 per cent) was in cereal (maize, sorghum, 
millet, rice), and 17.7 per cent roots and tubers. On the whole, farmers grow a diverse 
variety of crops: 
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“While maize remains the dominant crop in production, income from crop sales are 
considerably more diversified. In particular, there appears to be a great rise in 
smallholder revenue from the sale of fresh fruits, vegetables, and non-food cash crops 
as compared to maize. In both the 2000/01 and 2003/04 marketing years, horticultural 
crop sales were roughly equivalent to the value of maize sales nationwide. Sales of 
animals and animal products are also shown to account for a substantial portion of sales 
revenue in the smallholder farm sector, with these accounting for about 50% to 75% as 
much sales revenue as that generated from maize sales”. 
(Zulu et al, 2007: 22) 
 
The next sub-section sets out an agricultural policy timeline for Zambia, over the period 
1964 to 2003, before discussing the impact policies have had on agriculture sector 
performance in relation to smallholder farmers and also rural poverty. 
 
Agricultural policy and agricultural development 
 
Following independence in 1964, Zambia‟s agricultural policy can be divided into three 
different periods: from independence in 1964 to the 1974 collapse of copper; 1974 to 
structural adjustment in the early 1990s; 1990s to early 2000. This subsection sets out 
the main policy developments to provide the policy context behind the agricultural 
sector situation during the study period. 
 
i) Independence to the collapse of copper prices (1964-1974) 
 
Following independence in 1964, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
government, under President Kenneth Kaunda, focused agricultural policy on promoting 
and expanding maize production, aimed at improving smallholder farmer welfare. Rural 
resettlement plans were revived and new rural institutions were created. The main 
policies were fertiliser subsidies, pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing and 
government-led maize-buying stations to guarantee marketing services for smallholders 
nationally. The buying stations were run first by the National Agricultural Marketing 
Board (NAMBOARD) and later the Zambian Cooperative Federation (ZCF).  
Marketing boards and cooperative societies were largely inefficient, mainly due to 
mismanagement although this was exacerbated by the sheer costliness of providing 
services to remote areas, which led to difficulties in recovering their costs. However, 
expanding marketing infrastructure in rural areas combined with fertiliser subsidies did 
lead to a massive increase in maize production during the 1970s and 1980s (see 
Govereh et al, 2008; Howard and Mungoma, 1996). 
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By the 1970s, macroeconomic instability and the collapse of the world price of copper 
(in 1974) meant falling employment and incomes outside agriculture. Agriculture 
proved to be more resilient, with commercialisation held up as being the main buffer. 
 
ii) 1974 to Structural Adjustment 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural policy continued to focus on commercialising 
the agricultural economy, particularly maize cash-cropping. Input subsidies and pan 
territorial pricing continued as part of the government drive towards food self-
sufficiency. Responding to problems of unemployment and high food prices in urban 
areas, the 1980s saw a return to rural areas and rural livelihoods of former migrants. 
However, the high cost of inputs meant that returns to farming were generally low and 
therefore only a viable livelihood option for those with an additional income source. 
During this period and continuing to the 1990s, smallholder production was dominated 
by maize, at 70 per cent of total cropped area (Zulu et al, 2000) and just over three-
quarters of the total value of smallholder production (76 per cent), compared with just 
10 per cent of total smallholder crop income coming from cassava. All other crops 
combined made up the remaining 14 per cent (Govereh et al, 2008). However, the 
system was not sustainable and maize unable to be collected by marketing boards was 
left to rot, while farmers were increasingly paid with promissory notes rather than cash. 
 
iii) Structural Adjustment to 2002/2003 
 
Macroeconomic structural reforms under a structural adjustment programme began in 
1991 under Chiluba‟s government and included: market and price liberalisation; 
selected sector reforms; interest and exchange rate policies; banking sector reforms; 
privatisation of state and parastatal enterprises; trade liberalisation; and stabilisation 
measures in financial and currency sectors.  Reforms throughout the decade in maize 
marketing and trade were controversial: maize prices were deregulated and private trade 
introduced. However, reforms were partial as government continued to play a limited 
role in agricultural markets, particularly in relation to ensuring food security during 
drought years through maize imports (Govereh, Jayne and Chapoto, 2008). Subsequent 
agricultural policy reform from 1996-2001 fell under the umbrella of Agricultural 
Sector Investment Programme (ASIP), launched in 1995 and implemented in 1996, with 
the shift to sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and donor and government harmonisation 
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of policy and integrated sector investment, with the aim of engendering growth in 
agriculture based on decentralisation. A component of ASIP was the Rural Investment 
Fund (RIF), which operated through farmers‟ groups and provided financial support in 
the form of capital, basic agricultural infrastructure and a matching grants scheme, to 
smallholder farmers in disadvantaged areas. Funding for small-scale community 
infrastructure has also been provided since 2000 through the Zambia Social Investment 
Fund (ZAMSIF),  a World Bank supported assistance programme, aimed at alleviating 
poverty and emphasising community participation.  
 
iv) Agriculture in the early „00s 
 
Partial reforms in agricultural support - mainly, maize production subsidies and pan-
territorial pricing, in the early 90s, led to a decline in area cropped to maize and 
fertiliser use, and consequently production declined. ASIP saw an increase in areas of 
crops cultivated, and a diversification away from maize as smallholder producers (and 
consumers) switched to more „traditional‟ crops – food staples and export crops - 
including cassava, sweet potatoes groundnuts, tobacco and cotton, due to substitution 
effects (Table 1.3). In some regions, notably the north, where rainfall is higher, 
smallholders have also branched out into horticultural produce as important income 
sources.  
 
Table 1.3 Growth Rates (per cent per annum) for Selected Crops Produced by Smallholder Farmers, 
Zambia , 1991 – 2004 
Crop Area 
growth rate 
% per 
annum 
Yield 
growth rate % 
per annum 
Production 
growth rate % 
per annum 
Sales 
growth rate % 
per annum 
Maize 0.2 0.5 0.6 -1.8 
Sorghum -0.3 0.7 0.4 2.4 
Millet 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.9 
Cassava 1.6 1.7 3.3 5.2 
Groundnuts 0.9 3.0 4.0 3.9 
Cotton 3.6 1.7 5.3 5.4 
Soybean 2.9 1.8 4.8 3.5 
Sunflower -0.5 1.4 0.9 -1.5 
Sweet potatoes 4.6 2.0 6.6 6.6 
Mixed beans 1.8 -1.3 0.6 1.0 
Source: Govereh et al., (2006), computed from raw PHS data, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka. 
 
ASIP performed poorly in agricultural production as well as poverty and hunger 
reduction according to the 1998 mid-term review and the agricultural sector 
performance analysis. Apparent declines in maize production were certainly policy-
driven, given the reduction in government support. However, production of other crops 
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increased, and smallholder farmers have benefited from the availability of improved 
varieties in cassava, groundnuts, and sweet potato (Govereh et al, 2008). 
 
Despite a general pessimism in policy discourse that the sector had been in decline, 
empirical evidence from Post-Harvest Surveys (PHS) of small and medium scale 
farmers conducted by Zambia‟s Central Statistical Office (CSO) suggests improvements 
in the agriculture sector and a decline in rural poverty overall (see Zulu et al, 2000; 
Jayne et al, 2007), despite inherent policy biases against smallholder agriculture and 
poor response to reform of the economy as a whole.  
 
“At the start of the liberalization process in 1991, 88% of rural households were 
estimated to be under the poverty line. Following the major drought of 1991/92, the 
rural poverty rate increased to 92% in 1993. However, since this point, rural poverty 
appears to have declined markedly, to 83% in the late 1990s, and to 74% by 2003. 
Estimates of “extreme poverty” in rural areas have also declined ... over the past decade. 
 
...It is likely that the reduction in poverty over the past decade has been driven by the 
combination of growth of increasingly important food crops, such as cassava, sweet 
potatoes, groundnuts (and most likely, domestically consumed horticultural crops) as 
well as the export-led growth in cotton and tobacco, which have helped to buoy rural 
incomes despite the decline in maize production and the well-documented negative 
shocks affecting rural livelihoods mentioned earlier.” 
(Jayne et al, 2007: v)  
 
Nevertheless, poverty figures are still unacceptably high, especially in rural areas, and 
aggregate figures are likely to belie what is happening at regional and sub-regional 
level, and in particular might not be capturing differences between different „types‟ of 
household: “The households not selling maize, which make up roughly 75% of the total 
number of smallholder farms in Zambia, are largely subsistence oriented farmers, 
selling very small surpluses of other crops, have relatively small farm sizes, are 
generally further from markets and roads, have relatively little off-farm and livestock-
related sources of incomes, and therefore have very low total incomes” (Zulu et al, 
2007: 16). These farmers, like those in the research, will also vary in degree of 
commercialisation, and this will be in relation to sales of food crops such as cassava, 
sweet potato, beans. 
 
The next section sets out the impact of Zambia‟s economic policy and performance on 
the socio-economic status of its citizens. 
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Character and extent of poverty 
 
Poverty and inequality in Zambia are serious and widespread. Economic 
mismanagement, the external shocks/crises of 1970s, and inappropriate policies had far-
reaching effects into the 1990s, leading directly to and further compounded by debt 
problems. The poorest people bore the brunt of the impact of policies instituted under 
the structural adjustment programme. Price rises, especially for food as subsidies were 
eliminated, meant a greater proportion of people‟s income was taken up by food 
expenditure. This was coupled with unemployment, especially in urban areas, a decline 
in real wages and a worsening of rural terms of trade as the government attempted to 
keep maize prices low to cushion the impact on the urban population. This was 
subsidised by foreign borrowing. Further, high interest rates meant financial products 
were out of reach of the poorest people.  
 
Data from the 2002-03 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey suggest that more than 
half of Zambians were not meeting their basic needs, with more than a third „severely 
poor‟. Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas, where it is deeper and more severe 
especially in remote provinces and districts, compared with urban areas. Rural poor 
people are mainly engaged in semi-subsistence farming using family labour, and the 
poorest households tend to be female-headed with high dependency ratios spending a 
larger proportion of their household budget on food.  Land constraints play a large role 
in rural poverty in Zambia. Despite its relatively low population density there is a 
shortage of viable agricultural land with access to markets (Jayne et al, 2008). In all, just 
14 per cent of all arable land in Zambia is currently cultivated, the remainder being too 
remote without adequate infrastructure to make it commercially viable (Chizyuka et al, 
2006). Table 1.4 sets out selected socio-economic indicators for Zambia and the Sub-
Saharan African average. 
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Table 1.4 Selected Indicators 2002 
Indicator Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa average 
Poverty headcount ratio <$1/day (per cent) 76 44 
poverty headcount ratio  <$2 a day (per cent) 94 75 
HIV prevalence 15-49 age group* (per cent) 17 7 
Rural population (per cent) 64 65 
Rural population density, people per sq km of arable land 136 361 
Population growth (annual per cent) 1.8 2 
Rural population growth (per cent) 1.4 1 
GNI per capita, PPP (current US$) 801 1698 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 37 46 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 102 103 
Mortality rate, under 5 (per 1,000) 182 173 
*2003. All other data 2002. Source: World Bank (2007) World Development Indicators.  
 
 
The following section describes Northern Province, Zambia in relation to smallholder 
farmer livelihoods, and the role of social institutions in village economic life, both 
historically and currently. 
 
1.4.2 Northern Province 
 
Zambia‟s Northern Province was chosen as the focus of the study, under the DFID-
ESCOR-funded project of rural labour markets, because of its rich anthropological 
tradition as well as historical status as a labour reserve for Zambia‟s once-thriving 
copper industry. Rural and remote, the provincial capital Kasama is 850km from Lusaka 
(Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 Map of Zambia: Provinces 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Zambia; Last accessed 13th 
September 2011. 
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The dominant ethnic group is Bemba, traditionally a matrilineal tribe. Smallholder 
farming is the principal occupation of the majority of the Northern Province population, 
with some large-scale coffee and sugar plantations located along the line of rail. The 
prevalence of Tsetse fly constrains the rearing of livestock and while rainfall is 
relatively high (averaging 1,250 mm per annum), soils are acidic and generally poor, 
acting as a constraint on agricultural production. This also determines choice of 
cultivation system, which for smallholders is dominated by the traditional citemene 
system – slash and burn agriculture (see Stromgaard, 1985, for a detailed study of this 
system). Land is cleared of trees and branches burned to produce ash, which is 
subsequently applied to the soil prior to cultivation to counteract acidity, enhance 
nutrients in the soil and improve soil quality. This is a shifting cultivation system. Fields 
are generally cultivated for 3 to 5 years, at which point new gardens are established. 
Land preparation is labour intensive and tasks tend to be organised along gender lines; 
men cut the trees, while women collect, pile and burn the branches. The tasks are 
seasonal with tree-cutting in June-July and branch-burning just prior to the onset of the 
rainy season in October. Some cultivation is also carried out on ibala: gardens or fields 
fed by fertiliser, where available. 
 
Households grow a range of cereal crops, tubers, fruits and vegetables and cropping 
patterns vary across the province depending on agro-ecological conditions and available 
markets and infrastructure.  As elsewhere in the country, since the 1990s there have 
been moves away from a reliance on maize production to a more diversified crop base, 
in response to the scaling back of government support to maize production, and cassava 
features prominently for food security and as a relatively low-risk, low-input crop well-
suited to the environment.  According to the PHS survey data analysed by Zulu et al 
(2007), across Zambia as a whole, “the value of cassava production is about 40% to 
70% the value of maize production. There was an increase in production of 71% 
between 1992 and 1998 in Northern Province alone. The bulk of this cassava is grown 
in the northern, more rainfall abundant part of the country. The increase can be 
attributed to advances in productivity through the introduction of early maturing,  pest 
resistant varieties. In addition to this, the withdrawal of price supports for maize may 
have led farmers to diversify their energies to a crop that is suited to the agroecological 
conditions in the northern part of the country, which is cassava” (Zulu et al, 2007: 22). 
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Non-farming activities are also important for household livelihoods, including hunting, 
fishing, basket and mat-making, beer-brewing and gathering wild foods, because of the 
seasonality of farming and for food security. Households gather wild food from the 
bush such as caterpillars, mushrooms, chikanda and wild fruit, for household 
consumption but also for barter or to sell for cash. Food (often animal-proteins such as 
fish and meat) and beer are also used to access labour, especially for mobilising work 
groups to carry out heavy tasks such as tree-cutting for citemene. This „food-for-work‟ 
(ukupula) for neighbours and kin has a strong reciprocal element.  
 
Social relations and access to resources 
 
Audrey Richards‟ classic study of the Bemba Tribe in Northern Zambia observed: “In 
Bemba society economic transactions are based on a system of personal relationships – 
ties of kinship or political status” (1939: 226). Consequently, her account of production 
and consumption systems of the villages in her study was also bound up in accounts of 
kinship and political systems, going beyond descriptions of livelihoods activities but 
also considering the social relations of these activities and arguing that they cannot be 
separated. It is the (social) relations that enable production. As Moore and Vaughan 
(1994) summarise in their re-study: “these social relations, it seemed, could not be seen 
in any way as secondary to what people did; rather they were part of the very substance 
of life, imbricated in every meal and in every day of agricultural labor...The power and 
persuasiveness of „Land, Labour and Diet‟ lies, in part, in her demonstration of the 
inseparability of the material and symbolic worlds and of their mutually constituted 
nature.” (Moore and Vaughan, 1994: xi-xii). The strength of influence of social 
structure on economic activities in Northern Province and neighbouring Luapula 
Province villages was also is also emphasised in Stromgaard‟s (1985) study (see also 
Poewe, 1978; 1979).  
 
This is still true today. Recent work on migration and remittances finds that in Zambia 
social norms related to networks govern what would normally be considered to be an 
„economic‟ action, leading to migration patterns and remittance behaviours that contrast 
with findings from migration studies that demonstrate how transfers from migrants fuel 
rural development in sending communities (Cliggett, 2005). In the Zambian context 
remittances are made in the form of „small gifts and behaviours‟, for example providing 
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practical assistance on visits to the sending community: “Rather than provide significant 
support to relatives in sending communities, Zambian migrants invest in social 
networks over time through „gift-remitting‟. These „gift remittances‟ facilitate options to 
return to home communities, or to maintain mutually beneficial social ties for both 
migrants and relatives in home villages” (Cliggett, 2005:35). This is described by the 
author as gift-remitting in the Maussian sense: “as part of a system of mutual exchange, 
creating and maintaining social relationships” (Cliggett, 2005; 39)8.  
 
For rural households, networks are particularly important for accessing non-household 
labour during peak times in the agricultural calendar. This means investing in 
relationships, in both existing and new networks, but successful households also attract 
kin and this means household structure and composition can be complex. Moore and 
Vaughan‟s study of maize growing smallholders finds that the more commercial 
households tend to employ relatively more non-household labour compared with their 
less commercially successful counterparts (Moore and Vaughan, 1994: 193; 222; 226). 
This is not necessarily confined to kin networks, and reflects the tendency for village 
structures to differ widely across the province, with kinship ties only one of many 
motivations for a household‟s choice of settlement. This means historically “the 
structure of Bemba villages was multiplex and strategic, and such villages often 
contained households whose kinship ties to the dominant matrilene were those of 
affinity and/or allegiance” (Moore and Vaughan, 1994: 195). Various factors have 
influenced village structure,  and hence institutional structures such as networks, in 
Northern Province, namely: migration into and out of the region, particularly in relation 
to the province‟s traditional role as a „labour reserve‟ for the Copperbelt mines; colonial 
and postcolonial settlement policies; the need to be near roads and other infrastructure 
and services in order to make a living, especially from cash crops, due to the remoteness 
of the region; and the strategic importance (both political and economic) of mobilising a 
following. 
 
In emphasising the role of social and cultural norms, social organisation, and social 
networks in accessing resources in the context of smallholder commercialisation, the 
preceding discussion highlights the need to go beyond approaches formalised in terms 
                                                     
8
 See Marcel Mauss (1923-1924/ 1950) “The Gift: Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic 
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of individual optimisation problems. It points to the importance of incorporating into 
analyses a conceptualisation of institutional structures as having history and continuity, 
rather than viewing these as entities that emerge purely to fulfil economic functions. 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) reviews literature in economics and economic sociology 
that attempts to achieve this. 
 
......................... 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
social capital, social networks and New Institutional Economics (transactions costs) 
literature, the latter focused on smallholder agricultural commercialisation. This is 
followed by a discussion of fieldwork methods in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes social 
networks measures constructed from the data and analyses the social networks in 
relation to the characteristics of individuals in the three study sites. Chapter 5 discusses 
social networks hypotheses and sets out an initial exploration of the social networks 
data in relation to outcomes at the household level using bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. Chapter 6 presents empirical results of an econometric model of household 
crop marketing. Chapter 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Societies” Reprinted 2002, London: Routledge Classics. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Modelling the Social Context: Social Capital and Social Networks 
 
 
Economic transactions embedded in social relations are prevalent throughout sub-
Saharan Africa, with much exchange taking place on reciprocal or kinship bases. This 
certainly typifies market activity of individuals and communities living in the study 
areas, as discussed in Chapter 1. Conceptualising „economic‟ exchanges taking place 
within the social realm is challenging. So too is methodology: characterising, capturing, 
modelling and analysing these phenomena. Social interactions, institutions and relations 
go beyond a narrow, binary way of thinking in terms of possessing or not possessing a 
certain attribute. Rather, people are embedded within their social sphere and operate on 
economic, political, cultural and social levels in relation to others who are also socially 
embedded, in their sense of „self‟ and in their actions. This chapter explores social 
science responses to these conceptual and methodological problems, drawing on 
literatures that cut across both economics and sociology. 
 
Neoclassical economics has long been criticised for its „undersocialised concept of man‟ 
(Granovetter, 1985). Two parallel but related strands of the literature relevant to the 
thesis go some way towards incorporating social concerns into economic approaches to 
development: social networks and social capital. Social Network Analysis has tended, 
until recently, to remain firmly rooted in sociology (sociometry) while social capital as 
a concept or „metaphor‟ has emerged across the social sciences from its early roots in 
sociology and anthropology. In this chapter, the way social relations have been 
incorporated into economics is examined, concentrating first on attempts to define and 
conceptualise socially embedded resources through the metaphor of social capital 
(Section 2.1). Second, criticisms of the social capital literature are set out, leading to a 
discussion of the social networks approach (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). The chapter then 
considers how these concepts have been put into practice through econometric studies 
focusing on social networks and social network approaches to social capital (Section 
2.4). Specific measures and terminology used in social networks approaches, and how 
these potentially take us further in analysis by offering more depth than the social 
capital approach dominant in economics, are discussed in Section 2.5. Against this 
background, the chapter concludes with a discussion of conceptual frameworks and 
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theoretical approaches to markets and networks (Section 2.6) before discussing the 
literature modelling smallholder market participation from a New Institutional 
Economics perspective, taking a transaction costs approach (Section 2.7). 
 
Empirical studies that have looked at the role of  social networks and/or social capital  
in economic activity, such as trade, market access etc have focused on a narrow set of 
social networks measures, that essentially just proxy for size of network. There is 
another branch of the literature, however, for example work on migration and labour 
and job search that attempts to capture a richer set of information about the 
characteristics of the networks beyond how large these are. This will provide useful 
directions for the fieldwork. In all of this there are conceptual issues, in terms of how a 
network is defined, and also particularly around endogeneity. This chapter highlights 
some of the attempts to resolve these problems. 
 
 
2.1 Defining and Conceptualising Socially Embedded Resources: Social Capital 
 
Economic approaches to development have absorbed social concerns by incorporating 
the concept of social capital. Described as “one of the most powerful and popular 
metaphors in current social science research” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005: 1641), 
there has been an explosion of work in this area since the late 1980s. It was first 
considered in an economic sense in economic sociology, and since the earlier work of 
Bourdieu (1986), identifying its value, and Coleman (1988), setting out a conceptual 
framework, it has proliferated, with common ground in sociology, economics, 
anthropology and other social sciences
9
. 
 
Social capital is manifested so broadly that in economics alone the term has 
encompassed norms, friendships, networks, trust, civic virtue, community spirit, and has 
been used to explain diverse phenomena as how people vote, national economic 
performance and health
10.  A recent review states: “Literally hundreds of papers have 
                                                     
9
 Earlier still, Durkheim linked the value of being connected in community with mental health 
outcomes (1897). Hanifan (1916), credited with being the earliest proponent of social capital, 
highlighted community participation as important in improving school performance. For 
comprehensive reviews of social capital see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005); Lin and Erickson 
(eds) (2008); Woolcock and Narayan  (2000). 
10 Perhaps the most widely cited work on social capital has been Robert Putnam‟s (1995) study 
of social capital in the USA  “Bowling Alone”, about the decline of participation in voluntary 
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appeared throughout the social science literature arguing that social capital matters in 
understanding individual and group differences and further that successful public policy 
design needs to account for the effects of policy on social capital formation” (Durlauf 
and Fafchamps, 2005: 1641).   
 
What is social capital? A number of definitions abound in the literature, reflecting 
different disciplinary influences in conceptualising and operationalising it: 
 
“Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of 
different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of 
social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or 
corporate actors – within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is 
productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would 
not be possible” (Coleman, 1988: S98). 
 
 “Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action” (The 
World Bank).
11
 
 
"….the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, 
social structures and society‟s institutional arrangements which enable members to 
achieve their individual and community objectives" (Narayan, 1997: 50). 
 
 “… social capital may be defined operationally as resources embedded in social 
networks and accessed and used by actors for actions.  Thus, the concept has two 
important components: (1) it represents resources embedded in social relations rather 
than individuals and (2) access and use of such resources reside with actors” (Lin, 2001: 
24-25). 
 
 “The basic idea of social capital is that one‟s family, friends and associates constitute 
an important asset, one that can be called upon in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, 
and/or leveraged for material gain” (Woolcock, 2001: 12).  
 
 
Some definitions focus on what it is, its sources, while others focus on what it does: its 
outcomes and consequences. It is also referred to variously as an attribute of individuals 
or of communities. It is useful therefore to consider social capital as a multidimensional, 
overarching term, rather than a singular concept in itself:  “a code word used to federate 
disparate but interrelated research interests and to facilitate the cross-fertilization of 
ideas across disciplinary boundaries” (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005: 1642).  This has 
                                                                                                                                                           
organisations in the USA since the 1960s. While influential in that it attracted much attention to 
the links between social relations and economic outcomes, it has more recently been criticised 
for lack of rigour in terms of being “a piece of social science scholarship (Durlauf 2002b: 272). 
For work on trust and economic performance see Fukuyama (1995); On health, see Szreter and 
Woolcock (2002); voting outcomes see Bevelander and Pendakur (2007). 
11
 See The World Bank‟s Social Capital web pages: www.worldbank.org. 
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implications for how to „operationalise‟ social capital, as measurement will depend very 
much on the element(s) of social capital considered relevant in a given situation or 
setting. The thesis will examine ways social capital has been operationalised in the 
literature in section 2.4. 
 
 
2.2 Criticisms of the Social Capital Literature 
 
Given its apparent meteoric rise to prominence across the social sciences, criticisms are 
also many and varied, both of social capital studies and of the term itself. At the most 
basic level its tendency to cover multiple levels and dimensions of social phenomena 
has led to charges of imprecise definition and „conceptual vagueness‟. Some detractors 
question whether social capital can even be called „capital‟ at all, suggesting it is a 
metaphorical term rather than one that is „conceptually rigorous‟ with the necessary 
characteristics to be able analyse it like other forms of economic capital (see Arrow, 
2000; Solow, 2000).  
 
Some studies, most notably in the earlier literature on social capital, used a circular 
reasoning to argue for the presence or absence of social capital, presenting “evidence of 
a beneficial group effect as evidence of social capital itself, and consequently to 
conclude that social capital is good” (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005: 1644-1645). This 
inherent tautology makes measurement problematic and statements of positive social 
capital outcomes are not falsifiable. However, it is now accepted that social effects are 
not exclusively positive and social capital can produce social „bads‟ as well as social 
„goods‟ (Castiglione, 2005; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005; Warren, 2005). 
 
Economic studies of social capital have also been criticised for putting forward 
„unconvincing arguments‟ regarding the consequences of social capital and a poor or 
misleading use of evidence, including overstating empirical implications (Durlauf, 
2000). There is some confusion regarding the causes and effects of social capital, with a 
tendency towards mixing disparate ideas, especially “functional and causal conceptions 
of social capital” (Durlauf, 2002: F460) and conflating very different notions of 
individual motivation.  
 
The failure of many studies to distinguish between correlation and causality, even to 
establish a clear causal relationship at all, is the most serious criticism of the social 
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capital literature in economics, in terms of its ability to predict and make inferences. 
This has been pinpointed as a largely overlooked problem in social capital studies 
focusing on civil liberties and political freedoms (e.g. work by Grier and Tullock, 1989; 
Scully, 1988; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985) as well as in cross-sectional analyses. 
Some studies take correlations and statistical significance to imply causality when this 
may not in fact be the case. Even though studies usually point to significant and positive 
correlations between social capital and positive outcomes, the direction of causality is 
questionable. This has been put down to the “absence of any well-delineated theory 
about the relationship between underlying social norms which embody social capital 
and the various activities which are alleged to signal its presence or absence” (Durlauf, 
2000: 262).  
 
Establishing causal links between social capital and welfare outcomes requires explicit 
ways of measuring social capital, so one can actually demonstrate it has an impact on 
outcomes of individuals or groups. Some suggest data must be able to describe and 
explain endogenous social capital formation to identify social capital effects. Further, if 
studies do not use comparable observations, and regressors are missing from a specified 
model there will be unobserved heterogeneity in the residuals, and they are no longer 
exchangeable because the distribution of a given error will depend on the distribution of 
the included and omitted variables (Durlauf, 2002: 464). Exchangeability violations are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
However, explicit modelling of the creation of social capital, often through proxies such 
as group formation, may not be possible. At the very least, suitable instrumental 
variables are necessary, itself one of the biggest challenges in empirical work; but the 
problem is more general than arguing that social capital is an endogenous variable. The 
groups in which individuals are organised are often endogenous and there will be 
various forms of self-selection that empirical work needs to take into account. 
 
A related challenge is distinguishing between individual and aggregate efficiency 
effects: when external effects of social capital are captured by those outside the 
network, individual returns will underestimate social returns to social capital. Further, is 
it even possible to uncover the role of social capital in the presence of other types of 
social effects? To identify the effect of social capital, other possible institutional 
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solutions need to be adequately controlled for, and many studies do not address this 
sufficiently (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005).
12
 Issues related to model specification - 
endogeneity, exchangeability, identification, self-selection - will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 6 alongside estimation of the empirical model. 
 
Disputes over definitions can be thought of as intrinsic to academic debate, and not in 
themselves reasons to negate the credibility of social capital studies.  Further, there may 
even be a consensus emerging across the social sciences towards a definition of social 
capital with a concrete, empirical base: “Social Capital refers to the norms and networks 
that facilitate collective action” (Woolcock, 2001; p13). 
 
Technical criticisms, however, are weightier. They raise questions about whether it is 
even possible to uncover social capital effects from the kinds of data to which 
economists usually have access. Improving „tangibility‟ suggests social capital needs to 
be more tightly defined and conceptualised with data collected specially that measures 
social capital along clearly defined indicators that do not confound the social capital 
„resource‟ with its outcomes. There is a role here for using mixed methods and/or 
interdisciplinary approaches: “the credibility of the social capital literature will be 
augmented when non-statistical evidence is better used to motivate assumptions and 
suggest appropriate ways for formulating hypotheses” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004: 
61). 
 
 
2.3 Social Networks and Socially Embedded Resources 
 
That economic relations are embedded in the social sphere is not the same as saying 
people possess social assets taking the form of capital in an economic sense. However, 
features of people‟s social networks – the people they know and the links between them 
- and the ability to use these networks can make a difference to the way they make 
decisions, to their access to different capitals and resources. It is important to remember 
too that networks and resources are not identical; rather, networks are necessary to 
                                                     
12
 In a 2002 review Durlauf examines critically three leading empirical studies claiming to 
provide evidence to support the role of social capital in socio-economic outcomes - Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) - to ascertain 
whether the empirical evidence so far does in fact achieve the objective of supporting a 
“significant explanatory role for social capital”. He finds identification problems in all three 
papers. 
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access and use embedded resources. Moreover, “variations in networks or network 
features may increase or decrease the likelihood of having a certain quantity or quality 
of resources embedded. Thus, network features should be seen as important and 
necessary antecedents exogenous to social capital” (Lin, 2008: 58). Different network 
conditions, for example density (the proportion of ties between people in a network 
relative to the total possible number of ties) or openness, can provide access to different 
kinds of resources. These in turn generate different returns. For example, a denser 
network may mean greater likelihood of sharing very similar resources, whereas more 
open or sparse networks might mean better access to better or more varied resources or 
information (Burt, 2001).  
 
History of social networks research 
 
Social networks research dates back to the 1920s and „30s, with the development of 
„sociograms‟ and the field of sociometry. It very quickly became interdisciplinary. 
Other branches of the social sciences – sociology, social psychology, anthropology – as 
well as statistics, mathematics and, later, computer sciences, found the concept of 
networks useful and developed new network methods based on both empirical and 
theoretical motivations. Mathematical foundations of network methods were 
established, encompassing graph theory, statistical and probability theory and algebraic 
models (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  Social networks have been used by 
anthropologists as a way of understanding behaviour in „complex societies‟ (Mitchell, 
1974 and 1969). Developments in economic sociology
13
 and economic anthropology 
have led more recently to concepts being applied in economic studies.  
 
Formal network analysis uses insights from social anthropology and sociometry, and a 
set of analytical tools have been developed to cope with the complexity of networks and 
multi-stranded relationships, allowing one to go beyond „cultural‟ explanations to 
structural and relational features underpinning exchange behaviour (see Woolcock, 
2001). Network concepts and tools are useful for capturing the way exchange takes 
place in rural economies, with the advantage of being able to be used in many 
conceptual frames of reference (Homans, 1974). 
 
                                                     
13 See work by Granovetter (1985, 1992), Bourdieu (1977), Blau (1964), Homans (1974) on 
social networks in economic sociology. 
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Social networks and social capital 
 
The networks view is compatible with definitions of social capital focusing on the value 
inherent in social networks, viewing social capital as „resources embedded in one‟s 
social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the 
networks‟ (Lin, 2001a: chapter 2, also page 51).  Studies have distinguished between 
vertical (bridging) and horizontal (bonding) associations between people, often called 
„bonding‟ or „bridging‟ social capital. So, while social capital has been placed in „a 
family of capital theories‟, it has a „network-based conceptual origin‟ (Lin, 2008: 50). 
Indeed, the role of networks in facilitating exchange has been deemed „one of the most 
compelling empirical findings in the social capital literature‟ (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 
2004: 61). 
  
Capturing the social sphere using social network analysis could go some way towards 
addressing many of the criticisms of social capital by providing tighter, more clearly 
defined and coherent conceptualisation with analytical tools grounded in established 
sociological roots, allowing more rigorous measurement of social dimensions of 
economic life. A networks approach seems to fit best what the thesis is attempting to 
achieve in terms of identifying the potential role played by social relations in enabling 
smallholder „peasant‟ farmers to make a living out of farming. Further, social networks 
analysis is compatible conceptually with a New Institutional Economics Framework, on 
which the empirical models in the thesis rest. Chapter 4 examines in detail social 
network analysis, setting out social networks concepts, hypotheses, measurement and 
indicators used in the research, Chapter 5 analyses social networks in relation to 
transactions costs, and Chapter 6 sets out an empirical model grounded in New 
Institutional Economics‟ transactions costs approach. The next section explores 
empirical studies of social networks in the economics literature, including social capital 
studies focusing on networks though placed under the banner of social capital. 
 
 
2.4 Operationalising social capital and social networks 
 
Although economists have recently begun to incorporate networks approaches to deal 
with the social context, there has been relatively little formal modelling of social 
networks and social capital in the economics literature. Economic approaches have 
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varied but tend to fall along two main lines: those incorporating variables constructed 
using network concepts into standard economic analyses such as regression analysis, 
and those using a model of the network itself. The thesis draws on both strands of the 
empirical literature.
14
  
 
Empirical econometric studies cover a wide field, spanning: game theoretic models 
based on prisoner dilemma games (Routledge and Von Amsberg, 2003; Annen, 2003); 
general equilibrium growth models exploring moral hazard and monitoring with social 
capital incorporated in the form trust and trustworthiness (Zak and Knack 2001); 
models of cooperation in corporate cultures, again with social capital conceptualised as 
„trust‟ (Rob and Zemesky 2002)15; and a small but prominent literature in development 
economics based on micro-level studies of households and communities, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
Having made some of the more considered and technical criticisms of key econometric 
social capital studies, Durlauf and Fafchamps, in their recent review in the Handbook of 
Economic Growth, state: “In our judgment the role of social factors in individual and 
group outcomes is of fundamental importance in most of the contexts in which social 
capital has been studied” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005:1642). Indeed, though there is 
no consensus on the effects of social capital or social networks on welfare outcomes, 
many micro-level studies in developing economies find „well-connected‟ people are 
more likely to be better off along key welfare indicators such as housing, health and 
employment than less well-connected people (see Woolcock, 2001; Woolcock and 
Narayan, 2000; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999).  
 
As well as studies incorporating social networks and explicitly taking a network 
approach, the thesis also considers those falling under the social capital rubric using 
network variables - mainly studies of rural households in developing countries focusing 
on specific phenomena related to community institutional life: membership of village-
level groups and associations; group characteristics; and various „community-level‟ 
                                                     
14
 A small body of theoretical work in economics sets out models of network formation. For 
example, a theoretical analysis of network formation by Bala and Goyal (2000) formulates the 
process of network formation as a non-cooperative game. A theory of investment and exchange 
in a network, where the network is a group of buyers, sellers and the pattern of links connecting 
them, has been developed in Kranton and Minehart (2001). For a review see Jackson (2007). 
15
 A wide ranging discussion of the relationship between Social Capital and formal modelling is 
given in Dasgupta (2003). 
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measures - as proxies for social capital and therefore potentially relevant to the analysis 
here. The studies provide some empirical evidence on the value of social networks in 
the rural context and useful insight into potential network measures that elucidate the 
role of social dimensions of people‟s lives in economic outcomes.  
 
2.4.1 Econometric studies of Social Networks in Economic Life 
 
Links between social networks and development have been explored in a range of 
contexts in individual, household and community level studies in developing countries. 
Studies typically describing and measuring people‟s social networks tend to focus 
primarily on the role of participation in organisations and networks in determining 
economic outcomes, and on the way bilateral relationships facilitate cooperation, 
investment and exchange between actors through benefits such as information sharing 
(see for example: Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 2001, 2002; 
Isham 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Barr 2002).This section reviews empirical 
work on social networks and: risk-sharing networks; trading and other (socio) economic 
outcomes; technology and information diffusion; and migration, job search and 
employment.  
 
The Formation of Risk-Sharing Networks 
 
There is a burgeoning literature applying network approaches to modelling mutual 
insurance networks in developing country analysis. This mainly focuses on identifying 
the way reciprocal exchange networks are formed between “self-selected” individuals, 
outlining the social connections underpinning these networks and identifying who might 
be excluded and why (Platteau, 1991; Fafchamps, 1992; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; 
Fafchamps and Gubert 2002; Barr, 2002; Goldstein, deJanvry and Sadoulet, 2005; De 
Weerdt, 2002; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006). Overall, studies find risk is more likely to 
be shared among small tightly-knit clusters or networks, often, though not necessarily, 
organised along kin or geographical lines. Links between people also tend to be multi-
faceted.  
 
Using data from rural Ghana, Goldstein et al (2005) examine the role of social relations, 
intra-household as well as community-level, in asking for and obtaining help when 
faced with shocks: „social capital‟ variables used include the probability of knowing any 
person in the community, years respondent/family have lived in the village; number of 
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fostering episodes; number of organisations respondent belongs to. The research finds 
correlates of asking for and receiving help include kinship and membership of religious 
organisations. This is backed up by other research. Network formation is also explained 
by kinship, geography, and degree of exposure to risk by Murgai et al (2002) in a study 
using data from Pakistan. This is interesting because it raises the possibility that social 
networks are endogenous. If social networks are formed because of say geography and 
risk, those are the same things that might affect how commercialised a household is. 
Data from a village in rural Tanzania finds religious affiliation and wealth, as well as 
kinship and geography, strongly determine risk-sharing network formation (De Weerdt, 
2004). In a study of risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines, Fafchamps and Lund 
(2003) find risk-sharing, in the form of gifts and loans, takes place within networks of 
friends and neighbours rather than at village level, usually for consumption purposes. 
Network variables used in their analysis include dummy variables for networks of 
friends, relatives etc. Network characteristics are captured by: Number of network 
members; Number who own rice fields; Number with craft skills. It is clear from 
examining the literature that a large focus is on „numbers‟ or size measures. The thesis 
research attempts to take the consideration of networks further by measuring and 
analysing other network characteristics such as heterogeneity and diversity. 
 
Socio-Economic Outcomes 
 
Effects of social capital on per capita household expenditure as a proxy for household 
incomes have been modelled for households in  rural Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999). Social Capital is defined as “ the quantity and quality of associational life and the 
related social norms” (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999:2). Measured for both households 
and villages, indices are constructed based on membership in groups, characteristics of 
the groups, household values and attitudes. Trust variables - degree of trust in strangers, 
kin, village chairmen, district officials, central government - captured using household 
survey data, are used as instruments for endogenous social capital variables. The study 
finds village level social capital to dominate individual level social capital, raising per 
capita household incomes.  
 
One study of households in Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa using panel data constructs 
an index of individual membership in groups to proxy for social capital, with mixed 
results in terms of the effects of social capital on household welfare outcomes, in this 
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case per capita expenditures (Maluccio, et al, 2000). The component variables of the 
index are: number of groups, gender heterogeneity of group membership, and group. 
Community social capital levels are computed as aggregates of individual indices. The 
research finds both individual and community social capital measures are significantly 
associated with expenditure in 1998 but not 1993. A related study using the same 
dataset examines the impact of social capital on child height-for-age in the context of 
risk-sharing and shocks, measuring social capital as number of associations in the 
community and interaction of family income with community income (Carter and 
Maluccio, 2003). The research finds social capital measured along these dimensions 
helps households to mitigate more easily the effects of negative individual specific 
economic shocks.  
 
A positive impact of social capital on per capita household expenditure is also found for 
rural households in Indonesia (Grootaert, 2000). Social Capital here is measured across 
a number of variables:  the number of memberships in associations; diversity of 
associational memberships; an index of participation in group decision-making; 
measures of cash and time contributions to associations; a measure of orientation 
towards community. The social capital index is statistically significant, with the most 
important variables the number of memberships, „internal homogeneity‟ of associations 
and the level of participation in decision-making. 
 
While these studies argue for a positive relationship between associational life and 
economic and welfare outcomes, others argue that the relationship is more subtle than 
the variables of choice allow for (Krishna, 2001; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). In a 
study of villages in Rajastan, India Krishna (2001) finds the relationship between social 
capital and welfare outcomes is sensitive to what he terms „capable agency‟ - notions of 
effective governance. This includes strong leadership in organisations and frequent 
interactions between villagers and clients. He argues that group measures often used to 
proxy for social capital will be associated with better social outcomes only when 
capable agency is present. Group homogeneity measures, often used to proxy for social 
capital based on the hypothesis that these denote stronger social ties, were found not to 
predict well levels of collective action in a study of forest users in Nepal (Varughese 
and Ostrom, 2001). The authors found successful group activity depends on more than 
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social ties per se, and  institutional features such as decision-making structures play a 
cohesive role when members are heterogeneous. 
 
The effect of social networks on trader profitability (through lowering transactions 
costs) has also been modelled for agricultural traders in Madagascar, marketing food 
staples such as cassava, rice, potatoes and beans (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002). Models 
of imperfect competition and monitoring provide the theoretical motivation for the 
empirical analysis. Social networks are characterised as “social network capital” with 
variables capturing: the number of close relatives in agricultural trade; the number of 
non-family traders known by respondents; and the number of friends and family 
members who are able to support the business financially in difficult times. The 
research takes account of potential endogeneity of social networks with a rich set of 
instruments, mainly personal background variables beyond the control of the respondent 
or based on past activity, including: age and age squared, various indicators of place of 
birth, religion, number of brothers and sisters, number of children, profession, 
education, and business experience of parents, and history of informal lending and 
borrowing. Results identify three distinct dimensions of social networks that affect 
productivity measured as value added and total sales: i) relationships with other traders; 
ii) relationships with potential lenders – both of which increase productivity; and iii) 
family relationships which, by contrast, appear to reduce it. 
 
Technology and information diffusion 
 
Whether and how networks facilitate the exchange and use of knowledge – termed 
information externalities in the economics literature - allowing network actors to 
innovate, has been explored in a number of studies of farmers in developing countries.  
 
Social capital was found to be a statistically significant predictor of household adoption 
of improved fertiliser in rural Tanzania, with some regional differences (Ishan, 2002). 
Here, social capital was measured as: ethnic homogeneity (measured at the village 
level) of organisations in which households are members; level of  household 
participation in organisation decision-making; and the extent to which leaders of village 
organisations have different livelihoods compared with  village members. In terms of 
social networks these constitute measures of network diversity and thus access to novel 
information and resources. Research on high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and 
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rice in India during the Green Revolution using household-level panel data, found that 
both farmers‟ own experience and their neighbours' experience with HYVs significantly 
increased the profitability of these varieties (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995).  
 
Neighbours can be vital in sharing valuable information in farming communities.Studies 
specifically using social network analysis (SNA) include Conley and Udry‟s (2010) 
research in Ghana on social learning through networks, focusing on the adoption of new 
agricultural technologies. Networks of 450 individuals in four clusters of villages in 
eastern Ghana were mapped and used to demonstrate that when it came to social 
learning geographical proximity of network partners (being geographic neighbours) 
does determine communication between farmers, with social learning also occurring 
between „information neighbours‟.  A descriptive study of the influence of social 
networks on access to information in rice-farming communities in northern Vietnam 
(Hoang et al., 2006) found agricultural information runs through informal channels, for 
example kin networks, neighbours and friends. The research found kinship networks to 
be vital in accessing information, with networks of neighbours playing a key role in 
disseminating technological innovation. However, the research does not include any 
causal analysis. Other research suggests that associations also play a role in information 
sharing and technology adoption. Group characteristics including cohesiveness and 
motivation of group members were found to be positively correlated with technology 
adoption in rural Ethiopia and Kenya, based on a study of smallholder networks within 
agro-forestry projects in four sites using SNA (Darr and Pretzsch, 2006). 
 
Whether social learning leads initial decisions to adopt a new crop to be correlated with 
social networks is modelled by Bandiera and Rasul (2006) in the context of smallholder 
farmers in Northern Mozambique. Information on sunflower cultivation actually 
available to each farmer from their social network is defined and measured as the 
number of adopters among actors‟ self-reported network of family and friends i.e. 
people with whom farmers have strong social ties and are more likely to exchange 
information. Other measures of networks used are adopters in geographical proximity to 
farmers, and religion of network partners. The research estimates farmers‟ propensity to 
adopt as a function of the number of adopters among their family and friends and finds 
the relationship to be inverse-U shaped. This suggests social effects are positive when 
there are few adopters in the network, and negative when there are many. Results also 
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suggest that those farmers with better information about the new crop are less likely to 
be influenced by adoption choices of others in their network when deciding whether or 
not adopt. There is no correlation between the adoption decisions of those of different 
religions, and while there is a correlation between the decisions of those of the same 
religion, this is not as strong as family and friends. 
 
More recently, Spielman et al (2008) have carried out social network analysis of 
smallholder innovation networks in rural Ethiopia. Networks were mapped in ten 
locations of all actors involved with innovation dissemination and measures such as 
network density coreness (the degree of closeness of each actor to the network core) and 
degree centrality (the number of ties that the actor has relative to the total number of ties 
in the network as a whole) of actors were calculated. While the research does not model 
explicitly the links between various dimensions of actors‟ social networks and 
outcomes, results are interesting in terms of the role of institutions. They suggest that 
public sector plays a dominant role in providing information, inputs, and credit, though 
not in marketing and transmitting price information, in rural Ethiopia. Private sector on 
the other hand plays only a peripheral role across all these dimensions of the 
smallholder farmer innovation network. 
 
Job search, labour exchange and migration 
 
Research into the role played by social networks in labour markets is confined largely to 
developed country cases, although studies on networks and migration do include 
developing countries. The social networks and labour market literature encompasses job 
search and immigration (Granovetter, 1973; 1974; Dasgupta, 2003), self-employment 
decisions (Allen, 2000, using data from Wisconsin, USA), employee referrals (see 
Montgomery, 1991, for a succinct review), the role of social structure in determining 
labour market outcomes (Wahba and Zenou, 2005; Montgomery, 1991; 1992), social 
networks and earnings (Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994) and migration (Massey, 
1988; Light et al, 1993; Munshi, 2003; Iversen, 2006; Iversen et al, 2009). Work 
encompasses both the „strength of weak ties‟ highlighting the value of networks of 
acquaintances/ weak ties in job search in strengthening the information base, as well as 
the value of strong ties in the context of migration. 
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The formation of labour-sharing arrangements in rural Ethiopia is explored using a 
networks approach bringing empirical and theoretical work together (Krishnan and 
Sciubba, 2009). The study stands out in the way it examines the effects of not only the 
number of links (network size) but also key features of network structure and 
composition, which the authors term „architecture‟. Using data from a 1994 household 
survey of rural households across 15 villages in rural Ethiopia, the research tests a 
stylised model of network formation for sharing labour, first investigating how network 
architectures affect network structure, then effects on outcomes  - total value of harvest 
in the main season - estimating a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with 
regression analysis. 
 
Network variables include: heterogeneity of networks based on a range of characteristics 
of network partners including age and sex of household head; household labour quantity 
and quality; and wealth characteristics, including land and livestock holdings; network 
symmetry: network architectures are defined as symmetric if the number of links of an 
actor‟s partners is approximately equal to the number of links the actor has; clustering 
and inter-connectedness - the ratio of actual links connecting each household to the 
maximum possible number of links. The authors address potential endogeneity of 
networks by including as instruments variables that may affect network formation but 
unlikely to have any bearing on productivity. The instruments are related to how 
households might be embedded in their village and their relative role and include: 
number of close blood relatives living in the village; whether the household head was 
born in the village; the average number of years of residence of the head of household in 
the village. Locational fixed effects are captured by a household‟s neighbourhood 
within their village. The research finds that both number of links and architecture play a 
critical role in determining impact of social networks on output. Focusing narrowly on 
links alone downplays the impact of labour sharing on output (Krishnan and Sciubba, 
2009). 
 
There are strong links between networks and migration, and research finds migrants 
tend to choose destinations where they have friends, relatives or other networks 
(Massey, 1990; Lucas, 1997; Winters et al, 2001). New migrants tend to be assisted by 
people who have migrated earlier, for example previous migration experience and 
extensive community migration has been shown to increase the probability of migrating 
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to the US – termed cumulative causation theory (Massey and Garcia Espana, 1987; 
Myrdal, 1957). Further, other work on Mexico-US migration finds the development of 
strong community networks override household characteristics in constraining ability to 
migrate. So, at least until migration is established in a community, kinship and cultural 
ties and social networks are key elements of the migration decision (Winters et al, 
2001). This suggests that the „urban job lottery‟ is non-uniform and not anonymous or 
random as Harris-Todaro analysis would suggest. Instead, this can be modelled as 
strategic behaviour where actors cooperate in the first game, and then reciprocate, 
leading to ever-decreasing costs of migration and increasing returns. 
 
A dynamic theory of rural-urban migration is set out in Iversen (2006), underpinned and 
motivated by empirical observations in rural Karnataka. His model suggests that it is not 
only the rural-urban wage gap that influences migration, but also the strength of village-
specific “social network multipliers”. The magnitude of the multiplier effect depends in 
part on migrants‟ ability to take advantage of existing social networks: “The nature and 
size of these multipliers depend on patterns of social interaction and are sensitive to 
attributes such as the social fabric, caste composition, destination links and migration 
histories of rural source communities” (Iversen, 2006:7). 
 
2.4.2 Criticisms of the social networks approach in economics 
 
Social network concepts and analysis go some way towards addressing criticisms of the 
social capital literature‟s attempts to address social concerns. It offers tighter definitions 
of elements of the social sphere in its focus on the network of individuals and 
institutions that actors/ households have access to, the links between them and the 
resources embedded within them.  Social network analysis also provides tools to 
measure the nature and characteristics of links and of actors themselves (called „nodes‟). 
This helps to address issues, such as omitted variables, that can lead to biases and other 
inferential problems when attempting to analyse causal links between the social sphere 
and outcomes. However, with the exception of the recent papers by Spielman et al 
(2008), and Krishnan and Sciubba (2009), network studies in economics, unlike the 
networks literature in sociology, tend not to use any information on the structure of the 
network, focusing instead on number of links or on group membership. 
 
Thus, challenges remain. 
44 
 
 
 
 
 Group effects: How can social network effects be distinguished from other group 
effects such as information spill-over, or the presence of common features like 
underlying political or legal institutions? Like social capital, social networks can 
easily proxy for other „social determinants‟. The thesis, in clustering 
observations by village in the empirical analysis, takes account of this. The 
thesis also does not rely on group level variables alone to represent social 
networks. This will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Missing data: this is especially a problem when researchers attempt to represent 
a whole network based on data that is sampled or recorded from an individual 
(ego) basis, for example omitting network partners who are not part of the 
sample such as those located elsewhere. This ignores potentially valuable „weak 
ties‟ or bridging networks. Studies also potentially miss information on the 
dependent variable by eliciting information on potential as opposed to real links, 
or by randomly sampling individual actors‟ relationships as well as the actors 
themselves. Further, “understanding … relationships, seems to require sampling 
approaches that cannot be focused on individuals alone” (Santos and Barrett, 
2008:14)
16
. The thesis randomly samples households, then selects individual 
respondents from within households (usually the household head or their 
representative plus one other household member of the opposite sex), who are 
then asked about their complete network – both the nature of the link and 
attributes of the network partner.  
 Recall: Related to the previous point, as with all empirical, survey-based 
research, respondents‟ recall abilities also affect data quality and the extent to 
which there are missing data (see Brewer 2000).  This is more of an issue in 
studies that attempt to map an entire network, constructing structural variables 
such as density or centrality. The thesis, however, concentrates on the networks 
of households sampled in the three study sites, constructing variables on the 
nature of the links between actors (or egos) and their network partners rather 
than on the networks themselves. This is a simple, „egocentric‟ approach. 
 
                                                     
16
 Santos and Barrett (2008) critique of social networks literature in economics focuses solely on 
network formation, which is not the focus of the thesis. However, methodological points 
regarding sampling are still pertinent. 
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Methodological issues are revisited in more detail in Chapter 3 on Research Methods 
and Chapter 4 on Social Network Analysis. 
 
2.5 Social Network Analysis 
 
This section describes briefly key concepts in social network analysis focusing on 
defining social networks, methods used for collecting information on social networks, 
and social networks measures. 
 
2.5.1 Definition 
 
Social networks are defined earlier in this chapter (Section 2.3) as the people one knows 
and the links between them. More formally, following the definition of Hanneman, “A 
social network is a set of actors (or points, or nodes, or agents) that may have 
relationships (or edges, or ties) with one another” (2000:18). Actors can be either 
individuals or organisation, and a tie between actors has both „content‟, defined as the 
type of relation e.g. employer-employee, and can include information or resource flows, 
advice or friendship, or for organisations shared members, and „form‟, defined as the 
strength of the relation e.g. frequency of interaction (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). 
Any type of social relation can be mapped as a tie. 
 
2.5.2 Methods 
 
Social network analysis provides a set of analytical tools for studying patterns of 
structure made up of interpersonal relations with the aim of “uncovering the patterning 
of people‟s interactions” (Freeman, International Network of Social Network Analysts 
website www.insna.org). The underlying formal theory, methods, and applications are 
organised in mathematical terms and are grounded in the systematic analysis of 
empirical data. Social network analysis employs standard data analytic techniques and 
applied statistics, which usually focus on observational units (cases) and their 
characteristics, and applying these techniques to data on ties among the units, known as 
structural variables. The relationship (including presence, intensity or strength of the 
relation) and not the individual is often the main unit of analysis. The key feature that 
distinguishes network theory is use of this structural or relational information to study 
or test theories. However, attributes of the actors may also be included and these 
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measurements on actors themselves make up network composition. The „layering‟ of 
the data in this way results in complicated datasets so analysis needs to be relatively 
sophisticated, relying on graph theoretic, algebraic and/or statistical methods, some of 
which can allow for simultaneous analysis of structural and composition variables. Data 
analysis of whole networks (otherwise known as a „sociocentric‟ approach) is concerned 
with measuring structural patterns in relationships and is generally carried out through 
the construction of mathematical algorithms and the use of specialist social network 
analysis computer packages such as UCINET or Krackplot
17
. However, taking an 
„egocentric‟ or personal relationship approach, the focus is on individuals (ego) and the 
people they know (alters), that is the networks of relationships around individuals. This 
approach is rooted in the anthropological studies of the Manchester School (see work by 
Radcliffe-Brown and others). 
 
2.5.3 Concepts and Measures 
 
Social network variables fall into three main categories – structural, composition and 
affiliation. This section sketches out some of the main concepts in social network 
analysis. Definitions are discussed further in Chapter 4.
18
 
 
Structural Variables 
Structural variables describe the structure of the network. They relate to the shape or 
pattern of links in the network and describe the ties between the actors. Measures 
include: size of network; network density; geodesic distance; measures of centrality; 
power; cliques and subgroups. 
 
Affiliation Variables 
An affiliation network is specific type of network involving relations between a set of 
actors and a set of „events‟ that the actors „belong‟ to, such as participation in a 
particular organisation and can extend to informal social occasions. Affiliation variables 
give the subset of actors that belong to each „event‟. 
 
                                                     
17 The software is readily available from the websites of social network academics. Much of it is 
free of charge. See www.analytictech.com.  
18 Three key texts setting out social network concepts and analytical techniques are Wasserman 
and Faust (1994), Scott (1991) and Hanneman (2000). 
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Composition/Attribute variables 
Composition or attribute variables refer to the data on individual actors‟ attitudes, 
opinions and behaviour. They encompass characteristics such as age, sex, income, 
education etc. that are measured as values of particular variables. Attribute data can be 
converted into relational data. 
 
The thesis takes an egocentric approach to network analysis. In the study sites, personal 
social networks, operating through individual links and through membership of groups 
and institutions can serve myriad functions encompassing social support, emotional and 
material aid, companionship, information, social control, behavioural models and access 
to resources. This analysis concentrates on the latter - that is, instrumental networks: 
those that effect the transfer of material goods and services between people, including 
consideration of networks for social support and information, bearing in mind that 
different functions in networks may not be neatly distinguished.  Using a social 
networks approach in the analysis enables the research to capture the role that social 
relations play in economic participation in the three communities. Links with 
individuals and groups that mediate access to: i) labour; ii) markets; iii) social support; 
and iv) information, are considered, concentrating on first-order, direct ties between 
respondents and their network partners.  
 
The next section describes different approaches and conceptual frameworks for 
analysing networks in relation to markets. 
 
 
2.6 Conceptual Frameworks: Theoretical Approaches to Markets and Networks 
 
The motivation for the thesis research is founded in part on the apparent tension 
between the way neoclassical economics has tended to view the economy and markets, 
and subsequently model economic and market behaviour, and how markets are 
conceptualised and analysed in other social sciences. The discussion in Chapter 1 of 
smallholder commercialisation, couched in the role of social and cultural norms in 
accessing resources, highlights further the need to go beyond approaches formalised in 
terms of individual optimisation problems. It points to the importance of incorporating 
into analyses a conceptualisation of institutional structures as having history and 
continuity, going beyond viewing these as entities that emerge purely to fulfil economic 
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functions. Focusing on economics, economic sociology and economic anthropology, 
this section briefly sets out different approaches in conceptualising networks as 
institutions, ways of integrating sociological views of market exchange with economic 
analysis, and why integrating social networks variables can make a difference. 
 
Neoclassical economics‟ view of markets is based on arms-length exchange between 
„anonymous‟ buyers and sellers. This is anchored in a formal understanding of 
economics as a rational choice between the alternative uses of scarce resources, 
focusing around optimising behaviour of individuals as rational actors who, in pursuing 
self-interest, maximise some target function, for example utility or consumption, under 
constraints. This view of economic behaviour, based on weighing up costs and benefits 
before making decisions, suggests little room for considering social or cultural 
influences on the choices people make and the actions they take – generally a central 
concern in sociological and anthropological approaches. 
 
The division between the disciplines, however, is not clear-cut, to which the formalist 
versus substantivist debate in economic anthropology attests. The formalist view of the 
economy accords with neoclassical economics.  The substantivist stance, formulated by 
K Polanyi (1944) opposes this viewpoint, assuming neither rational decision-making by 
economic actors nor scarcity of resources. It focuses instead on the way economies are 
embedded in society and culture, and people formulate livelihoods strategies in 
interaction with social and natural environments as well as material conditions, and not 
necessarily by maximising utility. Polanyi‟s work focused on pre-industrial societies 
with economies embedded in religious, political and social institutions. In this context, 
prices are assumed not to be set by supply and demand but by tradition (reciprocity) and 
political authorities (redistribution). This is held up in direct contrast to „modern‟ 
societies.
19
  
 
In this regard the substantivist approach also presents a false dichotomy between the 
economic and social spheres. Some of the earliest work on the importance of social 
interactions in modern economics is Veblen‟s (1934) Theory of the Leisure Class, 
which first describes the way people‟s behaviour conveys signals about their wealth – 
                                                     
19
 See also Marshall Sahlins‟ (1972) Stone Age Economics. 
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i.e. the principle of conspicuous consumption. Recent approaches focus on: 
incorporating economic models into other social sciences; incorporating insights from 
other social sciences into conventional economic models; and network approaches. 
 
Rational Choice Sociology extends neoclassical economic models to topics traditionally 
the domain of sociologists (see Coleman, Homans, Becker, and others). The approach 
argues that all social action is rationally motivated and „instrumental‟, based on 
assumptions of the orthodox neoclassical view of rationality. In sociology, the basic 
framework rests on Homans‟ exchange theory (1961), with underlying principles drawn 
from behaviourist psychology, though later work converges with microeconomics. 
Based on formal mathematical models, analysis incorporates the way changes in social 
environment (culture, norms, and social structure) influence people‟s choices and 
behaviours and, conversely, how interaction between individuals determines the social 
environment itself. Key works include Becker‟s (1976) The Economic Approach to 
Human Behavior and Coleman‟s (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Analysing 
systematically effects of prices on market behaviour where social interactions are 
important, Becker and Murphy (2000) include social forces in models of utility 
maximisation and equilibrium in group behaviour. They find the influence of social 
forces to be „pervasive‟, with mutual interaction between social forces and market 
behaviour, which they call “social markets”. The approach is mainly criticised for its 
traditional foundations of rational choice analysis and the way it still takes an economic 
approach to behaviour, in particular in its assumption that existing economic institutions 
are efficient solutions to certain problems in the market. Further, its individualistic 
focus means collective action, social norms and social structure do not form part of 
analyses. 
 
Recognising the economy as part of a bigger social structure, socio-economics also 
argues for a strong role for society and social relations (including cultural values and 
norms and politics and institutions) in governing the economy, and mutually reinforcing 
relationships between economy and society (for example Etzioni, Akerlof, and others). 
Thus a much broader perspective than neoclassical economics is needed to solve 
economic problems. Like rational choice sociology, proponents of socio-economics 
tend to integrate findings from other social sciences such as psychology, sociology, 
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anthropology directly into economic models – however these models do not necessarily 
rest on rational choice assumptions. 
 
Rooted in the neoclassical economics of the Chicago school, New Institutional 
Economics and Transaction Cost Economics (see Williamson, and others) use economic 
tools to examine social phenomena, complementing a sociological approach in viewing 
institutions as social constructions of reality but not necessarily taking the most efficient 
forms. NIE departs from the mainstream in its key behavioural assumption of bounded 
rationality that lies at the heart of transaction cost economics. Bounded rationality 
posits that, rather than being optimising agents, people are "intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so" (Simon, 1961: xxiv), optimising only locally at best. In practice, people 
cannot make perfectly rational decisions because they are limited by their cognitive 
ability in processing information and solving complex problems (Williamson, 1985). 
While bounded rationality does not represent a wholly „socialised‟ view of economic 
actors, in implicitly recognising impacts of wider social context it does go some way 
towards acknowledging limitations of rationality (De Bruin and Dupuis, 1999). NIE 
approaches are discussed in more detail in 2.7 below.  
 
The importance of social relations in establishing economic organisation and action are 
explored directly in the New Economic Sociology (see Granovetter, Harrison C White, 
among others). Economic action is considered to be embedded in networks: 
 
“Economic action is socially situated and cannot be explained by reference to individual 
motives alone. It is embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than 
being carried out by atomised actors. By network we mean a regular set of contacts or 
similar social connections among individuals or groups. An action by a member of a 
network is embedded, because it is expressed in interaction with other people.” 
(Granovetter and Swedberg 1992: 9). 
 
Is there a separation between exchange carried out in a personalised way in a network 
and that carried out at arm‟s length, mediated by competitively determined prices in a 
market? Granovetter argues that “complex economic networks do not arise exclusively 
from technological or economic factors but also have social and institutional 
foundations that structure ownership, control and exchange relationships in the 
economy” (Rauch and Hamilton, 2001: 14; see also Swedberg, 1991; Granovetter and 
Swedberg, 1992). Networks are not confined to purely socially defined relationships, 
and can be seen as the „intersection and interaction of personalized exchange with arms-
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length exchange‟ (Rauch and Hamilton 2001: 1; chapter 1 in Rauch and Casella, 2001). 
People build their social networks through interaction in markets, employment and 
work and „economic calculation of a long term gain‟ (Friedland and Robertson, 1990). 
 
In terms of networks approaches, studies from this perspective find levels of 
embeddedness in both industrial and pre-industrial economies. The approach fits well 
with the realities of life in less-developed rural economies, such as rural sub-Saharan 
Africa. Here, as discussed in relation to smallholder agriculture in rural Zambia, 
exchange of goods, labour and other economic activities tend not to operate through 
impersonal market transactions as assumed in neo-classical economics. Personal ties 
permeate productive relationships, and gift exchange is especially important in 
allocating resources and providing social insurance among rural African households 
(Fafchamps, 2004; See also Platteau,1991; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing, 2002; 2003). That is not to say that markets themselves are unimportant. 
Synthesising a broad range of studies of market institutions in twelve countries in sub-
Saharan Africa based on empirical data and economic models, Fafchamps (2004) states: 
“Markets play a paramount role in Africa, arguably more so than in developed 
countries. The reason is the relative absence of large hierarchies and the weakness of 
those that are present...controlling for differences in the domain of gift exchange, 
markets play a much more important role than in developed economies” (Fafchamps, 
2004: 9). This relative absence of large hierarchies in both government and corporate 
sectors, and consequently weaknesses in contract enforcement, is also put forward in 
trying to explain the dependence on social networks in markets in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
2.7 Modelling Markets and Networks 
 
This section expands the discussion of New Institutional Economics to consider 
transactions costs approaches to modelling market participation in the context of 
smallholder farmer commercialisation, and explores the role of social interactions and 
informal institutions in responding to transactions costs and missing markets. 
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2.7.1 Smallholder crop market participation and transactions costs  
 
There can be poverty reduction benefits of enabling smallholder farmers, like those 
involved in this study, to develop their farming businesses and become more 
commercialised. One small but prominent seam of work examines smallholder farmer 
commercialisation within a transaction costs framework. This framework falls under the 
umbrella of New Institutional Economics (NIE), which uses the tools of economic 
theory to examine more social phenomena that normally fall outside the standard 
conception of „economics‟ (see Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 2000; North, 1990). 
NIE makes a distinction between organisations – firms, governments, groups and 
societies - and institutions – the rules of the game, comprising both formal laws and 
informal social norms governing behaviour at the individual and community level 
including economic and social interactions. NIE approaches social and economic 
analysis from the stance that institutions matter.  
 
Transaction costs are the costs of resources used to create, maintain, use and change 
institutions and organisations, for example costs of participating in the market process 
(Furubotn and Richter, 1997:40). At their simplest they can be defined as "costs other 
than price incurred in trading goods and services" (Swedberg, 1990:115), costs such as 
those involved in searching for  information, for example finding the best price or best 
candidate for a job. They can also be thought of as “the governance of contractual 
arrangements” (Williamson, 1979). They can be observable (explicit) costs or 
unobservable (implicit) costs. In the context of production, they are the costs of market 
exchange borne by the producer associated with, among other things: information about 
products, inputs and prices; bargaining; making, monitoring and enforcing contracts; 
screening costs; and transfer costs such as storage and transport. 
 
While rooted in the neoclassical economics of the Chicago school, NIE departs from the 
mainstream in important respects. One such departure is the key behavioural 
assumption of bounded rationality that lies at the heart of transaction cost economics. 
Bounded rationality posits that, rather than being optimising agents, people are 
"intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" (Simon, 1961: xxiv), optimising only locally 
at best. In practice, people cannot make perfectly rational decisions because they are 
limited by their cognitive ability in processing information and solving complex 
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problems (Williamson, 1985). This contrasts with the assumptions of the orthodox 
neoclassical view of rationality, focusing around optimising behaviour of individuals as 
rational actors who, in pursuing self-interest, maximise some objective function, for 
example utility or consumption, under constraints. While bounded rationality does not 
represent a wholly „socialised‟ view of economic actors, in implicitly recognising 
impacts of wider social context it does go some way towards acknowledging limitations 
of rationality (De Bruin and Dupuis, 1999). This makes the framework an obvious 
choice for exploring social-embeddedness of economic transactions. 
 
Empirically, that many households fail to participate in crop markets can be explained 
by transactions costs (see Hirschliefer 1973; de Janvry et al., 1991, among others).
20
 
Transaction costs can increase costs to a household of observing market information on 
which to base transaction decisions. They tend to reduce the net benefits of exchange 
because they affect returns to activities and potentially prices, which in turn influence 
traded output. They also shape the risk attitudes of farmers (Zaibet and Dunn, 1998), 
and can limit the participation of small-scale farmers in the market economy (Delgado, 
1997)
21
.   
 
Marketing constraints can increase transaction costs associated with market 
participation. High marketing costs in rural areas in particular are related to the physical 
aspects of transactions: transport, marketing, packaging, and handling. More remote 
smallholder farmers tend to face high transport costs due to distance from farm to 
market. Further, their transaction costs are also higher because of low volumes. This is 
exacerbated by poor or non-existent infrastructure and high marketing margins (due to 
monopoly power of traders/middle-men). Policies can also directly affect these costs, 
for example, those regulating traders or sectoral policies such as taxation of spare parts 
for trucks (Delgado, 1995). Incomplete and asymmetric information means that 
information is costly to acquire and use, poor information in turn increases risk and 
results in high search costs and costs of monitoring contracts (Zaibet and Dunn, 1998: 
833). Work by Pingali et al (2005) couches the transactions costs challenge faced by 
                                                     
20 For theoretical foundations of transaction costs see also Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995); 
Delgado (1991). 
21 Using a non-separable household model to simulate the effects of transactions costs on 
aggregate supply and demand and marketed surplus in generic African households, Minot 
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smallholder farmers in terms of a broad, agri-systems view of agricultural markets. The 
authors argue that a highly integrated, modern agri-food system with its demands in 
terms of  standards and contractual requirements, means potential market participants 
(smallholder farmers) are facing “a new set of transaction costs that emerge from 
dealing with a food system characterized by different rules, regulations, and players” 
(Pingali et al, 2005: 2). 
 
Combined with weak information flows and a weak institutional environment, 
marketing constraints can lead to smallholder farmers being locked in a vicious cycle: 
increased risks and transaction costs ultimately depress the level of economic activity 
because of investment and market failure, further raising transaction costs and risk of 
transaction failure, especially where markets are thin and risk and vulnerability are high 
– an „underdevelopment trap‟ (Dorward et al., 2004; Dorward, 1999). Market failures 
due to transaction costs can result in alternative institutional arrangements, for example 
sharecropping and interlocking markets (see Sadoulet et al., 1997; Bardhan, 1980; 
among others). Reciprocal (and barter) exchange is a widespread means of obtaining 
goods and services where markets are missing - but these arrangements can persist even 
when markets are present and assumed to be more efficient (Kranton, 1996).
22
 A 
transactions costs framework thus allows an examination of the kinds of institutions that 
minimise transactions costs in production and exchange. 
 
Empirical evidence on the role of transaction costs in making one household more 
commercially-oriented over another suggest conceptual and measurement difficulties. 
For example, if transaction costs are so high that the transaction does not take place then 
there is in effect no transaction cost, so how can it be measured? Do transaction costs of 
observed transactions differ from those that prohibit transactions? Other challenges 
include how to proxy for unobservable or unobserved transactions costs. (see Staal et al 
1997; Dorward, 1999). Developing country studies that have modelled smallholder crop 
market participation using household models within a transaction costs framework 
include: Goetz (1992) on coarse grain markets in Senegal, building on Strauss (1984) on 
the agricultural household market surplus decision in West Africa; Key et al (2000) on 
                                                                                                                                                           
(1999) finds that transaction costs reduce marketed surplus as well as supply and demand 
elasticities. 
22 See Delgado, (1999); Binswanger and Rosenzweig, (1986); Timmer, (1997) for further 
discussion of alternative institutional arrangements. 
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Mexican corn producers; Heltberg and Tarp (2002) on agricultural supply response in 
Mozambique; and Bellemare and Barrett (2006) on livestock markets in Kenya and 
Ethiopia. Also in Ethiopia, Gabre-Madhin (2001) models the effect of transaction costs 
on choice of grain brokers. Farm household specialisation and diversification decisions 
- food crops versus cash crops – in the presence of transaction costs are considered in 
Omamo (1998a). In a separate paper, Omamo (1998b) explores transport costs in 
smallholder choice of crops (cotton versus maize or sorghum) using a nonseparable 
household model on Kenyan smallholder data.
23
  
 
Using farm household data from South-Eastern Senegal (142 households across 12 
villages), Goetz (1992), models the discrete decision whether or not to participate in 
coarse grain markets separately from the decision of how much to buy or sell. The latter 
is modelled as being conditional on participation using a selection model. This builds on 
Strauss‟ (1984) model of market surplus decisions by farming households in West 
Africa. In the Goetz model, transactions costs are proxied by: information (a regional 
dummy to reflect differential costs in gathering information), poor access (market 
distance), cart ownership and two interaction terms of the information variable with 
access and cart ownership respectively. Also included are variables theoretically 
expected to affect degree of participation, including prices and household demographic 
characteristics. While the estimation considers and corrects for selectivity bias, other 
forms of potential endogeneity in the regressors are not addressed. Results suggest that 
better information increases the probability that a farmer will participate in markets. 
Degree of participation is associated with access to technology. 
 
Goetz‟ model has been built on by Key et al (2000), and Heltberg and Tarp (2002), who 
make a distinction between fixed and variable (or proportional) transactions costs (FTCs 
and VTCs respectively).
24
 As discussed later in Chapter 5, this allows identification of 
the first stage equation in a two-stage sample selection model by excluding fixed 
transaction costs from the „outcome‟ equation of the decision of how much to sell (or 
                                                     
23
 There is also a cluster of work focusing on milk marketing, particularly smallholder dairying 
in Ethiopia and Kenya and the role of cooperatives in reducing transactions costs by Staal et al 
(1997); Holloway et al (2000; 2004). 
24 By contrast, Bellemare and Barrett (2006), model crop market participation using 
determinants termed “fixed and variable costs of market participation” rather than explicitly 
using a transactions costs framework. The motivation behind their work is to examine whether 
56 
 
 
 
buy), because they are thought to represent fixed costs of access to markets and market 
information and thus invariant to the quantity of the good traded: “Once in the market 
supply is not affected by the FTCs because only the marginal return to production 
affects production decisions” (Key et al, 2000: 249). The different authors acknowledge 
on the whole that both fixed and variable transactions costs are unobservable but can be 
explained as a “function of observable exogenous characteristics…that affect these costs 
when selling and buying respectively” (Key et al., 2000: 247). Both FTCs and VTCs are 
therefore proxied by factors that explain these costs. All regressors are assumed to be 
exogenous. Table 2.1 summarises the way relevant studies of smallholder farmer 
commercialisation have measured or proxied for transaction costs. 
 
Table 2.1 Transaction Cost Measures in Studies of Smallholder Commercialisation 
Author/ Year Title Dependent 
Variable 
(commercialisation 
outcome) 
Commercialisation Determinants 
Heltberg and 
Tarp (2002) 
Agricultural Supply 
Response and 
Poverty in 
Mozambique 
Sells/ does not sell; 
amount marketed, 
aggregate value 
a) total sales 
b) food crops 
c) cash 
crops 
Fixed Transaction Costs (selection only): 
Ownership of radio/TV/phone 
Max education level of HH Head 
District population density 
Variable Transaction Costs (selection and 
outcome): 
Prices of maize and groundnuts 
Farm size per worker 
Dependency ratio 
Log number of trees 
Traction ownership dummy 
Log age of hh head 
Any member with a paid job 
Log mean maize yield in province 
Dummy for risky area 
Regional dummies 
Transport dummies 
Log distance from railway station 
Log distance from provincial capital 
Goetz (1992) A Selectivity Model 
of Household Food 
Marketing 
Behaviour in sub-
Saharan Africa 
Sells/ does not sell;  
amount sold 
(production minus 
consumption) 
Fixed Transaction Costs (selection only): 
Information 
Poor access 
Cart ownership 
Information interacted with access 
Information interacted with cart ownership 
Variable Transaction Costs (selection, outcome) 
Prices of coarse grains and rice 
Equipment owner 
Transformation technology 
Ethnicity 
Number of persons in HH 
Dependency ratio 
Age of household head 
                                                                                                                                                           
the market participation decision is joint or sequential. The thesis returns to this issue in Chapter 
5. 
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Author/ Year Title Dependent 
Variable 
(commercialisation 
outcome) 
Commercialisation Determinants 
Bellemare and 
Barrett (2006) 
An ordered tobit 
model of market 
participation. 
Evidence from 
Kenya and Ethiopia 
Volumes bought 
and sold: Net seller 
(positive net sales) 
cf net buyer 
(negative net sales) 
cf autarkic (net 
sales zero) 
Gender and age and age-sq of household head 
Household size 
Dependency ratio 
Assets 
Land 
Income 
Herd size 
% female Tropical livestock units 
males, females tropical  livestock units 
Log of average prices large and small livestock 
Animal births 
Key, Sadoulet 
and de Janvry 
(2000) 
Transactions Costs 
and Agricultural 
Household Supply 
Response 
Volume bought and 
sold of corn 
Variables appear as Proportional Transaction 
Costs in the production equation and Fixed 
Transaction Costs  in the threshold equation:  
Crop transport costs 
Distance to/from market 
Sells to/ buys from official source 
Sells to customer/ buys from grower 
Owns truck 
Local member of agric or transport organisation 
Consumption shifters (in production and 
threshold equations): 
Household calorie demand 
Predicted HH income 
Production shifters (in production and threshold 
equations): 
Price 
HH Head age over 55 
Crop and pasture land (ha) 
Uses local HYV 
Uses chemical pesticides or nat/ chem fertilisers 
Level of mechanisation 
Access to formal credit 
Access to common property 
Livestock Assets index 
Heltberg 
(2001 mimeo) 
Commercialisation 
and specialisation 
in Mozambican 
Agriculture 
Value of: 
Food crop sales 
Cash crop sales 
Total crop sales 
 
Fixed Transaction Costs (selection equation): 
Literacy of household head 
Maximum education 
District population densities 
Variable Transaction Costs (selection and 
outcome): 
Transport and market access: dummies for: 
transport; village sells to shop; village sells to 
trader 
Household characteristics (selection and 
outcome): 
Family size 
HHH age 
Amount of land cultivated (ha) 
Stock of animals owned 
Number of trees on farm 
Number of different agricultural tools owned 
Area characteristics (selection and outcome): 
Market prices 
Median yield of maize 
Flood/ drought dummy; Regions 
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Drawing on the work summarised in Table 2.1, proxies for Fixed Transactions Costs 
could include: 
- Education/ literacy (as a proxy for ability to interpret and use information) 
- Ownership of radio/TV/phone (as a proxy for access to/availability of information) 
- Ownership of cart, bicycle, other transport 
- Poor market access (for example road condition, proximity of market) 
- Local membership of agricultural organisation  
- Regional dummy (to capture production risk at local level) 
- Whether producer sells to shops, traders, other intermediaries or directly to 
consumers (to proxy for search and screening costs) 
 
Proxies for Variable Transactions Costs include: 
- Assets: Farm size; equipment; stock of animals owned; number of tools owned 
- Prices 
- Household dependency ratio 
- Traction ownership 
- Transport availability 
- Whether or not any household member has a paid job 
- Location (for example household distance to railway or road) 
- Input usage; access to and use of technology 
 
There are potentially overlaps between fixed and variable transactions costs, for 
example, ownership of a cart, bicycle, or other transport could also proxy for 
transportation costs, especially where farmers transport crops themselves. These costs 
are variable transaction costs because transportation costs depend on volumes 
transported – farmers usually pay a fixed amount per sack to traders. 
 
Modelling Mexican household corn market supply, Key et al. (2000) find that farmers 
selling to an official source and those located in a region with high participation in 
farmer organisations have lower proportional transactions cost and higher output. 
Significant and positive determinants of crop supply include higher “local” usage of 
High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) and mechanisation (as opposed to household usage), 
access to formal credit and prices. Results suggest that lowering transaction costs by 
promoting marketing organisations and improving crop transportation would increase 
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both market participation and participants‟ production volumes. In terms of 
methodology, Key et al.‟s analysis also suggests that the household decision whether or 
not to participate in markets should be modelled separately from level of participation 
(volume of crop sales) as some households will decide not to produce for markets given 
fixed costs of market participation. 
 
Focusing only on the supply side using a Heckman model, Heltberg and Tarp (2002) 
model farmers‟ crop marketing decisions in rural Mozambique. Results of their 
estimation for all crops (both food and cash) combined suggest that transport ownership, 
as a proxy for variable transaction costs, is significant and positively related to both the 
decision to participate and value of sales. However, the authors do acknowledge that the 
relationship between transport and participation is likely to be endogenous – causality 
could run in either direction. VTCs are also proxied by distance to railway which is also 
significant and negative as would be expected, as is the other proxy for VTCs, distance 
to provincial capital. This is likely to be because the closer one is to the provincial 
capital the greater the opportunity for and likelihood of pursuing non-farm activities and 
the less a household needs to rely on farming. Fixed Transaction Costs, thought only to 
affect the decision whether or not to sell, and not sales volume, are proxied by 
ownership of radio, TV or telephone (information access – significant and positive, 
though potentially endogenous) maximum education level of household head (ability to 
process information – not significant) and district population density (density of 
information and marketing networks – not significant). The mixed results mean that 
overall the authors do not find these variables to be convincing.  
 
To summarise, transactions costs typically arise in smallholder farming in sub-Saharan 
Africa because of imperfections in markets combined with differential household access 
to information, assets and networks. When these costs prove to be so high as to preclude 
market participation, markets are said to be „missing‟. The discussion thus far suggests 
that to participate effectively in markets, smallholder farmers need to be able to 
overcome constraints due to market imperfections and/or keep transaction costs to a 
minimum. The next section explores the role of social interactions and informal 
institutions in responding to transactions costs and missing markets. 
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2.7.2 Social Networks and Commercialisation 
 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that markets in rural sub-Saharan Africa are 
not necessarily competitive and do not solely consist of “arms-length exchange 
mediated by prices” (Rauch and Hamilton, 2001: 2). Instead, “a complex blend of 
informal and formal institutions” underlies market activities (World Bank, 2002: 179; 
North, 1995). Much exchange is personalised, operating through networks, and these 
links between people or organisations can be central to decisions around participation in 
markets. Importantly, they often prove to be crucial in mediating access to resources 
and economic opportunities for people operating in economies characterised by cash 
and credit constraints and where very many people are poor with few or no assets and 
limited access to markets. These informal institutions, based on social norms and 
networks, are, for some, central in making market transactions possible, especially for 
poor people without formal alternatives, in that they potentially lower transaction costs 
that act as barriers to participation. 
 
Returning to the transaction costs framework, two distinct though related ways of 
looking at transactions costs in economic analysis can be identified. One posits that an 
institution‟s role is to reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1985); the other that 
institutions substitute for missing markets when there is imperfect information (Akerlof, 
1970; Stiglitz on sharecropping/ rural organisation: 1974; 1986; 1989). So, 
conceptually, there are two reasons why institutions, which include social networks, are 
important in market exchange. There is clear theoretical support for the role played by 
repeated social interactions in reducing transactions costs, solving free-rider problems 
and curbing opportunistic behaviour. Social networks potentially offer a buffer against 
risk in markets and provide direct assistance in the form of access to transport, storage, 
information and potentially better terms of trade through relationships with actors in 
marketing chains. In the absence of formal markets, barter and cash exchange through 
social networks can provide direct access to goods and services. 
 
Social networks can also potentially have negative economic consequences. Obligations 
towards family, kin and friends may lead to decisions that are not rational in an 
economic sense, leading to low-level equilibrium traps. The tendency for more 
successful households to support the households of family and kin who are less 
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successful, for example through fostering, while potentially increasing access to labour 
for the fostering household can also increase dependency ratios, household expenditures 
etc, thus having on balance a negative effect for the household in an economic sense. 
During fieldwork in the study sites one such „successful‟ household certainly described 
just this situation: “You would expect us to be top in this community but we‟re not, 
we‟re more in the middle because we have extra people in our household now, and other 
people in the community expect me to help them”. Other potential negative externalities 
of social networks/ social capital highlighted in the literature include: fostering crime, 
behaviour detrimental to health, educational underachievement; social exclusion; 
barriers to social mobility (see also: Portes, 1996; Fine, 1999; Carroll and Stanfield, 
2003; Torpe, 2003; diFalco and Bülte, 2011). 
 
There are many examples in sub-Saharan Africa of the role networks play in sharing 
market information and lowering riskiness of transactions. Studies explicitly bringing 
social capital into market decision-making include decisions to use grain brokers by 
traders in Ethiopia (Gabre-Madhin, 2001) and social capital as a contract enforcement 
mechanism for traders in Malagasy flea market (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). 
Anthropological studies of communities in the same geographical area and of the same 
ethnic grouping dominating the study sites in this research describe the importance of 
informal institutions in market exchange. Audrey Richards‟ (1939) classic study of the 
Bemba Tribe in Northern Zambia observes: “In Bemba society economic transactions 
are based on a system of personal relationships – ties of kinship or political status” 
(1939: 226). The social relations of production and consumption behaviour of Bemba 
people in Northern Province have been „revisited‟ by Moore and Vaughan (1994), and 
finds similar patterns.  During fieldwork in the survey communities, the significance of 
social interaction and group participation in exchange relationships was evident. 
People‟s lives and economic decisions are embedded in relationships that can be mutual 
or one-way. Activities such as trading, job search and the hiring of individuals and 
group labour operate through many formal and informal channels within the 
communities. These include women‟s groups, resource maintenance groups, co-
operatives and the Church. 
 
The research hypothesises that one way social networks may relate to 
commercialisation is in helping to reduce transaction costs, both fixed and variable, 
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facilitating market access for some farmers. This could be through providing important 
sources of information, or through increasing trust thereby easing transactions and 
lowering supervision costs. Social networks are analysed in relation to proxies for 
transactions costs in Section 5.5.2 of Chapter 5. Further, do the characteristics of an 
individual or household‟s social networks help to explain whether and to what extent 
smallholder farmers participate in crop markets? While it is not difficult to establish a 
relationship or correlations between market participation and social networks 
characteristics of smallholder farmers, causal channels are less straightforward. 
Important, too, are the roles social networks potentially play in economic life in the 
absence of more “formal” institutions that would usually provide information and 
services. When considered in terms of transaction costs, market failure can be seen to be 
household- rather than commodity- specific (de Janvry et al, 1991: 140). The tendency 
towards a high degree of homogeneity between households in close geographical 
proximity raises questions, which the research attempts to address, of how some 
households in a particular location can access (better) markets than their neighbours. 
 
 
To conclude, this chapter has summarised attempts in economics to characterise the 
social domain in relation to socio-economic outcomes and address what Granovetter has 
termed the „undersocialised concept of man‟. The literature on social capital represents 
the bulk of these endeavours and the concept is ubiquitous across the social sciences. 
However, its ubiquity also contributes to one of its major failings: lack of conceptual 
clarity, manifested in the way research often confounds what social capital is with what 
it does. This creates problems for robust analytical work. Social networks analysis, and 
studies that conceptualise social capital within a networks approach, may offer an 
alternative.  
 
A social network analytical approach allows features of the institutional environment, 
not just „capital‟ aspects of social networks, to be captured. In this way the network is 
viewed not only as something an actor uses but also something they experience. Social 
network analysis provides a set of tools for measuring features of social networks and 
constructing social networks variables to allow analysis of specific social components. 
This enables examination of interactions, transactions and exchanges themselves, as 
well as the attributes of the different actors and the relations between them. In this way 
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one can uncover how network structures can both provide opportunities and act as 
sources of constraints. A transactions costs approach to modelling commercialisation 
offers a conceptual framework that allows incorporation of the social context into the 
analysis. 
 
The research will define the social context in terms of social networks of individuals, 
and the institutional context within which these networks are embedded. 
Anthropological and qualitative data are used to provide insights into individual‟s 
choices, which goes some way towards being able to set up a „causal notion of the 
social context‟ (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). 
 
......................... 
 
The next chapter describes the rationale for the household survey approach, design of 
the survey instruments and details of the field research methods. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Data Collection Methods 
 
 
The fieldwork for the thesis research took place over three periods totalling four months 
between March 2002 and May 2003, including a preliminary field visit. The study sites 
are three villages in Northern Province, Zambia. Individual, household, group and 
community level data were collected, including social networks data, using a 
combination of methods and instruments. It was an ambitious exercise, requiring 
considerable resources and time. However, interpretation of the quantitative social 
networks data analysis would not be possible without the deeper, contextual information 
provided by qualitative research. My role in the fieldwork was in research design, 
supervising the household survey, and supervising and carrying out qualitative research 
with the assistance of a translator. 
 
This chapter describes methods and methodological approaches used in the research 
design and data collection, first setting out how the study sites were selected and why 
(Section 3.1) and ethical considerations in undertaking such a study (Section 3.2). 
Section 3.3 explains the rationale behind taking a mixed methods (quantitative and 
qualitative) approach to the research and in particular in collecting the data. Section 3.4 
describes the design of the household survey including special modules to collect social 
networks data, and qualitative instruments. Data collection procedures are explained in 
Section 3.5, followed by a section on managing a complicated, multi-layered dataset, 
including data entry and data cleaning (Section 3.6). The chapter concludes with 
methodological challenges (Section 3.7). 
 
 
3.1 Study Site Selection 
 
Three sites were selected during a preliminary visit to Northern Province during March 
2002. Table 3.1 gives a summary of the survey sites. To capture diversity between sites, 
two villages
25
 were chosen purposively according to differing degrees of market 
integration, proxied by distance from graded road: one with „good‟ and one with „poor‟ 
                                                     
25
 „Village‟ is defined as the population under an individual headman. 
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market access. The third site was a resettlement scheme, with intermediate market 
access.  
 
Table 3.1 Survey sites 
Study Site Estimated 
Population  
Total No of 
Households 
Distance from 
tarmac (km) 
Distance from 
Kasama (km) 
Kabila  1600 200 80 87 
Ngulula  670 100 1 25 
Lufubu 480 65 200 200 
Source: Fieldwork, Northern Province, Zambia, 2002-2003 
 
The main disadvantage of sampling in this way is lower precision of sampling 
estimates, the sample is less representative of the population as a whole compared with 
random sampling. However, it was never the intention to obtain a sample representative 
of Zambia as a whole, rather to focus on ensuring the sample was representative of the 
population of smallholder farmers. Households were randomly sampled within villages 
in the case of Ngulula and Kabila, and full enumeration was attempted in Lufubu. The 
sample of households can thus be said to be representative of the village, or type of 
village („good‟, „intermediate‟, „poor‟ market access) from which they are drawn. The 
village was chosen as the „bounded‟ population because most labour-related 
transactions and social interactions are carried out at this level and as an administrative 
unit is an important focal point for social and political institutions. Confining the sample 
area to a single province meant that ethnicity was held constant to a very large extent. 
Bemba is the predominant tribal group in all three sites. It was also necessary from a 
cost point of view given the low population densities and large distances involved in 
working in a country the size of Zambia. 
 
Ngulula village, close to the provincial capital Kasama, was chosen as the site with 
good market access. It is located close to a graded road and noted for its relatively high 
degree of integration in the market. Of the range of villages visited, Philip Village, 
situated 300km from Kasama either side of the tarmac road and comprising 180 
households, was also considered as a potential study site with good market access. 
However, in this case proximity to the road is not an indication of market access. While 
Phillip Village is situated close to the tarmac it is distant from any markets and the 
population faces similar logistical and transport problems to communities situated off 
the main roads. Kabila village was selected as the site with little or no market access. It 
is located some 80km from a graded road and from „large‟ population centres and could 
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only be accessed by a 30km feeder road. Bulunda village, 60km from Kasama with two 
hundred households, was also considered as a possibility for the study site with little 
market access but compared with Kabila village it was decided that Bulunda was not 
remote enough and part of the village was reached by feeder road of average quality at 
the time of the visit. 
 
A resettlement scheme was selected as the third study site, with intermediate market 
access. It was also chosen for its interesting social set-up, with the implication that it 
was likely to be different from a traditional village in the way social networks are 
characterised because people were more likely to originate from different areas and less 
likely to be living in close proximity to kin. It could be hypothesised that within-
community kinship ties would be much weaker here compared with so-called „typical‟ 
villages, but also interesting is whether or not the same types of social and power 
relations and interactions are established once removed from the „traditional‟ setting. 
Out of a total of eight Rural Reconstruction Centres in Northern Province, two schemes 
were visited: Lufubu Resettlement Scheme and Lukulu South Resettlement Scheme. 
The latter was 28km from Kasama with 180 households in all. Many of the plots were 
owned by people working in the civil service and based in Kasama and farmed by full-
time managers. The inaccessibility of schools and other amenities meant that it was 
difficult for families to settle here so plot managers tended not to have families. It was 
decided that Lufubu Resettlement Scheme would be more suitable as a study site – it 
was smaller and appeared to have more characteristics of a „village‟. Lufubu has 
restricted access to markets for produce and is situated 40km away from the nearest 
town, and relative to Kabila and Ngulula has intermediate market access. 
 
 
3.2 Ethical Considerations 
 
There are many stages in the fieldwork process where one is in danger of making 
„ethical‟ transgressions. First, when entering the field there is a possibility of 
misrepresenting oneself and the research and generally misleading people in the study 
communities, whether intentionally or unintentionally. While working in the field, 
exploitation of respondents is very possible – engaging people in interviews that take an 
inordinate amount of time without giving them the opportunity to decline or coercing 
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people into taking part when really they do not want to. Finally, when exiting field it is 
possible to leave in „bad grace‟ – without thanking the communities or keeping them 
generally informed, for example what the next stages of the research are or what the 
research team is going to do with their personal information. Linked to this is the 
overarching issue of maintaining confidentiality. People will generally have agreed to 
participate in the research and provide personal information on a basis of trust that this 
information will not be used to their detriment.  
 
The research was considered to be „low risk‟. This includes: level of vulnerability of 
participants; the potential for inducing stress of any kind in participants or generating 
other negative consequences
26
.  A strict protocol was also followed during both rounds 
of the fieldwork. On entering the communities meetings were convened with 
community members with a policy of inclusiveness – everybody in the community was 
invited to attend and participate. The intentions of the research were not concealed, 
research affiliations were declared and care was taken not to make promises that could 
or would not be kept. The research process was explained very carefully, community 
members were assured that they were under no obligation whatsoever to participate and 
questions were invited from community members that the research team endeavoured to 
respond to. During the fieldwork itself, prior to interviews for both the household 
survey and the qualitative group and individual interviews the objectives of the research 
were reiterated to ensure that participants were fully informed, and they were given the 
opportunity once again to ask questions and/or decline to participate. Demand on 
participants‟ time was kept as low as possible and reimbursement was provided at the 
end of lengthy interviews in the form of bags of salt or bars of soap – goods that people 
need and value but often find difficult to access through lack of cash or goods to 
exchange them or inability to get to a shop. Respondents chose the time and location of 
interviews. There was no coercion on the part of the interviewer and the individuals‟ 
right not to participate was respected, although there were no refusals to take part. The 
research was conducted with the assurance of absolute confidentiality and data are 
anonymised in the analysis and presentation of results 
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 See http://www.sussex.ac.uk/res/documents/application_form_for_ethical_review.doc for the 
Sussex Ethics Committee‟s seven-point checklist for risk-level of research projects. 
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3.3 The Need for a Mixed-Method Approach 
 
This section sets out in more detail the choice of fieldwork methods, focusing on the 
qualitative and quantitative traditions, highlighting their philosophical foundations and 
the advantages and drawbacks of each. Combined methods approaches are discussed, 
and the rationale behind the choice of methodological framework for the thesis research. 
 
3.3.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Traditions 
 
Traditionally, social science research methods have been divided into two approaches, 
quantitative and qualitative, often seen as being diametrically opposed to each other. A 
quantitative approach, as defined by Carvalho and White (1997) is „one that typically 
uses random sample surveys and structured interviews to collect the data – mainly 
quantifiable data – and analyzes it (sic) using statistical techniques‟ (1997: 1). An 
explicit conceptual framework and hypotheses are usually constructed and key variables 
identified at the outset of the research. The data collected are then used to test these 
predetermined hypotheses. The quantitative approach is associated with the logical 
positivist paradigm. 
 
By contrast, a qualitative approach „use(s) purposive sampling and semi-structured or 
interactive interviews to collect the data – mainly, data relating to people‟s judgements, 
attitudes, preferences, priorities, and/or perceptions about a subject‟, (Carvalho and 
White, 1997: 1). The data are then analysed using social or anthropological research 
techniques. This definition of qualitative data can be widened to encompass textual and 
visual data generated by interviews and observations and derived from documents, 
records and other secondary sources. The focus of qualitative data collection methods is 
on understanding a situation holistically and data tend to be generated through intensive 
(often repeated) encounters with a small number of people in their natural setting. Many 
different research traditions have utilised and developed qualitative approaches, giving 
rise to substantial heterogeneity in collection methods and analysis and consequently no 
single, „right‟ way to do qualitative research. Qualitative research is by its nature mixed-
method in focus and has been described as „bricolage‟ – „a pieced-together, close-knit 
set of practices that provide solutions to a problem in a concrete situation‟ (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998:3). Qualitative methods are associated with interpretivist and 
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constructivist traditions that emerged as counter-movements to positivism. The main 
characteristics of each approach are summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Main features of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
Characteristics Quantitative Approach Qualitative Approach 
Theoretical 
Paradigms and 
Perspectives 
Logical Postivitism Phenomenological/ Post-postivist/ postmodern/ 
Constructivism/ Interpretivism/ Naturalism 
Methods of data 
collection 
Structured, formal, pre-designed 
questionnaire 
Open-ended, semi-structured, participant-
observation, ethnography 
Perspective Objective Subjective 
Sampling Probability Purposive 
Sampling error Less sampling error, prone to more non-
sampling error 
More sampling error, tends to reduce non-
sampling error 
Sampling size Large Small 
Geographic coverage Wide Narrow 
Analysis Deductive/ hypothetico Inductive 
Statistical Analysis Important part of approach Plays little or no part. Simultaneous use of several 
different sources and methods (triangulation) to 
validate findings. Some systematic content 
analysis and gradual aggregation of data based 
on themes emerging from research 
Source: Builds on Denzin and Lincoln (1998); Carvalho and White (1997).  
 
 
Describing differences between qualitative and quantitative methods according to types 
of data and the way they are collected, however, risks reinforcing a false dichotomy. 
First, both paradigms set out to collect data for a specified purpose. Further, data 
collected through surveys are not necessarily quantifiable and surveys have been used to 
elicit information traditionally thought of as being of a „qualitative‟ nature (see: Sharp et 
al., 2003, study of destitution in Ethiopia for an example; Chambers 2003a for a review 
of studies that incorporate „qualitative‟ questions into „quantitative‟ surveys). Similarly, 
qualitative methods can be used to collect quantifiable data, for example it is customary 
to code qualitative data for themes, which may then either be interpreted qualitatively or 
translated into quantitative data and analysed statistically, although this may not be 
desirable. One study using participatory methods including participatory mapping has 
generated statistics (population estimates for Malawi, estimates of „very food insecure‟ 
people in a population and the proportion of people who should be targeted) from a 
representative sample that are generalisable (Barahona and Levy, 2003). Study design 
incorporated statistical principles and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)-type tools 
were adapted to allow standardisation and comparability of data produced across sites. 
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3.3.2 Tensions between quantitative and qualitative approaches 
 
Potential conflicts lie in the basic philosophical underpinnings of each approach. At the 
philosophical level there are fundamental differences based on the „assumptions each 
method typically makes about the nature of reality‟ (Christiaensen, 2003: 114), and in 
the tension between regarding people as passive objects of study versus taking a 
phenomenological approach (see Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The logical positivist paradigm 
assumes there exists one „single, external reality‟, with the implication that it makes no 
difference who makes observation or how it is made. To capture this single reality as 
closely as possible researchers need „to increase the likelihood of achieving unbiased, 
objective answers to research questions‟ (Christiaensen, 2003: 114), hence the reliance 
on statistical principles in study design and structure - for representativeness and 
generalisability of results for the population under study -and on standardisation and 
quantification in data collection - to solve problems of bias and variability in 
interviewer-interviewee interaction. 
 
Interpretivist and constructivist traditions differ from the positivist paradigm in many 
ways
27
 but in particular they do not support the premise of a single, objective „reality‟. 
The starting point is the „recognition of a multitude of realities and the belief that 
objectivity and a value-free science are simply impossible‟ (Christiaensen, 2003). 
Instead, understanding social phenomena is based on social actors‟ own perspectives 
and the important „reality‟ („realities‟) is that (are those) perceived by the social actor. 
Semi-or unstructured, exploratory data-collection methods are used to involve multiple 
stakeholders to uncover multiple perspectives and meaning to understand contextually 
the topic of interest, and reality is constructed by the values and experiences of the 
individuals involved in the research. In the constructivist tradition the analyst goes one 
step further and „seeks to bring about change and empowerment of the stakeholders in 
the process‟ (Christiaensen, 2003: 115). 
 
The philosophical divide is used as an argument against combining approaches, based 
on the belief that the two methods are founded on incompatible assumptions and 
therefore cannot logically be used together (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985, and Cook and 
Reichardt, 1979, for extensive reviews of the paradigms debate).  In practice, while the 
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choice of methods tends to be based on the researcher‟s own philosophy and 
assumptions, as well as the research problem, only at the extremes will the two 
approaches be „incompatible‟, and can be summed up as „dichotomies of objectivity 
versus subjectivity, fixed versus emergent categories, outsider versus insider 
perspectives, facts versus values, explanation versus understanding and single versus 
multiple realities (Christiaensen 2003, citing House, 1994). 
 
3.3.3 Combined methods – transcending the tensions 
 
While most discussions of the philosophies behind different methods reinforce the 
dichotomy between quantitative/positivist „one reality‟ versus the multiple realities 
revealed through taking a „qualitative‟ approach, I would argue that it is not necessary 
or even desirable for a survey to be designed and conducted strictly in the „positivist‟ 
tradition to retain all the qualities of a quantitative approach. In survey design, more 
contextual/ qualitative material can inform the content and wording of questions, which 
can also be designed to allow for greater flexibility in responses than clearly-defined 
pre-coded categories. In incorporating an „other‟ code to record responses that do not 
fall within those specified by the pre-coded system, with space to note the exact 
response for coding later, the questionnaire is able to capture elements not previously 
considered by the researcher, allowing for surprises. This goes some way towards 
capturing multiple realities and does not necessarily commit the research to the 
worldview set out in the pre-coded questionnaire led by the conceptual framework. 
 
The degree to which a researcher is confined to imposing one world view through use of 
a pre-coded survey depends on flexibility in the field and also what has informed the 
research/ conceptual framework. Survey questionnaires can be and often are designed 
based on contextual information gathered from a variety of sources including those 
based on knowledge garnered through qualitative routes. However, the questions 
themselves are still predetermined with limited scope to change them in the field. In this 
respect surveys do impose a view of the world from the outset in that the set of 
questions is specified by framework chosen and the wording of questions is fixed from 
the start according to pre-identified variables necessary for testing hypotheses and 
modelling relationships. A flexible approach in the field can allow for modification 
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 See Guba and Lincoln (1989) for comparison of dominant research paradigms. 
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across the board if, from experience, there prove to be better ways of posing questions 
and eliciting responses. That said, there is little scope for allowing the research objects 
or variables to define the direction of the research. Questions are generally formulated 
with hypotheses in mind. If, in the course of fieldwork, a hypothesis proves to be 
untenable or if relevant issues arise that are not accounted for in the survey, then 
questions posed will not gather data on phenomena of potential interest, even though the 
researcher is aware of them. 
 
Nevertheless, the „qualitative-quantitative‟ distinction is an important one, in that it 
leads to the question of whether or not a researcher‟s paradigmatic views drive or 
predetermine the set of research methods chosen. This is partly so – as well as differing 
underlying assumption about the nature of reality, each paradigm makes implicit 
assumptions about the best way to reveal that reality (or realities) and „formulate 
knowledge about it‟ (Christiaensen, 2003: 114). Further: 
 
„… in using a particular methodological family to explore the subject of interest one 
also tends to imply certain ontological assumptions about that reality. In this sense the 
methodological debate is as much about the kind of reality that we want to discover as it 
is about methodology. This does not imply that both methods cannot be combined, but 
rather that the manner and the extent to which we use and combine both methods will 
affect the realities we discover.‟ 
(Christiaensen, 2003: 115) 
 
Equally, it has been argued that all research paradigms are valid and none are inherently 
linked to methods that have been labelled „qualitative‟ or „quantitative‟, a view 
defended by those who believe that epistemological issues should be separate from 
those of method (see Reichardt and Cook, 1979; Bryman, 1984). While paradigms are 
„important theoretical constructs for illuminating fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of reality‟ (Patton, 1990; 39), at the practical level it may be more useful to 
consider the different approaches as research strategies rather than paradigms and  use 
the method that best answers the research questions. Favouring „situational 
responsiveness‟ over an allegiance to one paradigm or another means that „there aren‟t 
just two paradigm-dictated choices‟ but different methods appropriate for different 
situations (Patton, 1990: 39). In taking this view, it is clear that qualitative and 
quantitative methods are not necessarily antithetical to each other, nor are they 
competing, irreconcilable ways of approaching research and, as discussed later in this 
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chapter, there is considerable scope for using a combination of techniques in designing 
studies, data collection and analysis. It is hoped that this research will demonstrate this. 
 
3.3.4 Integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches 
 
The „desirability and usefulness‟ (Hentschel, 2003: 20) of combining approaches has 
been acknowledged across the social sciences (see Carvalho and White, 1997; White, 
2002; Kanbur ed., 2003; Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991) and the limits of taking a purely 
qualitative or purely quantitative approach have been long recognised – e.g. World 
Bank poverty measurement and analysis. Depending on the questions being asked the 
two approaches can be combined to make „powerful and relevant analyses‟. The 
complementarities and tensions between the approaches have been highlighted in a 
collection of writings by participants of the workshop “Qualitative and Quantitative 
Poverty Appraisal: Complementarities, Tensions and the Way Forward” (Q-Squared) 
held at Cornell University in March 2001 (Kanbur, ed., 2003). How can combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods improve the quality of research, retaining the 
strengths of the two approaches and strengthening each further by utilising the results 
and insights of the other?  
 
At the analysis stage, triangulation can be used to increase the internal validity of 
findings. This means using several data collection methods to assess whether any given 
finding is „authentic‟. The weaknesses and limitations of respective methods may be 
offset by the strengths of others, thus exploiting the advantages of each approach while 
vitiating potential drawbacks. Table 3.3 sets out the relative strengths and weaknesses 
inherent in qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
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Table 3.3  Strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative methods 
Quantitative 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Sampling allows aggregation of the data; able 
to generalise, test hypotheses. 
Representativeness of the data. 
 Breadth – usually able to collect data from 
many respondents with respect to well-defined 
questions. Strives to be unbiased, reliable and 
rational 
Data can be used in models to simulate effects 
of policy options 
 Difficult to capture multiple realities, approach 
lacks depth and richness (Patton 1990; Lincoln 
and Guba 1985). 
 Relative lack of bias is arguable: there are 
biases, tend to be hidden – starting with the 
underlying assumptions. Questionnaire makes 
assumptions at the outset Biases can also 
arise in selection of indices and later in 
interpretation of data. 
 Sampling and non-sampling errors 
 Can miss what is not easily quanitifiable 
 Failure to capture Intra-household dynamic 
Qualitative 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Data more detailed, descriptive and highly 
contextual. Richer definitions, data cover wider 
dimensions and some analysis is carried out 
by the respondents themselves. 
 Multiple interpretations of reality = refrains from 
a priori assumptions 
 Allows important dimensions of a topic to 
emerge during data collection or analysis 
(does not preclude hypothesis testing, or 
qualitative analysis in deductive framework). 
Easier to incorporate ‘surprises’ into the data 
gathering process 
 Explains causal processes 
 Accuracy and depth of information. 
 Unrepresentative participation and tendency 
for dominant groups and individuals only to 
participate, missing out those more 
marginalised etc, agenda-framing  
 Selection of sites too few or too atypical – 
inability to generalise beyond the research 
area/ study sites28  
 Can be difficult to aggregate data and make 
systematic comparisons 
 Inaccuracies and biases inherent in 
respondents telling researchers what they 
think they want to hear. 
 Success in data-collection dependent to some 
degree on the personal attributes and skills of 
the researcher. Risk that the researcher 
influences (partially predetermines) the 
responses through pre-selection of questions 
and through being actively engaged in the 
interviewing process. 
Source: Builds on Chambers (2003b); Carvalho and White (1997).  
 
That each method has its own strengths, which can counteract weaknesses in other 
methods, also gives an indication of how the methods could be integrated. Qualitative 
methods may counter or go some way towards overcoming the „pitfalls of simplistic 
econometric approaches in uncovering causality‟ (Kanbur, 2003: 11). At a more prosaic 
level, knowledge garnered during qualitative research can be used to test semantics and 
concepts, ensuring clarity in questions and terms used in the survey. Data collection and 
                                                     
28
 There is a philosophically grounded set of arguments for generalisability and reliability in 
qualitative methods and techniques for handling qualitative data and hence methods of arriving 
at the „truth claims‟ in them. At the heart of the rigour of qualitative methods is „self-critical, 
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analysis from household surveys may be improved using qualitative methods based on 
the ability to probe in the field and uncover surprises – issues may arise during 
interviews that may not have been taken into account at the survey design stage. 
Analysis can then be reoriented based on observations in the field. This certainly was 
the case in the thesis research: the discovery of local nicknaming conventions during 
qualitative fieldwork in round 1, which had not been taken into account in the design of 
the name generator instruments for capturing the social networks data, meant that the 
subsequent survey in round 2 could capture nicknames thus allowing accurate coding of 
alters and ego in the social networks dataset. This is discussed later in the chapter. 
 
Information provided by qualitative methods may also generate more „accurate‟ 
hypotheses based on realities that can subsequently be tested using a quantitative 
approach, thus shaping the survey‟s conceptual framework. Two sources of data from 
the same population facilitate cross-checking and replication. In particular contextual 
(qualitative) information may help to explain counterintuitive, inconclusive or puzzling 
survey findings. If the two sets of results differ markedly this could indicate 
methodological or data quality problems in one or the other. 
 
The decision to combine quantitative and qualitative methods of data-collection and 
analysis in the DPhil research was driven by pragmatism, whereby the choice of method 
is based on technical rather than epistemological criteria (Patton, 1990). In addition, 
social network data are typically gathered using a variety of techniques ranging from 
survey questionnaires to interviews and observations. Methods were chosen that were 
appropriate for the given research questions, making sure there was a match between the 
kinds of realities revealed by the techniques chosen and what the research actually 
wanted to examine. It can be difficult to explore social processes using survey 
instruments where there is little scope for asking „why?‟ or „how?‟. As one of the 
strengths of qualitative research is its ability to explore social processes and the context 
in which they occur, it makes sense for a study of social processes or networks to utilise 
tools devised precisely for that purpose. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
epistemological awareness…with reflection on how context, process, agency and interaction 
influence what is presented and what is perceived by the researcher‟ (Chambers, 2003b). 
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The qualitative enquiry was intended to complement the quantitative and networks data 
generated by the survey, so that analysis would not rely solely on statistical correlations 
to support or reject hypotheses thrown up by the social science literature about the role 
that social networks play in livelihoods of poor people in rural areas of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Neither qualitative nor quantitative methods alone would be able to capture the 
complexities of social networks. Social network analysis is still in its infancy within 
economics and as such there is no systematic model to follow. Coupled with the dearth 
of secondary and historical data on social networks this meant it would be difficult to 
design a survey that would capture everything. Instruments needed to be more open-
ended, involving respondents in describing and analysing their own actions and lives. 
The contextual knowledge provided by the more qualitative approaches allowed access 
to the meanings and motivations for particular courses of action. Furthermore, much 
social network and labour exchange activity is nuanced and not easy to capture with a 
questionnaire. Qualitative methods helped to reveal people‟s exchange behaviour in 
social networks in a way that a quantitative survey never could, or would find very 
difficult, and was better at revealing multiple and conflicting perspectives and realities. 
Other advantages were flexibility and greater insights with regards to causal processes. 
The decision to conduct a household survey was not questioned as there was a clear 
need to be able to make comparisons and generalisations, as well as conduct 
econometric and statistical analyses. Estimating exchange behaviour through social 
networks would not be possible with qualitative methods alone.  
 
While the research does not go so far as to embrace an „heuristic‟ approach to data 
collection and analysis, a phenomenological or experiential understanding could be said 
to underlie important decisions governing research methods, both in highlighting the 
importance of using methods that will capture people‟s experience of the world and 
acknowledging that there is no separate (objective) reality for people. Instead, focus 
resides not only on what people experience, but also how they experience the world, and 
methods are chosen to reveal commonalities in these human experiences. The 
phenomenological perspective can be summed up as follows: „It is reflection which 
objectifies points of view or perspectives, whereas when I perceive, I belong, through 
my point of view, to the world as a whole, nor am I even aware of the limits of my 
visual field‟ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 329). However, this is not the place to elaborate on 
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particular philosophers, instead I want to draw out some more general implications of 
working within the phenomenological tradition. 
 
The research is reliant on understanding social networks and exchange networks as they 
happen within the experiential situation. The experiential situation is portrayed by the 
„self-reported‟ data. From the experiential examples offered I try and elucidate in 
greater detail the social matrices and networks that become apparent. Academic 
language and discussion is rooted in rationalism and the ill-fitting hubris of scientific 
methodology, therefore it is necessary to acknowledge that although I am writing of the 
experiential, I am doing it in a synthetic, analytical way. Now, this is unavoidable, but 
must be acknowledged, this is why Nietzsche claimed that his philosophy should be 
sung or danced rather than argued (Birth of Tragedy). Philosophers such as Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein suggest that we must already understand to some degree 
before we can take on the strands of argument. The spirit of the implication of self and 
others in continuity with the social matrices (containing the networks) seen in the 
experiential situation, must in a way be grasped before any analytical discussion of said 
networks can make sense. Even so, it is impossible to get everything. The analytic will 
never contain all of the experiential. 
 
The crucial role played by institutional and social contexts in underpinning both social 
networks and exchange behaviour and other aspects of economic life, suggested a 
mixed-methods approach to data collection using a blend of quantitative (survey) 
methods and more qualitative (contextual) techniques. The need for a panoply of 
methods is reinforced by the need for different types of data encompassing attributes, 
interactions, motivations and other contextual information. 
 
The next section discusses design of the data-collection instruments chosen, related to 
evidence necessary to address the overarching questions of the DPhil research on the 
role of social networks in economic life.   
 
 
3.4 Design of Data Collection Instruments 
 
Data collection instruments were designed following the preliminary field visit. 
Relevant literature in economics, sociology, anthropology and history, and other 
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secondary sources of information on Northern Province in Zambia were consulted to 
facilitate contextual accuracy. Important questions considered from the outset when 
designing the instruments were: At what time of year would the survey take place and 
would it be necessary to conduct more than one round? What variables would be 
necessary to answer the research questions? Would data be collected and analysis 
conducted at the household or individual level, or both? What data would be needed at 
the community level? 
 
First, in terms of timing, the seasonal nature of agriculture suggested multiple survey 
rounds, taking place at different points in the agricultural year.  In Zambia there are two 
distinct climatic seasons: the „rainy‟ season, running from November to April, and the 
„dry‟ season from March to October. Fieldwork was divided into two rounds, with 
Round 1 scheduled to take place in October, towards the end of the dry season, and 
Round 2 during March and April, towards the end of the rainy season. To define either 
season as a „lean‟ or „peak‟ season depends on the criteria employed as each season will 
be lean in some respects but not in others, for example the availability of some types of 
food over others or workload in different activities. Importantly, whether or not an 
individual or household experiences a season as lean depends on socio-economic 
circumstances. This proviso notwithstanding, for many subsistence farmers in Northern 
Province the period from October to March is generally thought of as being lean in most 
traditional foods, but there is a peak in labour demand for land preparation, planting and 
weeding and „early‟ harvests of green vegetables and beans. By contrast, most 
traditional food crops are plentiful from April to October, but farm labour demands are 
less overall; although most harvesting takes place during this period, it also incorporates 
a „slack‟ period during June and July in terms of labour requirements in agriculture. 
This is when people have time to pursue leisure activities, for example playing football 
and netball, or other non-farm activities such as making reed mats. 
 
In order to address the research questions, it was clear that data were needed that would 
reflect not only respondents‟ attributes, characteristics such as age, education, 
livelihoods activities and land cultivated, but also interactions between people, both 
„social‟ and „productive‟ exchange behaviour.  Early economic studies related to social 
networks focused on social processes as forms of capital and included variables to 
capture endowments of social capital constructed from survey data that were not 
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collected specifically for this purpose, so there was a reliance on proxies. More recent 
surveys have attempted to pinpoint people‟s social networks more directly through 
specially designed survey modules. However, surveys do not ask about specific network 
partners and tend to concentrate on social support networks in very broad terms. The 
World Bank/ Republic of Uganda Global Social Capital Survey (1998) focuses on 
membership of groups and attendance at church, as well as „subjective well-being‟, 
„violence and crime‟, „political engagement‟. There are some questions on informal 
interactions with others, but because they are very general and hypothetical and do not 
ask with whom do people actually interact and for what purpose, and actually gather 
names, the data are not suitable for a network analysis. 
 
While affiliations are an important element of social networks, and instruments such as 
the Social Capital Assessment Tool of The World Bank are useful for gathering 
information on groups and community characteristics, „social capital‟ does not 
necessarily manifest itself in social institutions such as attending church, which is the 
implication of the design of the early World Bank surveys (see for example Narayan 
and Pritchett, 1997, on Tanzania, with its focus on quality of associational life). One 
contribution of the DPhil research is the design of a survey module to gather data on 
social networks, recognising that social capital does not necessarily manifest itself in 
church or group affiliation, or in community-wide measures such as levels of crime and 
violence, but rests in transactions and interactions between people, their own personal 
networks and contacts and the way they operate and interact.  
 
An important part of the household survey was a module on labour exchange behaviour, 
designed for the research project alongside which the DPhil fieldwork was conducted. 
The labour exchange survey module also provided important social network 
information used in the thesis research. Previous surveys, including the Zambian 
LCMS, have tended not to contain questions that would adequately capture a true 
picture of labour market activity in rural areas
29
, and this has contributed to the opinion 
of many economists that labour markets in rural areas of developing countries and 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa, are thin or non-existent. In fact labour exchange is 
                                                     
29
 See Termine P (2001) „What can be learned from the LCMS Instrument on Rural Labour 
Markets? A Case Study of Zambia. Mimeo, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK. 
Background paper to Labour markets project. 
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widespread and dynamic among small-scale, subsistence farmers in rural sub-Saharan 
Africa and empirical evidence supports this (See Moore and Vaughan, 1994; den 
Ouden, 1995; Vaughan, 1998; McNetting, 1993; Binns, 1992).  This dynamism can be 
captured partly with a survey so long as questions cover such features as reciprocal 
labour and activities that people may not consider to be „working for others‟ because 
they do not receive a „wage‟ or other explicit payment for it. Indeed, as there tends to be 
a stigma attached to carrying out farm wage work for neighbours, direct questions on 
wage employment are least likely to elicit accurate responses. Other important features 
necessary for understanding labour exchange behaviour include different types of 
remuneration for various tasks, why certain modes of payment are preferred over others 
by different people at different times and how labour exchange behaves during 
particular times of the year or season and in relation to the life cycle/ life stage of 
workers. Much labour exchange takes place through network links. 
 
It made sense for some data to be collected at the household level, such as number of 
household members, assets held, type of abode and number of migrant workers. Other 
data were collected at the individual level – labour exchange, land cultivated, crops 
cultivated and other livelihoods activities – features not necessarily the same across the 
household. It was decided that social networks data would also be collected at the 
individual level as this, by its nature, is highly personalised information. The number of 
network partners, their locations and positions in the community, types of social relation 
and exchange between network partners can vary widely depending on gender or age, 
for example, although individuals can invariably benefit from the network relations of 
their family and other household members. Especially prominent are gendered 
differences in labour exchange through social networks, and other intra-household 
differences that could only be captured using individual-level data from multiple 
household members. 
 
The following sections describe instrument design, keeping the quantitative-qualitative 
distinction for ease of exposition. 
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3.4.1 Household survey instrument design 
 
The household survey was designed following the preliminary field visit. A World Bank 
manual on designing household survey questionnaires (Grosch and Glewwe, 1999) was 
a useful starting point, as well as household surveys conducted recently in Zambia 
including the LCMS (1998), agricultural census and post-harvest surveys (CSO Lusaka, 
Zambia; 1996-1997 and 1997-1998). Survey design also drew on previous „social 
capital‟ surveys in both developing and developed countries and lessons learned from 
social network surveys
3031
. This preliminary field visit and the knowledge and 
experience of in-country research partners provided valuable contextual information to 
ensure relevance of survey content. An initial draft of the questionnaire was piloted in a 
Bemba village close to Lusaka in June 2002. This incorporated training of the survey 
team who would be involved in the fieldwork proper. There was discussion and 
feedback involving the entire team following the pilot and the survey was consequently 
revised based on lessons learned and recommendations of the survey team. An 
enumerators‟ instruction manual was produced to accompany the questionnaire. 
 
Tracking devices were built into the survey in the form of detailed community, 
household and individual identifier codes, in order to locate respondents during the 
planned second round survey. This was especially important given the fluctuating 
nature of household form – a tendency for frequent divorce and remarriage, along with 
migration, means that the household identified in October could be rather different from 
that in March. A community-level questionnaire was also designed to record 
information at the village-level. This included „governance‟ details such as the name of 
the Chief presiding over the area and the provision of services to the village, for 
example the nearest health facilities and schools. 
 
                                                     
30
 See National Statistics Matrix of Social Capital Surveys 2001 for a list of UK surveys. The 
World Bank Social Capital website (www.worldbank.org) contains a number of surveys,  
including a social capital assessment tool. 
31
 For social support questions the research drew on the Office for National Statistics UK „Guide 
to Assessing People‟s Perceptions of their neighbourhood and Community Involvement‟. The 
International Social Surveys Programme (ISSP, 2001: www.issp.org) also included useful 
questions on social support and on membership of groups and associations. The World Bank 
Republic of Uganda Global Social Capital Survey and World Bank Social Capital Assessment 
Tool contain useful questions on social assistance and access to productive resources. 
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The household survey questionnaire comprised well-defined questions, structured 
around ten modules for Round 1, whereas the questionnaire for Round 2 was somewhat 
shorter as some questions did not need to be asked twice. Extra questions were also 
incorporated into the Round 2 survey, informed by data gathered during Round 1: for 
example, it became clear from interviews that tithes are paid by church members every 
month and are a regular household outgoing, however this had been overlooked in the 
design of the Round 1 questionnaire. Most questions were pre-coded although some, 
especially those relating to network partners, were open-ended. The recall period for 
many questions/ modules was the previous six months to the day of the survey, and the 
surveys were conducted six months apart, to capture seasonality. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts to allow ease of enumeration given the 
length of the questionnaire, providing a natural stopping point for enumerators if they 
felt the interview had taken long enough and there would be a benefit from continuing 
another time. Part A covered modules 1 to 4 and was designed to be administered once 
per household, with questions relating to the household as a whole. Household was 
defined as a group of people who live in the same compound, provide things for each 
other and often share meals.
32
 Parts B and C covered modules 5 to 10 and were 
addressed to individuals. Table 3.4 lists the questionnaire modules for each round of the 
survey. 
 
Table 3.4 Household Survey Modules 
 Round 1 Survey Round 2 Survey Social Networks Survey 
(Round 1) 
P
art A
 
1.  Household Roster 1. Household Roster 1. Household Roster 
2.  Current Migrants 2. Current migrants 2. Current migrants 
3.  Household Assets 3. Household assets 3. Household assets and land 
cultivated 
4.  Resettlement Module (for Lufubu 
only) 
.. .. 
P
art B
 
5.  Labour 5. Labour 5.‘Mini’ Labour Module 
6.  Former Migrants No Module 6 6. Former Migrants 
P
art C
 
7.  Social Networks No module 7 7. Social Networks 
8.  Livelihoods 8. Livelihoods  
9.  Land 9. Land 
10. Means of Exchange 10. Means of Exchange 
Source: Labour Markets Survey, Northern Province, Zambia 2002-2003 
                                                     
32
 Definition of Household, after consultation and discussion with Zambian research partners, is 
based on that used in the 1998 LCMS as a group of persons who normally cook, eat and live 
together. 
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Where possible, the household head and one other household member of the opposite 
sex were interviewed. Most often this was the male household head and his wife or 
wives. Where the household head was female the second respondent was often the 
eldest son or other male household member. The survey was long, which constrained 
the number of open-ended questions that could be included but the research team did 
follow up interesting and relevant issues with respondents (see below) and enumerators 
were encouraged to note interesting extra information that could be important for 
interpreting and contextualising the survey data later, at the analysis stage. 
 
Social Networks Module. 
 
Network interviews were conducted as part of the household survey during Round 1 of 
the fieldwork. A person-based data collection strategy was employed within the 
household survey questionnaire and from this a set of indicators, each referring to 
different aspects of social networks, was constructed. The social networks module of 
the household survey is in Appendix A. These data are complemented by qualitative 
information gathered using a range of techniques drawing on emerging work in social 
capital measurement, based on Lin‟s Network Theory of social capital (see van der 
Gaag and Snijders, 2003a; van der Gaag and Snijders, 2005; Lin and Dumin,1986). 
Different measurement instruments were combined within the household survey 
questionnaire and comprised
 33
: 
 
  Name Generator: maps an ego-centred social network and is widely used in 
social network analysis to generate a respondent‟s single core network. The data 
were collected in a specially designed social networks module. Respondents 
were asked to name all those people, neighbours, kin, co-workers, friends, with 
whom they interact from any sphere of their life from outside their own 
household, and their names recorded in a response matrix. Further questions 
were posed concerning attributes of the network partner (sex, age), the nature of 
the relationship between network partner and respondent and multiple role 
relationships. These data form the „interaction‟ network of the respondent. 
                                                     
33
 For a more detailed explanation of the different types of instruments see Van der Gaag and 
Snijders (2003b). 
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  Resource Generator: captures access to a fixed list of specific social and 
economic resources relating to several spheres of life. For example, in the labour 
markets module, the respondent was asked to supply names of employees or 
employers in terms of those they worked for or employed to work for them from 
outside their own household, before going on to answer questions regarding the 
nature of the employment arrangement. In the migration module respondents 
also gave names of household members who were working away from the 
household as migrant workers. Similarly, respondents were asked in a separate 
subsection of the social networks module to name all those they turned to under 
various scenarios for assistance and/or information. This section allowed sources 
of support to encompass institutions and organisation, as well as individuals, 
with room for multiple responses. Again, follow-up questions covered age, sex, 
relationship to respondent and multiple role relationships. 
 
  “Position Generator” (Prestige networks): respondents were asked whether 
they have kin or friends in an „influential‟ position, the name and position of the 
„influential‟ person, focusing on the presence of social resources rather than the 
relationships per se, although the data do provide additional information on 
network extensiveness and diversity. 
 
Once the survey module had been completed respondents were either shown the lists, or 
they were read out by the enumerator, and asked if anybody was missing. Research in 
methodology for social capital measurement suggests that the three types of generator 
are each appropriate for generating different types of network information (Van der 
Gaag & Snijders, 2003b). Potential drawbacks of each of the three generators are 
discussed in Section 3.7. 
 
Recording names and other details about people‟s network partners potentially raises 
ethics issues. However, the data were completely anonymised following the 
construction of the social networks datasets prior to analysis.  
 
Distinct sections of the module capture various dimensions of social relations: 
i) Non-household member interaction; 
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ii) Prominent people and network elites; 
iii) Involvement in formal and informal groups and clubs; 
iv) Exclusion; 
v) Community mobilisation; 
vi) Social support: health, credit, farming, work, form-filling, marketing; 
vii) Information networks: livelihoods and health. 
 
The data allow construction of variables such as access to social support networks, 
participation in social institutions, as well as measures to capture network content in 
terms of attributes of people the respondent interacts with, including frequency of 
interaction and relationship to respondent. As part of the sample survey, whereby we 
have information on the networks of the sampled respondents/ households and not of 
the entire network, the research takes an egocentric approach. This allows us to build up 
a picture of respondents in relation to their social roles, rather than uncovering the 
macrostructure of the entire network of the three communities. The ego-centred 
approach is discussed further later in this chapter and in Chapter 4. 
 
Labour networks questions are embedded in the labour module of the questionnaire. 
Respondents were asked to name all employers and employees with basic attribute 
information. In the social support section of the social networks module a question on 
who the respondent would go to if they, or a member of their household, needed work 
will allow a degree of cross-checking of network information. Migration modules 
(„Current Migrants‟ and „Former Migrants‟) contain questions about contacts. The 
instruments taken together generated data on the following networks that combine to 
make the overall social network of the respondent: 
 
i) Migration 
ii) Labour (as both employer and employee of individuals and groups) 
iii) Daily interaction 
iv) Social support 
v) Information 
vi) Affiliation to community-level groups and societies 
vii) Trading and access to markets 
viii) Prestige networks: friends and kin. 
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There was no constraint on the number of people respondents could nominate in 
response to different questions. This format was designed with minimising 
measurement error in mind, elaborated later in Section 3.7 on methodological issues and 
also in the econometric analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
3.4.2 Qualitative instrument design 
 
The qualitative research was designed to uncover complexities of social networks and 
labour exchange that could not be captured by the survey instrument alone, to allow a 
micro-level, in-depth study. Information was generated through case study methods 
adapting anthropological and participatory techniques. Although the fieldwork design, 
data collection and subsequent analyses draw on anthropological methods, the study 
makes no pretence as to ethnographic comprehensiveness. Neither is it „participatory‟ in 
its truest sense in terms of involving in research design and empowering the study 
communities. Participatory behaviours were upheld regarding principles, approaches 
and methods and we had the consent and active participation of the communities 
concerned. Researchers were transparent about the purpose of the research and what 
people could and could not expect, and on the whole meetings were well-attended with 
participants appearing to enjoy the process. Nonetheless this was a research exercise 
and as such instruments were largely „extractive‟. 
 
The qualitative element of the fieldwork employed a basket of techniques, both visual 
and conversational, to reveal information along the main themes of the research: social 
networks, labour exchange, access to economic opportunities, market access and 
migration. They were designed drawing on ideas from Chambers (2002) and 
Rietbergen-McCracken and Narayan (1998), consultation with Zambian colleagues, 
attention to in-country media and other sources of information about the area under 
study, including information gleaned from the study sites during the fieldwork. 
Approaches were combined and tailored to what was considered to be both socially 
„appropriate‟, while being able to supply information relevant to the research themes. 
 
During Round 1 qualitative and contextual methods concentrated on semi-structured 
interviews with key informants and interviews with formal community-level groups. 
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Prior to the fieldwork a short „group‟ questionnaire and interview guides were designed 
to guide discussion around perceptions of village life and social networks as well as 
community and group-level data to provide a basis for collecting affiliation networks 
data. This stage of the qualitative work also allowed for issues to come to light that 
might not have been considered previously, allowing them to be pursued further later by 
incorporating them into the design of instruments to be used in Round 2, thus 
demonstrating the iterative nature of fieldwork method design. 
 
Round 2 of the qualitative fieldwork was designed around follow-up interviews with 
groups identified during Round 1, in addition to semi-structured interviews with 
informal groups in the communities using interview guides, seasonal activity and labour 
calendars produced using PRA methods and personal testimonies and oral life-histories 
of individuals with an aim to gather case study material for between ten and fifteen 
individuals in each of the study sites. Table 3.5 lists the qualitative methods used. This 
case-study-style approach was chosen for its ability to help causal mechanisms to 
unfold allowing plausible causal inferences to be made, and to elicit information on 
constraints affecting farmer behaviour. As with the focus groups discussions, interviews 
were semi-structured and designed to stimulate discussion on a range of issues related to 
social networks, livelihoods and poverty. 
 
Table 3.5 Qualitative methods used 
Individuals: 
 Semi-structured interviews 
 Personal Testimony: Oral Life History combined with Daily Activity Chart 
 Seasonal activity and employment calendar (Labour calendar) – male and female 
 Personal testimony: Village histories  
 Structured direct observation 
 Transect walks 
Groups: 
 Personal Testimony: Oral Life History combined with Daily Activity Chart 
 Seasonal activity and employment calendar (Labour calendar) – male and female 
 Institutional Mapping  
 Determinants exercise, including preference ranking 
 Gender Division of Labour Exercise 
 Structured direct observation 
 Semi-structured interviews (with and without ‘group questionnaire’ interview guide) 
Community: 
 Village and natural resource mapping 
 Structured direct observation 
 Personal testimony: Village histories 
 Semi-structured interviews with ‘community questionnaire’ interview guide 
Source: Fieldwork, Northern Province, Zambia, 2002-2003. 
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3.5 Data Collection 
 
Data collection methods were „sequential‟, although not strictly so, rather than a 
simultaneous mixing of methods, with the aim of creating an ongoing dialogue between 
the qualitative and quantitative components of the research. First, data collection 
instruments were designed using an iterative process. The process of collecting data in 
the field was also dynamic and evolving, using an eclectic set of tools and methods. The 
qualitative fieldwork and the household survey were conducted side-by-side. The 
demands of supervising the household survey and conducting qualitative field research 
simultaneously were great and there was a tendency for the household survey to take 
precedence over other activities, given the structured nature of the exercise and the 
concentration of survey team members on this element of the research plan, so Round 2 
was designed to allow extra time for qualitative work. Again the household survey and 
qualitative fieldwork were conducted alongside each other, followed by a further period 
devoted solely to qualitative work, with a smaller team of three researchers remaining 
post-survey to continue contextual data collection. 
 
During fieldwork there was continuous evaluation and discussion of the data collection 
processes, including challenges faced by enumerators when posing certain questions in 
the survey. This meant that many potential problems, such as difficulties with questions 
or sections of the survey, could be addressed and remedied on the ground. One 
particular problem arose with the section of the questionnaire on fish farming activities 
– questions related to household fish consumption proved to be difficult as people had 
no idea how much fish they had consumed and no way of estimating. Enumerators were 
told not to waste time probing too much on these questions, especially as by the time 
this section was reached late in the interview respondent-fatigue was evident. Data 
collection overall was systematic and care was taken to preserve the integrity of the 
data, in particular through i) avoidance of „leading‟ questions (although the scripted 
questionnaire meant that this was less of an issue here than with the less structured 
qualitative research); ii) exact recording of responses; iii) systematically observing and 
recording the information gathering processes; and iv) a „working‟ awareness of power 
relationships between different groups and individuals in the population and between 
the researchers and the researched. 
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3.5.1 The Household Survey 
 
The research team comprised six enumerators, four male and two female, five of whom 
had been trained during the pilot survey. The survey was co-supervised by a civil 
servant from the Zambian Ministry of Labour who had participated in the preliminary 
field visit. Together with researchers from a Northern Province regional agricultural 
research station, his presence helped to smooth access to the communities. The survey 
communities on the whole treated the survey seriously, however the presence of a 
government official also meant that despite efforts made on entry to the survey sites to 
convey clearly the exact purpose and meaning of the research many of the respondents 
harboured concerns about possible „hidden‟ implications of the work: would there be 
repercussions and would they be adversely affected?  Uncertainty about the research 
appeared to play on existing insecurities; for Ngulula and Lufubu Resettlement Scheme 
this reflected concerns about security of land tenure. Consequently in the beginning 
there was some reticence on the part of respondents to open up to the research team, 
although on the surface they appeared to be cooperating. This mistrust abated as 
familiarity with the research team increased, and appeared to be absent from Round 2.  
 
The same six enumerators took part in Round 2 of the survey with one additional female 
enumerator who had participated in the pilot survey. This freed up one of the original 
team to work full-time as a researcher and translator in the qualitative fieldwork. The 
Round 2 survey was co-supervised by an experienced field researcher and supervisor 
who worked part-time in the Ministry of Planning. The continuation of largely the same 
staff in the second round of the survey contributed to a loss of outsider status by the 
team and a more relaxed interaction with respondents as relationships were strengthened 
between researchers and community members. 
 
Sampling 
 
Full enumeration (a census) of Lufubu Resettlement Scheme was attempted in terms of 
household coverage, partly due to the relatively small size overall of the community (65 
households in total) and partly because one important focus of the rural labour markets 
project was resettlement schemes. For Ngulula and Kabila villages a sample of 40 
households each were drawn. The sample frames were the household registers provided 
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by the respective headman of each village, and households to be included in the survey 
were selected at random using random numbers lists generated in Excel. Before the 
sample was drawn the household lists were updated with the help of village committee 
members to add new households and remove those who were deceased or had moved 
away permanently since the registers were compiled. The lists were reasonably up-to-
date thanks to a recent national census of population and housing (carried out by 
Zambia‟s Central Statistical Office in 2000). If a sampled household was not available 
for interview after three attempted visits by enumerators, the household was replaced 
using a random number table. Table 3.6 summarises the sampling frame used. Out of 
sixty-five households in Lufubu Resettlement Scheme, just sixty-two were enumerated. 
One person was missing due to sickness, one was absent and the remaining household 
was an oversight – the village committee omitted it from the register because the plot 
had only recently been occupied and the plot-holder had not yet moved permanently to 
the scheme.  
 
Table 3.6 Sampling frame 
Study Site Total No.  
Households 
Estimated 
Population 
Kabila 200 666 
Ngulula 100 600 
Lufubu RS 65 480 
Source: Labour Markets Survey, Northern Province, Zambia, 2002-2003 
 
 
Survey Data Collection 
 
The household survey was based on a pre-coded questionnaire in English translated into 
Bemba during the interviews. Enumerators were all native Bemba speakers and training 
included vocabulary to ensure uniformity of translation. Using native Bemba speakers 
facilitated access and acceptance. Households were allocated to enumerators in Round 1 
and interviewed by the same enumerator in both rounds. Supervision involved attending 
interviews. During Round 2 respondents appeared to be considerably busier than the 
previous visit, especially those engaged in early beans harvests. 
 
Each evening the team discussed progress made during the day at a debriefing session, 
tabling any issues and problems arising during the survey. They also provided feedback 
of a contextual nature that helped to inform the qualitative exercises. In addition, the 
completed questionnaires were checked at the end of each day as part of supervision 
91 
 
 
 
duties and corrections and clarifications made where possible. Sometimes this would 
require repeat visits to households. Data were also re-coded in the field when required.  
 
Sample Attrition 
 
Relocating households the second time round was relatively straightforward using the 
four-tier identifier code and household registers. In addition, given the relatively short 
interval between visits of just six months, enumerators remembered clearly households 
they had been assigned and the location of households by village section had been noted 
at the first visit. Table 3.7 details the number of people and households interviewed 
during the survey. Sample attrition for both households and individuals was 5.5%. 
Household coverage (percentage of total households) was 37, 20.5 and 91 per cent in 
Kabila, Ngulula and Lufubu respectively. 
 
Table 3.7 Sample Attrition 
Survey Site Round 1 
households 
enumerated 
Round 1 
individuals 
enumerated 
Round 2 
households 
enumerated 
Round 2 
individuals 
enumerated  
% Total 
households: 
final sample 
Kabila  41 71 37 64 20.5 
Ngulula  43 55 41 53 37 
Lufubu  61 105 59 102 91 
TOTAL 145 231 137 219 .. 
Source: Labour Markets Survey, Northern Province, Zambia, 20003-2003. 
 
3.5.2 Generating qualitative data 
 
The qualitative data collection was conducted with the assistance of two Zambian 
research assistants, one male and one female. Interviews took an informal approach and 
refreshments were provided as a small „payment‟ for participants‟ time and effort. The 
emphasis in Round 1 was on focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews 
with formal and informal village groups and with key informants. Institutional 
background information was gathered from interviews with people in relevant local 
government departments such as the agricultural extension service, Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Government of Zambia Resettlement Office. In Round 2, activities 
were expanded to include in depth interviews with individuals in the study sites, 
encompassing oral life histories, personal testimonies and group exercises using 
Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques. These included: seasonal calendars; village 
mapping; institutional mapping; daily time use diagrams. During the exercises 
participants generated their own analysis of key elements of their livelihoods and 
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market behaviour. Interviews were conducted in Bemba and translated into English in 
situ, although I built up a working knowledge of the key vocabulary for crops grown 
and different types of agricultural and non-farm activity over time. This helped to 
identify key words in people‟s conversation and allowed follow-up questions to unravel 
points made and a more in-depth investigation. Some interviews were taped with the 
permission of the interviewee; direct quotations used in the thesis come from the taped 
interviews. 
 
From the outset, an awareness of the following issues was instilled in the research team 
and steps taken to guard against inherent biases, inconsistencies and „misleading‟ 
information that might arise as a consequence: 
 
i) village/ hierarchical structure: The views of „those at the top‟ are likely to be easier 
to access and more apparent with a tendency for prominent community members 
such as village committees to dominate discussions, giving the impression that they 
are voicing generally held views, whereas others may be less willing, even in 
private, to give views that oppose those of village leaders (Casley and Lury, 1982). 
This can extend to a tendency for village elites and dominant community members 
to put forward their friends and relations for oral life histories and other research 
exercises, increasing self-selection and other biases. 
ii) ii) „insider/ outsider scale‟: There could be incidents of respondents telling 
researchers what they think they want to hear. A related issue is a tendency for 
people to put on their „best face‟ to outsiders and giving only an „official‟ view 
(Casley and Lury, 1982). Other issues: responses given based on a perception of 
what the respondent thinks they may be able to get from the research team or out of 
the research project; having to accept as „authentic‟ what people tell us – the 
retelling of their understanding of own situations, derived from their „stock of 
knowledge‟, balanced by an awareness of respondents engaging in „leg-pulling‟ 
because they are not taking the research seriously. 
 
Efforts were made to establish the points of view of less vocal groups in the community, 
such as poorer people, those who were more marginalised and those living further from 
village „centre‟, and care taken not to avoid reliance on particular informants. This 
included transect walks, interviewing people encountered along the way. Enumerators 
also reported interesting interactions with respondents during the course of the survey 
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and identified individuals and households that they felt it would be important and 
valuable to talk to. Sampling is dealt with in more detail in the following sections. 
 
Key to the success of the qualitative research was establishing relationships with people 
that would permit intrusion, making people feel comfortable with the research and 
research processes and building up trust. It was initially difficult to transcend the 
precedence set by the household survey and the presence of ministry people, which gave 
an „official‟ air to the research and meant that people were initially reticent to give out 
highly personal information on their social networks and their labour activities. In some 
cases there was also a perception that the survey team were expressing favouritism 
towards those chosen for the household survey or for the oral life histories. The team 
endeavoured to make the process as transparent as possible and encouraged the people 
to ask as many questions as they liked, allowing for a two-way interaction between the 
researchers and the respondents. 
 
Individual interviews 
 
Individuals were interviewed for their life history as a starting point for a discussion 
about the main issues of the research, by researchers working in pairs. Interviews were 
based on open-ended questions. Conversation was steered around perceptions of village 
life to open up the arena for new issues to come to light as well as following research 
themes identified in the interview guide. The interviews began by asking people to tell 
the researchers about themselves, their lives, where they were born, what their parents 
did, where they went to school, taking their own story right up to the present-day. On 
the whole it followed a free-conversational format but researchers ensured issues 
concerning social networks and labour exchange were covered. Interviews took a 
considerable length of time to complete and it was not always possible to cover all 
issues in one sitting. On some occasions interviews were conducted over a number of 
sessions. If respondents did not raise issues contained in the interview guide then the 
interviewer would instigate a discussion, but only as a last resort. 
 
Where couples were interviewed, the discussions with the husband and wife were 
conducted separately by two different interviewers with the male interviewed by the 
male researcher. Respondents drew a daily activity chart with guidance from the 
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interviewer, to show graphically how they spend their day giving activity patterns for 
the rainy season and the dry season, followed by a short discussion of what they had 
drawn. The discussion also included semi-structured interviewing to probe further on 
themes emerging from the life history. Table 3.8 provides a tally of numbers of 
interviews in each study site. All interviews were discussed in depth by the research 
team at the end of each day and sometimes participants would be revisited to clarify 
points made or to follow up on interesting leads. 
 
Table 3.8 Qualitative Fieldwork – Total Number of Interviews 
Study 
Site 
Oral Life 
History 
Personal Testimony Semi-structured 
interviews 
TOTAL 
Kabila 17 9 17 33 
Ngulula 20 15 10 45 
Lufubu 15 8 14 37 
 
The sample of individuals and groups for the qualitative fieldwork was taken from the 
bounded set of inhabitants of the three villages selected for the household survey. From 
this set, respondents were purposively sampled using the following categories to ensure 
sufficient diversity: 
- Migrant worker 
- Employer 
- Employee 
- Female-headed household 
- Old person 
- Young man 
- Young woman 
- Intra-household – 3 couples from different age groups (plus daily activity charts). 
- Prominent person 
- Marginalised person 
- Village group leader 
- Village group member 
- Non-member of groups 
- Section heads or village committee member 
 
All people sampled fell into two or more categories so there was considerable overlap. 
Respondents were found using snowball sampling, through consulting the 
questionnaires from round 1, taking transect walks, „accidental‟ sampling and common 
sense. At least one male and one female were selected in each category where possible, 
covering a wide age-range to ensure that the data portrayed the perspectives of a broad 
cross-section of the community, including representation of different socio-economic 
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levels, community and employment status and geographic/spatial locations. The latter 
was especially important in Kabila because the village was particularly large in that 
there were two hundred households covering a wide geographical area. The village 
comprised six different „sections‟, some far from the village centre and relatively more 
isolated, and initial interviews suggested that labour market behaviour was markedly 
different in the further-flung sections compared to the village centre. Individual cases 
are not sampling units in a statistical sense. Table 3.9 details respondents (sex, age 
group and status) participating in oral life histories, conducted during the second round 
of fieldwork. 
 
Table 3.9 People selected for Oral Life Histories – Round 2 of Fieldwork 
Study Site Oral life Histories Category 
Kabila 
 
 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female 
 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female 
 Youngish/ middle-aged couple, male b1962 
 Prominent person, Branch Chairman 
 FHH with migrant worker 
 Couple: employers and produce surplus 
 Section leader, elder 
 Older couple keeping orphans 
 Young man, newly married, living with in-laws 
 Married woman, well-connected 
 Young married woman 
 Young man, married, young children 
 Older woman, not member of any groups 
Ngulula  
 
 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female 
 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 male 
 1 male 
 1 male 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female  
 Older couple, retired here, well-educated 
 FHH 
 Young Man 
 Middle-aged couple, prominent group member 
 Member of village committee 
 FHH, elderly, marginalised 
 FHH, ‘destitute’ 
 Young male, migrant, single, about to get married 
 Young male with big plans, grade 12 education, single 
 Older man, not a member of any groups 
 Married Man b 1970,  7 children 
 Young couple, no children yet 
 Headman 
 Married woman, originally from Kasama 
Lufubu 
Resettle-
ment 
Scheme 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 female 
 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 female 
 1 male, 1 female 
 1 male 
 1 male 
 1 female  
 Middle-aged couple 
 FHH, ‘average’ 
 FHH, not destitute, well-connected, group leader, 
employer 
 Relatively rich, polygamist 
 Wife of above, managing land for migrant brother  
 Relatively rich, polygamist, group leader 
 Married woman, middle-aged, settled <1 year, poor 
and struggling 
 Older couple, migrant workers 
 1975 settler on largest plot 
 New  settler, employs people, married 
 Middle-aged woman, married, well-connected, group 
member/ leader 
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Group discussions and exercises 
 
Qualitative materials from group discussions and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)-
style exercises were used to inform the research. Techniques used include: 
i) Village and natural resource mapping  
ii) Semi-structured interviews 
iii) Personal testimony: Village histories  
iv) Institutional Mapping  
v) Seasonal Activity and Labour Calendar 
vi) Gender Division of Labour Exercise 
vii) Determinants exercise, including preference ranking 
 
The exercises were sequenced to schedule the relatively „simple‟ ones first such as 
drawing the village map, and later covering more complicated issues, either because 
they involved a certain amount of analysis on the part of the participants or because the 
issues were of a more sensitive nature, such as gender division of labour. This was to 
ensure that the community/ participants were more comfortable with the tools and 
concepts employed to increase their effectiveness, and a greater degree of rapport 
between the facilitators and the community allowing for more open, frank discussions. 
Participatory mapping exercises provided visuals to facilitate discussion and in all cases 
the participatory exercise was accompanied by short semi-structured interviewing with 
the groups concerned as well as discussions of the exercise at hand. The combination of 
techniques allowed for cross-checking of issues and findings („triangulation‟). 
 
The determinants exercise was designed to explore and identify the relative importance 
placed on social networks for livelihoods improvement by respondents. Mixed focus 
groups were convened to discuss economic opportunities and successful livelihoods, 
focusing on what it means to „get on‟ in the context of their lives. Once it was 
established what these concepts meant to the participants, the focus was switched to 
what was needed to access a particular economic opportunity identified by the group. 
The participants listed everything they thought they would need in order to „get on‟ or 
to benefit from that opportunity. Respondents then voted for the ten most important. 
Each was written on a separate piece of paper and participants assessed the different 
items, according to which they considered to be the most important for getting on, 
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giving reasons for their choice. The items were presented in every possible combination 
of two until all possible combinations had been considered. A matrix was drawn up of 
responses, which were ranked and listed according to the number of times they were 
preferred over the other items (pair-wise ranking). The group discussed the results. 
 
This exercise was challenging to both participants and facilitators. Potential biases arose 
during the exercise, related to differences and gaps in understanding that needed to be 
addressed as the discussion and exercise proceeded. These included: the tendency to 
choose a new item as opposed to the „preferred‟ item when an element appeared in two 
consecutive pairs; confusion and difficulties in coming to consensus when respondents 
could see no apparent direct link between two items drawn in a pair for comparison; a 
propensity to relate the elements in a pair to each other rather than relating each of them 
to the „outcome‟ i.e. better livelihoods in farming. 
 
 
3.6 Data Entry and Data Cleaning 
 
Data entry for both the household survey and the qualitative fieldwork took place in 
Zambia – either in the RuralNet offices in Lusaka in consultation with the survey 
enumerators, or while in the field (in the case of the qualitative data). 
 
3.6.1 Survey Data Entry 
 
For Round 1 of the survey, data entry was carried out by three data entry assistants at 
the RuralNet offices in Lusaka using SPSS. The data template and coding scheme had 
been designed in advance alongside questionnaire design. The data entry assistants had 
not been involved with the pilot survey data entry but were trained by the person who 
had entered the data from the pilot. Because of the length and complexity of the 
questionnaire there were some problems with inaccuracies in data entered from Round 1 
that necessitated a return trip to the RuralNet offices in Lusaka to consult the hard 
copies of the questionnaire and re-enter much of the data. Lessons-learned from this 
experience meant that for Round 2 those involved with collecting data in the field also 
carried out data entry once the team had returned to Lusaka. This proved to be more 
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successful in terms of quality of the dataset because those who had collected the data 
were more accurate owing to a deeper understanding of how the questionnaire worked. 
 
3.6.2 Qualitative Data Entry 
 
Detailed, verbatim notes were taken during all of the interviews and PRA exercises 
conducted for the qualitative strand of the research, and all materials such as maps and 
calendars produced by participants were kept by the research team. All interview notes 
and transcripts were typed up directly following the interviews, on the same day where 
possible, but much of the time the team was staying in the villages themselves without 
access to electricity so this was not always possible. The recording and transcription of 
interviews was an extremely time-consuming task, but care was taken to process 
everything in-country to allow for discussion and clarification with research assistants.  
 
3.6.3 Social Networks Data Entry and Dataset Construction 
 
The network data from each of the survey modules was aggregated into a „Tiewise‟ 
dataset containing characteristics of network partners and ties.
34
 The respondent and 
each of their network partners have only one tie but this tie may have multiple role 
relationships. The Tiewise dataset is a hierarchical dataset; records for each network 
partner or „alter‟ are nested within a respondent record. Network measures are derived 
from the Tiewise into a „Netwise‟ dataset (constructed by various aggregations of the 
data). This presents the data at the level of the individual respondent (as an ego-centred 
network dataset), with measures on the respondents‟ alters aggregated to provide the 
social networks variables. When identical network partners were mentioned by a 
respondent in response to different questions, they were coded systematically so that for 
each respondent the network partners have their own unique identifier code, allowing 
for an analysis of multiplex and multifunctional relationships. This was carried out 
manually – converting names (often given in multiple forms including nicknames) into 
unique identifier codes - and proved to be complicated and time intensive.  
 
                                                     
34
 See Müller C, B Wellman and A Marin (1999). “How to use SPSS to study ego-centred 
networks”. Bulletin des Méthodologies Sociologiques 64: 63-76. 
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3.6.4 Data Cleaning 
 
Household survey data were cleaned several times following both rounds of the survey, 
checking for consistency in data, missing responses, and „do not know‟ responses. A 
sample of ten per cent of the questionnaires was taken and data entry for these 
questionnaires was checked for accuracy. Cleaning qualitative data was a question of 
cross-checking notes between researchers to ensure accuracy of recording information 
and comparing and contrasting perceptions of the same accounts or events. 
 
 
3.7. Methodological Concerns 
 
This section elaborates potential and actual methodological pitfalls relevant to the field 
methods used in the DPhil research, considering first sampling errors, then non-
sampling and measurement errors.  
 
Sampling errors 
 
In taking a case study approach to the research, there was in effect a two-stage sample 
design for the household survey. As discussed above, survey sites were purposively 
selected for their relative market access. In terms of selecting households within each 
site, for Kabila and Ngulula random samples was selected using an up-to-date sampling 
frame – the most recent (2000) national population census list of all households in each 
village. Resource constraints led to an approach of interviewing a chosen minimum 
number of households in each site – 40 per village. Each household had equal 
probability of being selected from its respective village list, by using a random number 
table. Lufubu Resettlement Scheme had 66 households in total, so in this location the 
survey attempted complete coverage and managed to interview 62 out of the 66 
households. The remaining households in Lufubu were absent or unavailable due to 
sickness at the time of the first survey but were visited during round 2 and interviewed 
during qualitative fieldwork. Relative representativeness of each household to its share 
of population was ensured by weighting households in the total sample according to its 
proportion in the subsample, to take account of differential selection probabilities by 
community. The survey team was fortunate to experience complete cooperation and as 
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the team lived in the survey sites during the fieldwork, revisits were possible for 
clarifications or if respondents were not at home for the original visit. 
 
One replacement was made during round 1 of the fieldwork in Kabila village using a 
replacement rule. However, when the survey team revisited the household in round 2, it 
could not be found.  It transpired that someone who had already been interviewed in 
round 1, had been interviewed again as this replacement „household‟ in round two, with 
a different enumerator to their original interview, giving false names and a false 
household roster. The deception only came to light when the qualitative team returned 
ten days later with the questionnaires, the original household having absented itself 
during the survey period in round 2. Both „households‟ were omitted from the dataset. 
As households were recompensed for their time in participating in the survey (a 
payment in-kind of a small bag of salt) there was a clear incentive to attempt to beat the 
system in this way, and had the research been based on a one-off visit to villages rather 
than split into two rounds to capture seasonality, this incident would have slipped 
through the net. On consideration, it is fortunate there were not more incidents of this 
kind, but the level of familiarity and knowledge built up between the survey team and 
people living in the study sites meant they could be kept to a minimum. 
 
One of the strengths of the survey data collected in the research is the depth of 
information available for each household, although to achieve this sample size was 
sacrificed. Nevertheless, the sample is still large enough to permit robust estimation for 
each population subgroup (study site). Because more than one person was interviewed 
in each household (one adult male and one adult female, where relevant), at the 
individual level the sample is larger still. It was decided, however, to analyse the data at 
household level. At the outset, while the study was being designed, it was believed that 
different information, for example on crop cultivation, would be given by males and 
females in households based on the prior that men and women in households cultivate 
different crops in different fields. This was not the case in practice, and respondents 
reported crop cultivation, consumption, sales and losses at the household level resulting 
in duplicate information. 
 
Clustered survey design usually results in lowered precision of sampling estimates in 
terms of representativeness of population as a whole. Households within the same 
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cluster, in this case village, will be more similar to each other in terms of behaviour and 
characteristics compared with households in other clusters. This tends to be more 
pronounced in rural areas where households with shared geography also share agro-
ecological conditions, face the same prices and tend to belong to the same ethnic groups 
(see Deaton, 1997). Samples drawn in this way thus risk lowered variance. The research 
is based on just 3 clusters (villages), and the nature of rural lives of smallholder farmers 
in regions such as Northern Province suggests relatively little variability between 
households within each cluster. However, one of the motivations for the research is to 
examine how factors such as social networks, which are highly personal and do tend to 
vary from individual to individual, make a difference to households who ostensibly face 
very similar conditions and who appear to exhibit very similar characteristics, so this is 
not considered to be a problem here, and on the contrary can be viewed as a desirable 
property of the sample. This is discussed further in Chapter 5. Further, neighbourhood 
effects are captured using a dummy variable for location. Given the purposive nature of 
sample site selection, this variable also captures differential market access.  
 
Non-sampling errors 
 
Both respondents and enumerators can find surveys tiring and this may lead to errors as 
issues can be glossed over, people may choose not to answer a particular question or 
enumerators may not fill in parts of the questionnaire. In terms of using quantitative 
methods to collect data on social processes it is important to bear in mind the trade-offs 
that take place between the convenience of being able to gather specific, comparable 
information across a larger number of respondents and potentially missing important 
nuances and explanations due to the inherent oversimplification of social processes in 
reducing the complexity of human interaction in this way. It is true that the 
questionnaire for the research was bulky and as a result interviewer and interviewee 
fatigue almost certainly set in. It may have been preferable from the point of view of 
both parties to spread the questionnaire over several visits to the respondent, although in 
some cases, geographical location restricting access to respondents would have 
precluded this in the time we had available. However, the routine of checking 
completed questionnaires at the end of each day meant that re-visits we carried out 
where necessary. Using a well-trained and experienced survey team also meant errors 
related to misunderstanding questions on the part of both enumerators and respondents 
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was kept to a minimum, though cannot be ruled out completely. Complementing the 
survey with qualitative fieldwork, including following up some survey respondents as 
case studies, meant that more probing of issues could take place than is usually possible 
with questionnaire-based household surveys. The time spent living in each survey site 
during the course of the fieldwork meant also that further follow-up was possible, as 
well as making it more likely for „untruths‟ to be uncovered.  
 
Conducting network interviews as part of the household survey heightened many of the 
problems outlined above. Given the demands of the survey even without the social 
networks module, enumerators were unable to probe to any great extent should the 
question/response demand it. This is where follow-up interviews proved to be 
invaluable in clarifying and expanding on people‟s responses. The name generator 
instrument in particular, with its free-recall structure also posed further demands in data 
entry – which was carried out by the RuralNet team in Lusaka – with much room for 
error in recording names of network partners. However, the construction of the actual 
social networks dataset was carried out by myself, using the original questionnaires 
including clarifications on names and nicknames. 
 
In relation to social networks data themselves, there are issues related to measurement 
validity, reliability, accuracy, and error related to the nature of these data (see: 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 56-59; Marsden, 1990). Measurement error is related to 
the differences between the true structure and the observed structure of the social 
network. This can be caused by choice of reporting period leading to possible reporting 
and recall errors by respondents in relation to exactly who they have interacted with 
over a certain time period and the details of this interaction, such as frequency, purpose 
etc. Such errors are inherent in self-report data such as social network data collected 
from people reporting their own interactions. Studies on informant accuracy examining 
observed interactions compared with what people actually report of their interactions 
have found that „on average, about half of what informants report is probably incorrect 
in some way‟ (Bernard et al, 1984: 503). However, studies suggest this is only true of 
certain situations, for example recalling in great detail interactions at a party (see 
Freeman et al, 1987; Brewer, 2000). Overall, when principles of memory and cognition 
are taken into consideration when interpreting the studies, what people report of their 
interactions appears to be related to „long-range social structure‟ rather than to particular 
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instances (Freeman et al, 1987. See also: Marin, 2004), and therefore closer to the „true‟ 
structure of the network thus minimising measurement error. Measurement error was 
also minimised in the thesis research in the choice of a free recall rather than fixed 
choice design in the bulk of the social network data collection. Avoiding restricting the 
nomination process by asking people for the names of all the people they interact with 
rather than asking, for example, who are the three people they interact with most, 
minimises measurement error of the network itself and in measurement of network 
properties.  
 
A question often posed of qualitative in comparison with quantitative research is 
whether or not the findings are representative, if not of the population then certainly of 
the group of people under study, rather than purely anecdotal? Putting aside Lipton‟s 
(1992) assertion, of both economics (quantitative) and anthropological (qualitative) 
research, that until a researcher has studied a village they are not going to know whether 
or not sample is representative, also noting that “the idiosyncratic person...can well be 
key to the whole puzzle” (Lipton, 1992: 1543), it is important to bear in mind that the 
objective of qualitative work is not to be „representative‟ in a statistical sense of being 
generalisable to a whole population, or in this case the population of Northern Province 
smallholder farmers. Rather, the qualitative work strives to provide in-depth 
information about how and why, while the household survey focuses on what and how 
many.  
 
Issues of validity and reliability need also to be considered, especially in relation to the 
social networks data given its less „tangible‟ nature compared with other attributes such 
as crops grown or level of education.  Validity (or internal validity) refers to whether or 
not the data/ researchers actually measure the concepts they intend to measure. External 
validity refers to the „extent to which theoretical constructs and postulates generated or 
tested are applicable across groups‟ (see LeCompte and Goetz, 1982: 43-53). Validity is 
linked to questions arising due to conflicting findings from different methods, although 
it is important to remember that allowing for this is one of the main motivations behind 
taking a combined methods approach to empirical research and triangulating between 
methods, and can be a desirable outcome of the research and an interesting finding in 
itself.  However, one needs a relative degree of confidence regarding the internal 
coherence of a dataset and this is in part measured by the extent to which a number of 
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people agree about what they see and hear when they are all observing the same 
phenomenon in the same setting. In social networks analysis there is very little research 
on validity of some concepts, for example, measures of friendship. 
 
In asking whether or not a measure of a variable or a concept is reliable, this means do 
repeated measurements give the same estimate of the variable?  Key approaches to 
assessing the reliability of social network data include: test-retest comparison; 
comparing different question formats and reciprocity of sociometric choices (see Tracy 
et al 1990). However, in practice it can be problematic to use the test-retest approach as 
one cannot expect social phenomena to remain static over time, and in this respect 
research can be difficult to replicate (thus raising questions about external reliability). 
For qualitative data in general, and including social networks data, validity and 
reliability depend to a great extent on the „skill, sensitivity and integrity of the 
researcher‟ (Patton, 1990). Essential elements of this include „systematic and vigorous 
observation and skilful interviewing‟ so that findings are useful and credible, and this 
accords with the view in qualitative inquiry of the researcher as instrument (Patton, 
1990).  
 
To assess the degree of validity and reliability of the data collected in the research one 
can consider coverage and selection criteria. In terms of coverage, the household survey 
approached full enumeration in Lufubu (91 per cent of households), with lowest 
coverage in Ngulula at just over 20 per cent, and more than one-third of households 
enumerated (37 per cent) in Lufubu. The qualitative fieldwork broadened the reach of 
the research in including members of the population who had not been selected for the 
household survey. There was some overlap in participants of the survey and the 
qualitative fieldwork in these locations, though many households who had not been 
selected for the survey viewed the focus group discussion and group exercises as an 
opportunity for them to „have their say‟. Some households and individual household 
members were selected for revisits for follow-up discussions. Gender balance of 
participants of oral life histories/ individual interviews was good: of 44 interviews 
during round two, 23 were male and 21 were female, and care was taken to ensure 
gender balance in the composition of mixed focus group discussions. One exception to 
this was focus group discussions with the more prominent employers in each location – 
these tended to be male-dominated. Purposive sampling for in-depth interviews and 
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focus group discussions meant a broad range of age groups and „positions‟ in society 
were covered.  
 
The integration of methods in the research raised many practical issues, not least 
tensions caused by underestimating time needed for both the survey and qualitative 
components The resource demands (including budget needed) of carrying out in-depth 
research in this manner, including the level of detailed required in the household survey, 
constrained sample sizes, although in relation to population size coverage was good. 
Demands of the quantitative and qualitative elements of the fieldwork were often 
competing and in most cases the household survey took precedence. As this became 
apparent in Round 1 of the research, I was able to balance this out in the subsequent 
Round 2 of the research to allow more time post-household survey for a smaller team of 
researchers (myself and two translators) to remain in the study sites to carry out further 
research. 
 
 
Challenges notwithstanding, taking a combined methods approach has helped to provide 
a more rounded picture of social and economic realities in the study sites, allowing the 
strengths of each approach to overcome the limitations of the other. This proved to be 
vital given the nature of the research in attempting to uncover the social-embeddedness 
of economic behaviour and relations. 
 
......................... 
 
The next chapter uses these data to begin to analyse the local social environments and 
networks of small-holder farmers in the three study sites. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Social Networks in Three Zambian Villages 
 
 
This chapter analyses the social networks of survey respondents in smallholder farming 
households in the three study sites. Social networks variables are constructed using 
social network analysis techniques. The data are concerned with exchanges between the 
respondent (ego) and their network partners (alters), the ties between ego and alter, and 
attributes of alters. Information about the nature and extent of relationships provides 
insights into the social context, going beyond simpler measures such as group 
membership or network size. This enables us to consider the richness of people‟s 
connections and analyse the ways in which different types of networks may be 
important for accessing different resources for different people. 
 
Section 4.1 presents a visualisation of the social networks of three interconnected 
respondents from one of the survey sites. This is followed by definitions of the social 
networks variables constructed from the dataset to capture different dimensions of 
social networks: network size; prestige networks; and network diversity (Section 4.2). 
Correlations between the variables are presented in Section 4.3. Associations between 
the different social networks variables are set out in Section 4.4 to demonstrate that 
different characteristics are associated with different network properties. This analysis is 
extended in Section 4.5 using multivariate analysis of the social networks variables in 
relation to respondents‟ individual and household-level characteristics. Section 4.6 
concludes. 
 
 
4.1 Egocentric Social Networks 
 
The economic literature has for a long time examined the role of networks in economic 
life, more recently couched in terms of social capital, or social network capital. 
However, the overwhelming tendency has been to use group membership, and 
characteristics of group membership, and/or social network size to capture social 
network effects. Table 4.1 shows social capital and social network measures used in a 
selection of prominent econometric studies linking social capital and social network 
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capital to outcomes, drawing mainly on those in rural contexts. These studies are 
discussed in more detail in the literature review in Chapter 2. As the summary table 
demonstrates, these studies tend to capture social networks/capital using group 
membership and characteristics of group membership such as length of time in groups, 
and measures of network size to proxy for social networks/capital. The dearth of studies 
of social networks in relation to smallholder farmer commercialisation is reflected here. 
The most relevant studies to the thesis research focus variously on risk-sharing and 
insurance networks, technology diffusion, household welfare, agricultural traders, and 
not directly on smallholder farming outcomes.  Barr‟s (2002) work on the functional 
diversity and spill-over effects of social capital, based on data on entrepreneurial 
networks in Ghanaian manufacturing, is included here as a contrast to the tendency to 
focus in rural studies on group affiliation and related group membership characteristics, 
and network size,  as proxies for social networks. 
 
Table 4.1 Social Networks/ Capital Measures Used in a Selection of Econometric Studies 
Author(s) Study Network/ Social Capital Measures Used 
Conley and Udry 
(2010) 
Learning about a New 
Technology: Pineapple in Ghana 
Farmer’s information networks: who they know and talk to 
about farming 
Goldstein et al 
(2005) 
Inclusion and Exclusion in 
Mutual Insurance Networks in 
Southern Ghana 
Probability of knowing any person in the community; years 
respondent/family have lived in the village; number of 
fostering episodes;  number of organisations respondent 
belongs to 
Fafchamps and 
Lund (2003) 
Risk-sharing networks in rural 
Philippines 
Dummy variables for networks of friends, relatives etc. 
Network characteristics captured by: Number of network 
members; Number who own rice fields; Number with craft 
skills. 
Fafchamps and 
Minten (2002) 
Returns to Social Network 
Capital Among Traders 
Number of close relatives in agricultural trade; the number 
of non-family traders known by respondents; and the 
number of friends and family members who are able to 
support the business financially in difficult times 
Barr (2002) Functional Diversity and 
Spillover Effects of Social 
Capital (study of Ghanaian 
manufacturing) 
Mean number of contacts; Mean diversity of contacts; 
Mean number of liaisons with an average contact per year; 
Mean number of contacts of entrepreneurs co-networkers; 
Percentage of contacts who would assist in a crisis 
Maluccio, et al 
(2000) 
Social capital and household 
welfare in South Africa 
Index of individual membership in groups to proxy for 
social capital: three components: density - the number of 
group memberships per household;10 performance - the 
average reported performance of the most important 
groups in the household; and participation - the average 
reported frequency of meeting attendance for the most 
important groups in the household 
Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) 
Cents and Sociability: 
Household Income and Social 
Capital in Rural Tanzania 
Social capital indices based on membership in groups, 
characteristics of the groups, household values and 
attitudes. Trust variables - degree of trust in strangers, kin, 
village chairmen, district officials, central government 
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The research is interested in social networks and network relationships as the basis for 
access to resources contained within the network, and ultimately what this means for 
smallholder farmer outcomes. Drawing on anthropological and sociological studies of 
social institutions in rural Zambia, discussed in Chapter 1, the research recognises that 
different types of networks may be important for accessing different resources for 
different people. To capture the channels through which social networks may enable 
access to resources, the social networks survey module described in Chapter 3 collected 
egocentric network data related to exchanges between the respondent (ego) and their 
network partners (alters), the ties between ego and alter, and attributes of alters. This 
allows the construction of social networks measures going beyond size and affiliation 
variables generally used in studies, described above. 
 
Egocentric network approaches are appropriate when hypotheses are posed at the 
individual level. An added advantage of an egocentric over a full-network approach is 
that it is less problematic statistically and econometrically. Standard statistical 
procedures including hypothesis and significance tests apply because the independence 
of observations assumptions are not violated. Analysis of egocentric data first requires 
summaries of network composition and of features of the individual ties to generate a 
set of variables that are attributes of the respondent. These social networks measures can 
be used as independent variables to predict outcomes. Measures of network properties 
include network size and network heterogeneity, as well as variables capturing features 
of individual ties including: frequency, duration, multiplexity and intensity. These are 
defined and discussed in more detail in Section 4.2 below. In the research we are 
concerned with only first-order, direct ties between respondents and their network 
partners („alters‟), and not ties between alters.  Ego and each alter has only one tie, but 
this tie may have multiple role relationships. 
 
First, consider what the social networks of the survey respondents look like. Figure 4.1 
shows a network diagram or sociogram of the egocentric network of three of the 
respondents participating in the research.  
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Figure 4.1: Egocentric Networks of Three Interconnected Egos 
 
Source: Household Survey, Northern Province Zambia, September 2002. 
 
Each respondent, or ego, is represented by a square with a number in the centre. Each 
alter is a black dot and the tie between ego and alter is given by a line (also called 
edges). Respondent 19 (blue) has a small reported social network, just 4 people. 
Respondent 27 (green) has 9 reported network partners and respondent 66 (red) has 39 
reported network partners. Taking respondent 19 as the focal individual, for 
simplification, this person‟s employment networks can be seen by the black lines in the 
graph, both respondent 66 and respondent 27 provide employment to respondent 19. 
Respondent 19‟s social support networks with kin network partners are given by the 
Fuchsia line. One of respondent 19‟s network partners is kin providing social support.  
The links between the other two egos (27 and 66) could similarly be coded to denote a 
particular type of network relationship. For example, the connection between 
respondent 66 and respondent 27 could also be given by a Fuchsia line. Respondent 27 
is the mother-in-law of respondent 66 and has stated a social support relationship. The 
graph can be extended to include a visualisation of multiple network relationships 
between egos and alters. For example, Figure 4.2 shows respondent 27‟s multiplex ties 
in terms of resources accessed through the network. This respondent has multiplex ties 
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with just two alters: Alter 2 and Respondent (alter) 66. In this case alter 2 is an 
employee and also provides information. Alter 66 provides social support and 
information. Multiplex ties are given by the broken line. 
 
Figure 4.2 Egocentric Network with Two Multiplex Ties 
 
 
The next section defines the social networks measures constructed from the dataset.  
 
 
4.2 Social Networks Measures 
 
The social networks survey instrument comprised three main components: the name 
generator, the position generator and the resource generator (see van der Gaag and 
Snijders, 2003a; 2003b; Lin and Dumin, 1986). The dataset was constructed as a tie-
wise dataset, in which each case is an alter and the dataset contains information on alter 
attributes as well as the relationships between alter and ego. This allows network 
properties to be aggregated to the respondent and household levels for use in the 
econometric analysis. The tiewise dataset was thus subsequently aggregated and 
structured into a netwise dataset, where each case is the respondent or ego (described in 
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Chapter 3. See also Müller et al, 1999). The analysis in this chapter focuses on 
individual level social networks, with a sample size N=211. Analysis in subsequent 
chapters relating social networks to outcomes uses the household as the unit of analysis 
because the outcome variables in Chapters 5 and 6 are household level variables. 
Constructed social network variables capture three different dimensions of social 
networks: network size; prestige networks; and network diversity. The following 
subsections discuss each in turn. 
 
4.2.1 Network Size 
 
Network size can give an indication of the likelihood of a network containing an alter 
who possesses a resource that ego needs (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). Network size 
measures can be constructed from the data. These include the total number of alters 
(network size) or the number of alters who fulfil specific roles such as providing 
employment, for example the size of employment network. Group affiliation contributes 
to network size, and the analysis includes a variable for membership of community-
level groups and societies as a more „typical‟ social capital variable. Table 4.2 
summarises network size variables derived from the Tiewise dataset described in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Table 4.2 Network Size Variables  
Variable name Definition Mean St. dev Min Max 
size Total number of network partners cited across all 
role relationships (interaction, employer, 
employee, migration, marketing, social support, 
information)   
9.81  5.67 2 39 
affil Group Affiliation variable. Membership of village-
level and other formal or informal groups  
2.04 1.50 0 7 
 
Size is the most basic measure of a social network, defined simply as the total number 
of network partners in an interpersonal environment. According to social networks 
studies, network size gives a “reasonably direct measure of social integration” (see, 
among others, Marsden, 1990; 1987; Marsden and Campbell, 1984). However, it is 
important to note that the number of alters might be misleading as a measure of ego‟s 
“connectedness” in terms of accessibility of resources because it assumes each tie has 
the same sort of content, and does not tell us anything about embedded social resources. 
Using the household survey data, size of network is captured by i) the total number of 
alters (size); and ii) group affiliation (affil). Here, size is measured as the number of 
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different alters given across the following environments: interpersonal (interaction), 
labour (both employer and employee), migration, marketing, social support and 
information. Group affiliation is a variable capturing respondents‟ total number of 
memberships of formal and informal village-level groups and societies including 
women‟s groups, sports clubs, farmer groups and cooperatives.  Figure 4.3 shows the 
kernel density estimate for network size. Larger networks (larger than 10 alters) are 
relatively uncommon in the sample.  
 
Figure 4.3: Kernel Density Estimate – Network Size 
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4.2.2 Prestige and Influence 
 
Social capital studies suggest that positive social capital results from accessing network 
members with high prestige, relative to ego and other alters in the network. This is 
because alters in „powerful‟ positions are more influential and more likely to provide 
access to valuable and/or novel resources (financial, cultural and political) in their 
network (Lin, 2001). This relates to „bridging‟ or „linking‟ networks: links with 
individuals who are dissimilar to „ego‟ and provide access to a more diverse flow of 
resources (See Woolcock, 2003). This goes beyond the number of ties or associations in 
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a network to ascribe also some kind of potential „value‟ to alters and to the ties between 
ego and alter. 
 
Unlike traditional position generator instruments, which tend to present respondents 
with lists of occupations from which to identify where they have alters, the research did 
not define prestige networks in relation to occupations. Instead, the social networks 
survey asked respondents whether or not they had influential network partners, phrased 
as “Do you have a friend/kin who: owns a business/ heads a committee/ community 
leader/ other influential position?”, along with their position, relationship to respondent, 
and their location (see Appendix A). This allowed the survey instrument to capture 
context-specific notions of prestige rather than imposing these from the outside. 
Prestige networks are captured as a dummy variable signifying the presence or absence 
of influential kin or friends, and a categorical variable for location: whether they live in 
ego‟s own community (village) or elsewhere (Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3 Prestige Network Variables 
Variable Name Definition Mean St.Dev Min Max 
kininf Whether or not respondent’s network 
comprises influential kin or friends 
0.57  0.49 0 1 
kinloc Location of influential kin/ friend 0.75   0.76 0 2 
 
4.2.3 Diversity in Composition and Function 
 
The greater the diversity of the network (in terms of social resources accessed through 
the network, or range of network relationships), the more chance there is that someone 
in the network has something that the „ego‟ needs. High diversity implies integration 
into several spheres of society or social circles/ contexts and this is considered to be 
advantageous for mobilising resources and for instrumental actions like gathering 
information (Lin et al, 1981; Campbell et al., 1986; Kadushin, 1982). Once again, by 
merely counting the number of different alters in a network we miss information about 
the relationship between ego and alter, how useful an alter might be for resource access 
or for providing support and information. Network diversity is another way of 
considering network heterogeneity – or how mixed networks are.  Variables that capture 
network heterogeneity include: diversity of composition (sex and age heterogeneity of 
alters, kin versus non-kin network partners), and functional diversity (alters perform a 
variety of functions in the life of „ego‟). Functional diversity can be captured in various 
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ways, for example as the number of „networks‟ an alter operates in, in relation to the 
respondent, or the number of resources ego can access through the network, or the 
number of ties that are multiplex, that is,  have more than one function or role 
relationship in ego‟s network. 
 
A. Diversity of Composition 
 
Heterogeneity or dispersion measures of network partner attribute variables are the most 
direct measures of the diversity of alters that ego can contact within his/her personal 
environment (see Campbell et al, 1986). Respondents‟ networks may be highly 
heterogeneous in some respects yet homogeneous in others, for example in the way they 
vary by age, sex, kin. For interval measures of network partner characteristics (for 
example, age) the standard deviation of alter attributes is used. For nominal or 
categorical variables, such as ethnic group, sex etc, analysts use an Index of Qualitative 
Variation (IQV). 
 
The Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) is a measure of variability or dispersion that 
represents diversity within a distribution, measuring variation by comparing the cases 
(scores or observations) to one another. It is appropriate for any level of measurement 
once it has been categorised (see Agresti and Agresti, 1977). IQV is a standardised 
version of the Index of Diversity, which indicates the likelihood that two observations 
drawn at random from a sample are from different categories of the variable. The IQV is 
the ratio of observed to maximum heterogeneity, and ranges in value from zero to 1. A 
value of zero means there is no diversity at all. A value of 1 signifies a distribution that 
is maximally diverse. For our sample we have calculated the IQV of each respondent‟s 
sex of network partners using the formula: 
 
IQV=k(N
2
-f2)/N2(k-1)     (1) 
 
where: 
k    = number of categories (male/female) 
N   = number of cases (network size) 
f2 =  sum of squared frequencies of each category 
 
However, when constructed in this way a network of two members, one male and one 
female, would get an IQV score of 1 and be maximally diverse, whereas a network of, 
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say, 20 people, 13 of whom are male and 7 female, would get an IQV score of around 
0.9 and therefore appear less diverse than the smaller network. This does not make 
logical sense so the measure is standardised by weighting it by the size of the 
respondent‟s network as a proportion of the largest network size in a respondent‟s 
location.  
 
Heterogeneity gives some idea of the range of someone‟s social network, that is, 
potential access to social resources. Size can also be used as a measure of range. In 
general, heterogeneity increases with network range. In the research, network 
heterogeneity is captured by diversity in age and sex of network partners, and kin 
composition of networks (Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4.4 Composition Diversity Variables 
Variable Name Definition Mean St.Dev Min Max 
agehet Age heterogeneity of network partners 
(standard deviation of alter ages, across each 
network) 
10.5   4.91 0 28.99 
sexhet Sex heterogeneity of alters (Simpson’s Index of 
Qualitative Variation in sex of alters, across 
each network) 
0.18   0.17 0 0.98 
propkin Proportion of network members who are kin  0.33 0.26 0 1 
 
Age Heterogeneity is measured as the standard deviation of the ages of each 
respondent‟s network partners. The kernel density estimate in Figure 4.4 shows that it is 
centred around the lower two-thirds of scores, suggesting very mixed networks in terms 
of age are relatively less common in the sample.  Figure 4.5 gives the distribution of the 
sex heterogeneity variable. This appears to be skewed towards lower values of the 
variable suggesting more homogeneity in networks related to sex of network partner. 
This fits with the local context, Zambian society, especially in rural areas, is generally 
conservative, „gender‟ relations are very traditional in that there is a tendency towards 
less interaction between members of the opposite sex who are not kin/ related. The twin 
peak in the sex heterogeneity plot suggests that there may be two underlying 
distributions here, possibly one for men and one for women. 
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Figure 4.4: Kernel Density Estimate – Age Heterogeneity of Network 
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Figure 4.5: Kernel Density Estimate – Sex Heterogeneity of Network 
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Relational heterogeneity is given by the ratio of kin to non-kin alters in ego‟s network 
(see Marsden, 1987). A high proportion of kin in one‟s network implies a network that 
may be less diverse in terms of background of alters. It also implies that ties between 
ego and kin alters are strong ties, relating to Granovetter‟s “Strength of Weak Ties” 
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argument (Granovetter, 1973; 1983). Weak ties between alters provide access to other 
people‟s clusters of closely knit friends, that are different from one‟s own close circle of 
friends. They therefore potentially act as a crucial bridge to novel information and 
resources „from distant parts of the social structure‟, which is seen to be an advantage in 
competitive environments (see Burt, 1992). By contrast, alters with strong ties to each 
other, such as kin, tend to know the same things ego knows, and are less likely to 
provide such access to information and resources. The distribution of the kin 
composition variable is given in Figure 4.6. The distribution suggests most networks 
have lower proportions of kin (less than 0.5): the average proportion of kin is just one 
third (Table 4.4). This is on the surface surprising given the importance of kin in the 
context of the three rural communities, although the inclusion of a resettlement scheme 
may be influencing the distribution here. Breaking down the propkin variable by 
community, this indeed appears to be the case (Table 4.5). The maximum kin 
proportion network in Lufubu is two-thirds compared with Kabila and Ngulula, where 
respondents reported entire networks consisting of kin; the average kin proportion in 
Lufubu is also lower. 
 
Figure 4.6: Kernel Density Estimate – Kin Composition of Network 
0
.5
1
1
.5
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
ratio of kin to nonkin network partners
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0801
Kernel density estimate: ratio of kin to nonkin
 
 
118 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Kin as proportion of Network, by Community 
Propkin N Mean St.Dev Min Max 
Kabila 61 0.49 0.27 0 1 
Ngulula 51 0.36 0.27 0 1 
Lufubu 99 0.22 0.19 0 .67 
 
B. Functional Diversity 
 
Functional diversity of a network can be captured by measures on tie attributes, 
describing the quality of relations between the respondent and network partners. 
Concepts here include direction, frequency, duration, multiplexity, and intensity of 
relationship (Marsden, 1987; Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Scott, 1991). Many measures 
at the network level are inductive and often used as indicators of more than one concept: 
 
Multiplexity: or „multi-stranded‟ relationships. Relationships between ego and 
alters can operate in different contexts or with different roles, for example as employer-
employee, and/or as friends who offer each other social support, and/or as a source of 
information (see also: Mitchell, 1969; Marsden, 1987; Skvoretz and Agneessens, 2007). 
Multi-stranded relationships “tend to be more intense because they are more diffuse in 
character” (Scott, 1991: 32). Positions in one set of relations may reinforce or contradict 
positions in another. Moreover, actors may be tied quite closely in one relationship 
network but be quite distant from one another in others. 
Direction: relationships can involve a transaction or exchange, encompassing 
reciprocal arrangements, or they can be one-way. For example the respondent employs 
Person B, but B does not employ the respondent. Therefore in the respondent‟s 
employee network the relationship is uni-directional. 
Intensity: The strength of obligations involved in a relationship. This can be 
measured in a number of ways: the strength of commitment to obligations or the 
multiplexity of the relationship or whether the relationship is with kin or non-kin, or by 
the general level of „closeness‟ between the respondent and network partner, for 
example are they friends or merely neighbours. It can also be measured as the number 
of relationships a respondent and network partner share. 
Frequency: how often does interaction take place? (mean frequency of contact 
for each tie). 
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Duration: Is the relationship a one-off or is it constantly being „activated‟? i.e. 
transience of relationship. 
 
Here, diversity in the ties between the respondent and their network partners is 
measured using variables capturing multiplexity in the relationships between the 
respondent and their network partners. Multiplexity can also signify strength of 
relationship. It can indicate the extent to which ego is strongly or weakly tied to alters 
and the extent to which alters might be obligated to support him/her, and vice-versa. 
Social networks studies measure multiplexity in a number of ways. Measures of 
multiplexity based on the ties between ego and alter are: 
 the total number of multiplex ties (multiplex: the number of ego-alter 
relationships with more than one role or function); 
 a dummy variable for the existence of these multiplex ties in ego‟s network 
(multidum); 
 and the number of multiplex ties as a proportion of the total number of ties 
(propmult), that is, as a proportion of network size (Kapferer, 1969). 
 
Roles or functions are defined in the study as interactions along the following networks: 
social interaction, labour, migration, marketing, social support, information, group 
affiliation. When an alter is mentioned in relation to more than one of these functions, 
for example as an employer and also providing social support, then the tie is considered 
to be multiplex. For the individual therefore the variable multiplex can range in value 
from zero, to denote ego has no tie mentioned more than once, to all ties in the network 
being multiplex, which for the individual will correspond to the total number of ties in 
their network (network size). 
 
Multiplexity from ego‟s perspective can be captured in two further ways. First, the 
mean number of roles found in ties between ego and alters.  Alters can have ties to ego 
in each of the seven strands of instrumental network being measured, that is, the 
relationship has multiple contents. This can range from 1, the alter has only one role 
relationship with ego, to 7, the alter is mentioned in relation to all of the roles. The 
variable multcont is thus the average number of roles an ego‟s alters have across the 7 
networks types. A score of “zero” would denote no relationships and corresponds to 
complete isolation (a network size of zero). Second, multiplexity can be given by the 
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“number of specific relational contents...represented in a network” (Campbell et al, 
1986:104).  In the survey, respondents were asked about different network contents or 
resources focusing on specific types of social support or information in the „resource 
generator‟ section of the social networks survey module, for example “who would you 
go to if you were ill in bed and needed help at home” (questions 7.25-7.29. See 
Appendix A). These network contents and labour network content from a separate 
labour markets survey module are combined (summed) to give a variable with 
potentially a maximum score of 21 and a minimum score of zero (ressum). 
 
Functional diversity (multiplexity) measures constructed from the survey data based on 
tie characteristics are summarised in Table 4.6, and the kernel density estimate for the 
variable propmult is given in Figure 4.7. Once again, the twin peak is suggestive of two 
underlying distributions, possibly between commercialised and non-commercialised 
farmers – the former tend to score more highly on the propmult variable, with a higher 
average score. 
 
Table 4.6 Functional Diversity Variables 
Variable Name Definition Mean St.Dev Min Max 
multiplex Total number of multiplex ties 1.67  1.43 0 7 
multidum Dummy variable for the existence of multiplex 
ties 
0.78   0.42 0 1 
propmult Proportion of total number of ties that are 
multiplex (multiplex/size) 
0.18 0.15 0 0.67 
ressum Sum of resources accessed across network 
(max=21) 
12.00 4.43 0 20 
multcont Average number of  ‘contents’ ie network 
roles  per alter (max=7) 
3.22   0.83   2 7 
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Figure 4.7: Kernel Density Estimate – Network Multiplexity (proportion of ties) 
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The next section sets out correlations between the social networks variables. 
 
 
4.3 Correlations between different social networks measures 
 
Correlations between the different social networks measures described above, including 
the variable for group affiliation, are examined to test whether the social networks 
variables are capturing different things. The correlation coefficients are given in Table 
4.7. There is only one strong correlation, between the network size and sex 
heterogeneity of network partners (rho=0.72). The positive sign suggests that larger 
networks are more mixed. There is a moderate correlation between network size and 
group affiliation (rho=0.47) – group members have bigger networks; and between 
network size and two of the multiplexity variables: ressum (number of resources 
accessed through networks: rho=0.49); and multiplex (total number of multiplex ties: 
rho=0.43). A larger network means access to more network resources and more 
multiplex ties, that is more network partners performing multiple roles/functions, both 
relationships to be expected. The variable capturing the ratio of kin to nonkin in the 
network (propkin) has a weakly negative correlation with network size that is 
significant at 5 per cent. The multiplexity variables all have significant and mostly 
moderate positive correlations with each other, suggesting the research may wish to 
122 
 
 
 
select just one multiplexity variable in subsequent multivariate analyses. The propmult 
variable is the preferred multiplexity measure as this takes network size into account. 
 
Table 4.7 Social Networks Variables: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 size affil agehet IQVst2 propkin multcont ressum multiplex 
size  1        
affil  0.47*  1       
agehet -0.04 -0.08  1      
IQVst2  0.72*  0.21*  0.01 1     
propkin -0.22* -0.21* 0.16* -0.003 1    
multcont  0.08  0.13 -0.07  0.08  0.05 1   
ressum  0.49*  0.41*  0.12  0.33*  0.01 0.19* 1  
multiplex  0.43*  0.27* -0.07  0.32* -0.02 0.52* 0.39* 1 
propmult -0.10  0.03 -0.01 -0.03  0.11 0.62* 0.19* 0.72* 
* p<0.05 
 
 
The next section (4.4) presents bivariate analysis of social networks data and respondent 
attributes, before turning to multivariate analysis in Section 4.5. 
 
 
4.4 Network characteristics and respondent attributes 
 
This section analyses relationships between respondent networks and other individual 
attributes, reporting only those that are statistically significant, to test if social networks 
properties vary over the same individuals, and by implication does one draw different 
conclusions about how connected people are if different social networks measures are 
used. This section presents some simple bivariate associations before moving on to 
more formal testing using multivariate analysis in the next section. 
 
Appendix B presents cross-tabulations of significant relationships between categorical 
versions of a selection of social networks variables.  Different kinds of people do appear 
to have different network properties. Respondents with a male household head tend to 
report larger networks, as do those with a higher level of education (Table B.1 in 
Appendix B). Network size appears to be increasing with level of education. This may 
be related to the greater opportunity to expand one‟s network as a direct result of 
attending secondary school, which tend to be located in the nearest town, by providing 
the opportunity to mix with a (more diverse) set of people outside of one‟s community.  
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Males report larger networks than females: In the sample there are roughly equal 
numbers of men and women (slightly more men than women: 53.3 per cent male against 
46.7 per cent female). Overall, male respondents are over-represented in the larger 
network categories and women in the smaller. Women make up 63.5 per cent of 
smallest network category and men 67.6 per cent of the >15 network partners category 
(Table B.2 in Appendix B). But women‟s networks are more likely to be mixed-sex 
than those of men. Most men (57.6 per cent) fall in the middle of the distribution, but 
are over-represented in the lower sex heterogeneity category, making up 77.6 per cent 
of those with low sex heterogeneity in their networks (Table B.10 in Appendix B). 
Women make up 79.3 per cent of those with sex heterogeneity of greater than 0.9 
compared with 48.9 per cent of the sample as a whole. Men are likely to have network 
partners in more of the network types than women: almost 60 per cent of those involved 
in five, six or the maximum seven of the networks being measured are males compared 
with 51.1 per cent of respondents being male in the sample as a whole (Table B.11).  
 
Employers of group labour have larger networks: Across the sample as whole, 
employers of group labour tend to have larger networks (70.6 per cent of those with 
networks of greater than 15 network partners compared with 41.6 per cent of sample). 
Three-quarters of those with 5 or fewer network partners are not employers of group 
labour compared with 58.4 per cent of sample (Table B.4 in Appendix B). Employers of 
group labour are also more likely to be involved in many kinds of network, and to report 
having influential kin or friends in their network. Those employing group labour are 
over-represented in the larger multiplexity category of five to seven of the instrumental 
networks being studied:  56.8 per cent of respondents involved in between five and 
seven networks employ group labour compared with 41.6 per cent of sample (Table 
B.11 in Appendix B).  
 
The next section extends the analysis to consider multivariate relationships between 
respondent and household attributes and network characteristics to test whether the way 
networks are measured matters. 
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4.5 Determinants of Social Network Characteristics 
 
The analysis above suggests it is important how we measure social networks: different 
individual and household characteristics have different relationships to social networks. 
This section presents the results of regression analysis taking in turn as dependent 
variable each social network variable: network size; group affiliation, age heterogeneity 
of network; sex heterogeneity of network; kin members as proportion of network; and 
the four multiplexity variables (multiplex, propmult, multcont and ressum). The purpose 
of the analysis is to see if we can identify what kinds of networks different types of 
people have, and whether or not there is any consistency across people in terms of their 
network characteristics. Summary statistics for the dependent variables and regressors 
are given in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 Dependent Variables in Social Networks OLS estimations 
Dependent Variables: N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
size 211 9.81 5.67 2 39 
affil 211 2.04 1.50 0 7 
agehet 203 10.50 4.91 0 28.99 
IQVst2 211 0.18 0.17 0 0.98 
propkin 211 0.33 0.26 0 1 
multcont 211 3.22 0.83 2 7 
ressum 211 11.95 4.43 0 20 
multiplex 211 1.67 1.43 0 7 
propmult 211 0.18 0.15 0 0.67 
Regressors:       
Sex (memb_sex) 211 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Age (memb_age) 211 40.17 13.74 15 80 
Household Size (hh_size) 211 7.09 3.06 1 17 
Sex of HH head (hh_sex) 211 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Marital status (marital) 211 1.14 0.35 1 2 
HH Head dummy (hhhead) 211 1.42 0.50 1 2 
Education level (educ) 196 1.96 0.71 1 3 
Communal labour dummy (commun) 211 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Nonfarm income dummy (nonfarm) 211 0.40 0.49 0 1 
No of large livestock (livelarg) 211 2.44 4.67 0 39 
No of small livestock (livesmall) 211 5.76 6.25 0 45 
Group labour employee (glpart2) 211 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Group labour employer (glboss2) 211 0.44 0.50 0 1 
 
The regressors are chosen to represent the main characteristics of individuals: sex, age, 
education level, marital status, whether or not the respondent is household head; as well 
some household-level demographic information: household size, sex of household head. 
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Variables are also included for livestock ownership as a proxy for assets. A distinction 
is made between large and small livestock because large livestock is more indicative of 
assets in terms of being a store of value, as well as potential farm inputs (draught 
animals; manure). Variables are also included for involvement in communal labour on 
community works such as road maintenance, for group labour involvement, and dummy 
variables for both employer and employee of group labour, as these might be expected 
to be closely related to social networks. 
 
Leaving aside for now the issue of potential endogeneity, each estimation is compared 
to see how the coefficients change with the different dependent variables
35
. While the 
data are collected at the individual level, in many cases multiple people are from the 
same household (just 57 households have a single respondent). A set of household 
dummies are included to capture fixed effects
36
. The equality of coefficients between 
the equations is tested. Results of the Ordinary Least Squares regressions are given in 
Table 4.9. 
 
An F- test of the equality of coefficients of variable k between regressions (m), β(k,m), 
tests whether or not all coefficients in each regression are different from each other, 
under the null hypothesis H0: β(k,1),= β(k,2) =...=β(k,m). The F test gives an F statistic of 
F(128, 173) = 3.07 (Prob > F = 0.0000), rejecting the null hypothesis, suggesting that 
the correlates of social networks characteristics do differ significantly across the 
different social networks measures and that different groups of individuals have 
different kinds of networks. 
 
                                                     
35
 Endogeneity may arise because of reverse causality between the social networks variables and 
other characteristics of respondents. For example, involvement in group labour may lead to 
larger networks but larger networks may also lead to more involvement in group labour, either 
through the information ( for example, job search and screening) effects of networks, or through 
greater obligation towards networks partners to participate in reciprocal group labour. The 
research returns to this issue in detail and offers solutions in Chapter 6. 
36
 See also the discussion of unobserved heterogeneity in Chapter 6. 
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Table 4.9 OLS Results: Determinants of Social Networks Characteristics 
 Network Size Network Diversity: Composition Network Diversity: Function 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES size affil agehet IQVst2 propkin multcont ressum multiplex propmult 
          
Ngulula 13.73 2.74 11.79 0.55* 0.16 -2.20 6.18 -1.91 -0.52* 
 (1.01) (0.77) (1.05) (1.37) (0.26) (-1.14) (0.60) (-0.58) (-1.47) 
Lufubu -9.86 -3.61 7.88 -0.14 -0.15 -0.63 -0.54 -5.02* -0.25 
 (-0.86) (-1.20) (0.84) (-0.43) (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.06) (-1.81) (-0.82) 
memb_sex -1.10 -0.36 1.31 0.15*** -0.01 -0.27 -0.36 -0.72* -0.03 
 (-0.10) (-0.12) (0.14) (0.44) (-0.02) (-0.17) (-0.04) (-0.26) (-0.10) 
memb_age -0.10 -0.02 -0.09 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.35) (-0.46) (-0.10) (-0.41) (-0.17) (-0.08) 
marital -5.00 -0.75 3.38 -0.19 0.13 -0.12 -6.41** -0.52 -0.02 
 (-0.28) (-0.16) (0.21) (-0.35) (0.17) (-0.05) (-0.47) (-0.12) (-0.04) 
hh_size 0.45 0.20 2.01* 0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.13 0.10 -0.00 
 (0.24) (0.40) (1.27) (0.56) (0.11) (-0.72) (-0.09) (0.22) (-0.01) 
hh_sex -10.27 -3.10 9.24 -0.26 -0.08 0.74 -5.76 -0.38 0.22 
 (-0.59) (-0.68) (0.61) (-0.50) (-0.10) (0.30) (-0.44) (-0.09) (0.50) 
hhhead -1.43 -0.75 -2.21 -0.09 -0.03 -0.31 -2.86* -0.17 -0.04 
 (-0.12) (-0.25) (-0.23) (-0.26) (-0.07) (-0.19) (-0.33) (-0.06) (-0.15) 
nonfarm 1.08 -0.78* 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.13 0.02 0.36 0.03 
 (0.09) (-0.25) (0.00) (0.08) (0.17) (-0.08) (0.00) (0.13) (0.10) 
upp prim ed 0.16 -0.23 0.70 -0.03 -0.15* -0.33 0.01 -0.39 -0.05 
 (0.01) (-0.08) (0.07) (-0.10) (-0.29) (-0.20) (0.00) (-0.14) (-0.17) 
sec ed 0.97 -0.24 1.76 0.02 -0.15 -0.76** 0.19 -0.58 -0.12* 
 (0.07) (-0.07) (0.16) (0.06) (-0.24) (-0.40) (0.02) (-0.17) (-0.34) 
commun -1.56 0.10 4.45* -0.02 0.10 -0.02 -1.91 0.62 0.07 
 (-0.10) (0.02) (0.33) (-0.04) (0.14) (-0.01) (-0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
livelarg -0.87 -0.67 2.98* 0.00 0.01 -0.11 -0.59 -0.07 0.02 
 (-0.73) (-2.12) (3.04) (0.00) (0.12) (-0.66) (-0.65) (-0.25) (0.60) 
livesmall 0.68 0.37 -1.38 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.75) (1.55) (-1.84) (0.16) (-0.17) (0.01) (0.17) (0.12) (-0.77) 
glpart2 -1.06 0.03 2.47 -0.00 -0.12 -0.02 1.45 -0.35 -0.02 
 (-0.09) (0.01) (0.25) (-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.01) (0.16) (-0.12) (-0.05) 
glboss2 5.32*** 0.82* -1.04 0.09* -0.01 0.33 3.21** 0.25 -0.05 
 (0.46) (0.27) (-0.11) (0.28) (-0.02) (0.20) (0.37) (0.09) (-0.17) 
Constant 18.47 4.48 -12.59 0.36 0.63 6.64** 30.74** 5.97 0.67 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
          
Observations 196 196 190 196 196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.842 0.792 0.763 0.782 0.803 0.777 0.809 0.816 0.791 
          
Household 
Fixed Effects 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.81 
Prob > F 
= 0.0063 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.10 
Prob > F =    
0.3396 
F(119, 54) 
= 1.02 
  Prob > F 
= 0.4812 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.45 
Prob > F =    
0.0576 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.38 
 Prob > F 
= 0.0860 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.34 
Prob > F =    
0.1055 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.58 
 Prob > F =    
0.0263 
F(120, 59) 
= 1.70 
  Prob > F 
=    0.0122 
F(120, 59) =    
1.53 
Prob > F =    
0.0344 
  
Normalized beta coefficients in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
N=196, due to the availability of education data, with the exception of the age heterogeneity 
regression where missing data on alter ages for five respondents reduces the sample size further 
to 190.  
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Household id dummies are included in the regressions to pick up household fixed 
effects: unobserved correlations within households, those characteristics that people in 
the same households share that might also affect their social networks properties, for 
example personality, popularity, status. F-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients on 
the household id dummies are jointly equal to zero fail to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 10 per cent level for three of the regressions (affil, agehet and multcont) and for two 
at the 5 per cent level (IQVst2 and propkin). This suggests that shared household 
characteristics may not affect respondents‟ network diversity of composition, group 
affiliation and multiplexity measured as the average number of network roles per alter, 
but may be important for other network characteristics, such as network size and 
resources accessed through networks. This could be due to unobservables not captured 
by the household survey, such as personality or popularity of the people the respondent 
shares a household with: more outgoing people may be more likely to have larger 
networks, and more popular or higher status people may attract more „followers‟. These 
may generate positive (or negative) externalities for ego, as people are likely to benefit 
(or otherwise) from the externalities of the social networks of those they live with. A 
variable for power in groups, which may proxy for status, is available in the household 
survey, based on responses to Question 7.16: To what extent do you participate in the 
group‟s decision-making? (Appendix A). Bivariate distributions of this variable by 
network size suggest that those with more decision-making power in groups tend also to 
have larger networks (Table B.12 in Appendix B). 
 
From the OLS estimations it is interesting that women (memb_sex variable, base 
category male) are more likely to have smaller networks but these networks seem to be 
more heterogeneous, whereas men have larger networks but don‟t necessarily gain any 
additional information from the extra members as captured by the composition diversity 
measures for sex heterogeneity (IQVst2). Therefore whether or not men are considered 
to be better connected than women depends on the measure used.  
 
People who are employers of non-household group labour (that is, are able to mobilise a 
following) appear to have larger networks (5 more alters than average), as well as 
network advantages over non-employers in relation to the resources they are able to 
access through networks (ressum: accessing 3 more resources through their networks 
than the average). This can be illustrated by the observation by participants in the 
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qualitative fieldwork that “the „famous‟ always get their work done” and “those who are 
well known easily have their work done, which includes finding customers as well as 
employees”. By contrast, those employed in group labour activities have smaller 
networks. One reason may be that their networks for economic and for social activities 
overlap. However, there appears to be little difference between group labour employees 
and other people in terms of most network characteristics. 
 
Owners of large livestock appear to have larger networks and more diversity in their 
network composition therefore potentially access to more novel information, but other 
than that have no additional network advantages over those who have small livestock, in 
terms of resources actually accessed through networks. This may be because livestock 
farming is still an agricultural activity, and is quite widespread, so the differences in 
types of people encountered and thus types of resources accessed may not be 
appreciably different. 
 
In summary, the preceding analysis shows that it does matter how social networks are 
measured. Different findings emerge on who is more connected depending on which 
measure is used, and different types of connectedness will be important for different 
types of people.  For example, the analysis suggests that while men tend to report larger 
networks than women, the sex composition of women‟s networks is more mixed. This is 
important in the context of the research. There are two main modes of cultivation in the 
study sites: ibala or garden cultivation on mounds and citemene or slash and burn 
cultivation. For citemene in particular land preparation tasks are strongly gender 
disaggregated (discussed in Chapter 1). Men tend to cut the trees, while women collect, 
pile and burn the branches. Qualitative fieldwork suggests that while men may pile 
branches etc, it is very rare for women to cut trees, therefore access to male labour, and 
in particular male group labour, for these tasks is crucial. This suggests that a woman 
with a more mixed network, balanced between men and women, rather than being 
heavily made up of women, may be at an advantage when it comes to organising male 
labour for these tasks especially if there is limited or no availability of male labour in 
the household. Using just network size or group affiliation to capture social networks 
(or social capital) would miss valuable network characteristics such as this, leading to 
misleading results about connectedness and resource access. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has defined social networks variables constructed using the survey data, 
and analysed relationships between different aspects of social networks and 
respondents‟ individual and household characteristics to provide insights into the social 
networks of respondents in the study sites. Correlations, basic descriptive statistics and 
some simple multivariate analyses suggest significant associations between various 
individual and household-level attributes and social networks, and these differ 
according to the social networks measure used. This implies different groups of 
individuals have different kinds of networks. Some low correlations between the 
variables also suggest that different measures of social networks are capturing different 
things. This is backed up by the OLS results using the social networks measures as 
dependent variables. Here, estimates on the parameters change according to the 
dependent variable used. That different demographic groups have different kinds of 
networks is signalled by the way the signs on the coefficients for the same regressor 
changes across the different regressions. An F-test of the equality of coefficients 
between the regressions suggests that coefficients do differ significantly across the 
regressions. 
 
Men have larger networks and are likely to report network partners in more of the 
network types than women do, women‟s networks are more diverse in terms of sex of 
their alters. Being an employer of group labour means the respondent has a bigger 
network. This is apparent in both the bivariates and the conditional correlations given 
by the multivariate analysis. The same property does not apply to employees in groups: 
it appears not to be group interaction itself that generates the network. 
 
The analysis demonstrates that using social networks variables allows us to capture a 
more detailed picture of social integration going beyond membership of groups and 
societies. This allows us to uncover more nuanced insights into the role social networks 
might play in economic life. Not only that, the type of social network variable used 
matters. While we need to be cautious about ascribing causal relationships between 
social networks and individual and household characteristics, using only group 
affiliation or network size to capture social networks properties risks missing other, 
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important network properties, such as network diversity, that are useful to particular 
groups: for example the potential value to women of having more mixed sex networks 
over network size. This may result in misleading conclusions about people‟s 
connectedness and the role of their networks in effecting outcomes, suggesting that 
social networks and social capital research in economics needs to be more mindful of 
the subtleties between the different properties of social networks. This is in line with 
methodological work in social capital measurement using data from The Netherlands, 
which finds different dimensions of social capital are covered by different measures: 
“the extensity of a network, the variety of persons and their attributes in a social 
network, and their resources all concern different phenomena” (van der Gaag and 
Snjiders, 2003b: 18). Further, the authors find “different aspects of social capital 
indicators show up as significant predictors for different returns to social capital” 
(ibid:18). The research turns to this in the next chapter. 
 
......................... 
 
Having established that the way we measure social networks matters, the next chapter 
analyses how the local social environments and networks of small-holder farmers in the 
three study sites function in relation to accessing economic opportunities. Social 
networks variables described here allow the research to test hypotheses linking different 
social networks characteristics to specific outcomes. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Social Networks and Access to Economic Opportunities  
 
 
This chapter analyses the social networks of smallholder farmers in the three study sites, 
in relation to accessing economic opportunities. Social networks variables, described in 
Chapter Four, allow the research to test hypotheses linking different social networks 
characteristics to specific outcomes. Analysis in this chapter identifies relationships 
between social network characteristics and socio-economic status, and crop market 
participation: both entry into markets and degree of participation in terms of crop sales. 
By clustering households according to resource use in combination with crop marketing 
outcomes, the research examines how might social networks enhance households‟ 
existing resources, inputs such as labour for example, or make up for deficiencies in 
productive resources allowing households to overcome constraints to market 
participation. In this way, the research investigates whether social networks help to 
explain why some households do better or worse than might otherwise be expected. 
 
Section 5.1 states briefly three hypotheses relating social networks to outcomes to test 
in the research, describes the social networks dataset and the outcome variables. Each 
hypothesis is taken in turn in Sections 5.2-5.4, and simple bivariate analysis is presented 
linking social networks to outcomes under the three hypotheses. Section 5.5 links 
smallholder commercialisation to social networks using multivariate analysis by 
creating a typology of farm households clustered according to command over resources 
and crop marketing levels and using this as a dependent variable in a multinomial Probit 
estimation incorporating social networks variables as regressors. Section 5.6 
summarises the discussion and concludes. 
 
 
5.1 Linking Social Networks to Outcomes 
 
This section considers the potential links between social networks and outcomes, setting 
out hypotheses regarding beneficial network characteristics and couching these 
hypotheses in relation to outcomes specific to the rural Zambian context. The research 
takes an ego-centred (or personal) network approach (see Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
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Hanneman, 2000). The network consists of a focal individual (ego) and the people they 
know (alters) and the focus is on structure, composition and shape of the network. Each 
ego-network is treated as a separate case, and relations between ego and alters form the 
variables. This approach is rooted in the Manchester School of anthropology (see, 
among others, Radcliffe-Brown; Mitchell, 1969). Econometric studies that have 
incorporated a social networks approach, linking social networks to outcomes in the 
sub-Saharan African context, include: Fafchamps and Minten‟s (2002) study of the 
effect of social networks on agricultural trader profitability in Madagascar; A study of 
technology adoption in rural Ethiopia and Kenya, based on a study of smallholder 
networks within agro-forestry projects (Darr and Pretzsch, 2006); and Conley and 
Udry‟s (2010) study of Ghanaian farmers‟ social learning and technology adoption 
through networks.  
 
5.1.1 Social Networks Hypotheses 
 
Social network theory and empirical studies of social networks and social capital 
highlight a number of „standing hypotheses‟ linking (ego) networks to outcomes:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Bigger is better. A bigger network is better for ego‟s "individual goal 
attainment" (Bourdieu, 1986; and Burt, 1992).  
 
Hypothesis 2: There are benefits to having ‘friends in high places’.  Positive social 
capital results from accessing network members (alters) with high prestige (Lin 2001). 
 
Hypothesis 3: The strength of heterogeneous networks. Those with heterogeneous 
networks are better able to attain their goals (Granovetter, 1973; 1983; Lin et al 1981; 
Campbell et al, 1986). 
 
These hypotheses are examined in detail below. It is worth noting here that these points 
are arguable. There is evidence to suggest that larger networks arise in response to 
„resources‟ available from a specific focal individual or ego (see Borgatti, 1998, for a 
summary), raising the issue of endogeneity. A large network can thus imply a greater 
drain on ego‟s resources as a result of obligations to a number of people, and in this 
case this individual could constitute a „high prestige‟ network partner from the point of 
view of their alters. Social Resource Theory (Lin, 1982; 2001) states that tie strength is 
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linked to the kinds of resources provided: diverse social resources are necessary for 
instrumental actions such as buying goods or looking for work, and tend to be accessed 
through weak ties, whereas so-called expressive actions (such as emotional support) are 
more likely to be carried out by strong ties. Kin or relatives usually know each other and 
therefore are likely to mobilise quickly when certain types of assistance are needed, for 
example in response to illness (see Borgatti, 1998). Networks spanning generations can 
be a rich source of resources, for example, young people providing older network 
partners with physical labour, and older people providing younger people with 
knowledge or skills (see Borgatti, 1998). In communities like the study sites in this 
research people traditionally have strong kin networks. An empirical question here is 
whether or not a large kin network is likely to contain more heterogeneous alters, in 
terms of sex and age, given such networks tend to span generations and contain cross-
sex links that otherwise would be less socially acceptable? And following from this, is 
this the kind of diversity in networks that is useful in economic life in such settings? In 
general, the larger ego‟s networks, the more support they receive, and more support is 
given by network partners to focal individuals (egos) with larger networks. It is not 
clear why this should be the case but it has been put forward that perhaps alters in such 
networks perceive ego to be more important and therefore deserve more help (Borgatti, 
1998). 
 
The hypotheses provide a starting point for conceptualising properties of networks and 
their implications for socio-economic and livelihood outcomes. They provide 
theoretical and empirical foundations to help to guide the choice of variables 
constructed using social networks data captured in the household survey (see van der 
Gaag and Snijders, 2003a; 2003b; 2004; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). To test these 
hypotheses, variables are needed to capture: i) network properties, for example: size; 
network heterogeneity; group affiliation; ii) properties of the ties contained within the 
network, for example: multiplexity (multiple relations among sets of actors); and iii) 
outcomes. 
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5.1.2 Social Networks Variables 
 
Variables to capture properties of social networks and of the ties contained within the 
network constructed from the dataset are described in Chapter 4. These are: 
 
i) Network Size: total number of alters; total number of groups in which household 
is a member; 
ii) Prestige Networks: dummy variable for influential alter; location of influential 
alter; 
iii) Diversity in Composition: age and sex-heterogeneity of alters; proportion of kin 
in network; 
iv) Diversity in Function: network multiplexity measures capturing number of 
multiples ties, proportion of ties that are multiplex, number of resources 
accessed through networks, average network role relationships of alters. 
 
5.1.3 Outcome Variables 
 
The hypotheses above suggest some “gain” or “benefit” attached to social networks: 
bigger is better, in relation to goal attainment, for example, but the meaning of “better” 
needs to be defined and outcomes (or „goals‟) need to be relevant in the context of rural 
Zambia. These are predominantly smallholder farming communities, where even people 
who tend to work for others nevertheless engage in some cultivation on their own 
account. A pair-wise ranking exercise was carried out in focus group discussions in all 
three study sites, during fieldwork for the research, designed to uncover what villagers 
themselves considered to signify „getting on‟ in terms of socio-economic success. 
Structured discussion encompassed: what people considered „getting on‟ to be; the 
factors they believed to be necessary in achieving this; and the ordered preference of 
these factors in relation to each other (see Appendix C for an explanation of the exercise 
and field-notes). 
 
Participants universally agreed that „getting on‟ means “having a better life” through 
achieving a successful livelihood, and saw the route to this to be income-generation 
through farming. In each focus group, participants, unprompted, listed all the elements 
they thought necessary for farming success, which could run into twenty or more 
factors. These included the obvious assets and inputs necessary for cultivation, and also 
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encompassed personal relations: cooperation (between people both within and outside 
the household, working together); people: relatives, workers and other people more 
generally; „being famous‟ i.e. popular (thought to be necessary for attracting and 
keeping customers and attracting labour). Personal attributes also appeared in the list 
produced by Lufubu participants: honesty, sobriety and cleanliness, with a discussion 
about the importance of these for doing business with other people in general. The 
participatory pair-wise ranking exercise therefore suggests that people consider their 
social networks to be an important factor in determining success in smallholder farming 
enterprises in the three study sites. 
 
An overarching question is what determines households‟ differential ability to sell crops 
in the market, if on the surface at least there is little variability between households‟ 
control over other productive resources. Do the (characteristics of) a household‟s social 
networks play a role, and through which mechanisms? In relation to the three 
hypotheses described above, the research hypothesises therefore that social networks 
reduce transaction costs in economic participation, enabling people to access markets 
(local, regional, national, and international) for their crops. For example, networks can 
be important sources of information and, through greater levels of trust, can lower 
supervision and other transactions costs, making it easier for some farmers to access 
markets for their produce. 
 
The research thus considers three outcome variables: 
1. Socio-Economic Status; 
2. Degree of Market Participation given as value of crop sales ; and 
3. Crop Market Participation (yes/no). 
 
The socio-economic status measure is an index constructed using survey data on: 
ownership of consumer durables, agricultural implements, livestock units, housing 
quality, transport and water source. It ranges from zero to 1 (see Appendix D for an 
explanation of how the index is constructed)
37
. Here, a categorical variable of the index 
                                                     
37
 The way the socio-economic status variable has been constructed is a potential limitation of 
the study. A simple construction using aggregation and averages across key variables, driven by 
theoretical and empirical considerations, was chosen over a statistical method that selects and 
weights variables arbitrarily, such as factor or principal components analysis (see Vyas and 
Kumaranayake, 2006). 
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taking three values, „high‟, „medium‟, „low‟, is used.  This is a relative measure based 
on percentiles, with those scoring in the top third of the sample falling in the category 
„high‟, the next third are classed as medium socio-economic status, and the bottom third 
in the low socio-economic status category. 
 
Degree of crop market participation (or level of commercialisation) is a categorical 
variable based on total value of sales across all crops sold, and an aggregate of round 1 
and round 2 crop data to give sales over a year
38
. A table of percentage of households 
growing each crop by community, and average prices per kg are given in table E2.8 in 
Appendix E, and descriptive statistics are in Table 5.1. Level of commercialisation is 
given as either: zero, low, medium, or high value of crop sales, in order to explore 
associations with categorical social networks variables. Cut-off points were determined 
by previous studies on agricultural commercialisation in Northern Province, Zambia, 
where a farming household was considered to be commercialised if they sold more than 
30 bags of maize and „emerging‟ if they sold between 1 and 30 bags of maize (see Table 
1.1 in Chapter 1 and Moore and Vaughan, 1994). This was converted into a value at 
current prices to give a cut-off point of crop income of 1.8 million Kwacha, beyond 
which a farmer is considered to have a „high‟ level of commercialisation. The category 
„emerging‟ was further split into „low‟ and „medium‟ commercialisation with the cut-off 
point between the two set at 800,000 Kwacha, the amount needed to invest in an asset 
such as a head of cattle plus a margin for other farm inputs and some consumption. For 
the households in the research commercialisation is considered across sales of all output 
sold, regardless of traditional classifications of crops as cash crops (for example, maize) 
or cash crops (for example, cassava). Crop market participation is also given by a 
dummy variable for market entry, with a value of zero for no crop sales and a value of 1 
for crop sales greater than zero, in order to analyse determinants of whether or not a 
household sells, as well as how much.  
 
                                                     
38
 The crops sold variable is an aggregate of sales in thousand kwacha across the following 
crops: Maize; Hybrid Maize; Cassava; Millet; Sorghum; Mixed beans; Soybean; Sweet potato; 
Irish potato; Ground nut; Cabbage; Mango; Banana; Plantain; Squash; Orange; Tomato 
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Table 5.1 Outcome Variables: Summary Statistics N=136 Households 
Outcome Variable Unit Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
Socio-Economic Status (SES) Scale: 0 to 1 
Low=42 households 
Medium=46 
households 
High=48 households 
 
0.33 0.17 0.11 0.81 
Total annual sales agricultural food 
crops 
Thousand Kwacha 
Zero=22 households 
Low=63 households 
Medium=33 
households 
High=21 households 
 
806.0     1541.7 0 9439.48 
Market participation 1=Yes; 0=No (% yes) 83.8 .. ..  .. 
      
 
Outcomes in terms of both socio-economic status and crop income are measured at the 
household level. The socio-economic status variable is an index based on household 
assets, and crop income was reported at the household level by individual respondents 
during the survey, even though this part of the questionnaire was administered at the 
individual level. Social networks data, however, were reported at the individual level so 
to allow analysis in relation to outcomes the data are aggregated to give social networks 
scores at the household level. This is defensible in that it can be argued that an 
individual‟s networks are to the potential benefit (or detriment) of the entire household. 
The links of one household member provide access to all household members to the 
externalities associated with the connection (see Haddad and Maluccio, 2002). These 
can be picked up by household fixed effects, shown in the multivariate analyses at the 
individual level in Chapter 4. Qualitative fieldwork as part of the research suggests this 
is indeed the case. Thus, where there are network data for more than one individual in 
the household the maximum value is taken. For group membership, the variable is the 
total number of different groups in which the household has members. 
 
The chapter now discusses each hypothesis in turn, describing the social networks 
measures constructed in relation to the hypotheses and presenting relationships between 
social networks measures and the outcome variables at the household level. Only 
statistically significant relationships are reported, unless stated otherwise. 
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5.2 Hypothesis 1: Bigger is Better 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that a bigger network is better for "individual goal attainment" (see: 
Bourdieu, 1986; and Burt, 1992). But the type of goal may matter, and all types of 
resources in a network may not always be important at any given time. However, the 
larger the network the more likely it is to contain the very specific resources necessary 
for achieving certain goals, for example job search. Emerging evidence points to 
negative externalities associated with large social networks. This is related to forced 
redistribution under a social contract among kin and extended family (Hoff and Sen, 
2006; Lewis, 1955). Examining the role played by extended family and kin in the 
context of the absence of formal insurance markets in KwaZulu-Natal, DiFalco and 
Bülte (2011) suggest tentatively that more extensive kinship networks may be 
associated with lower incomes. Analysing borrowing behaviour in Cameroon, Baland et 
al. (2011) find “that some people „pretend to be poor‟ by both depositing and borrowing 
money. While excess borrowing is costly, it signals poverty and suggests an inability to 
respond to demands for financial assistance from kin members”. 
 
5.2.1 Social Network Measures: Network Composition 
 
To test the hypothesis that a bigger network relates to better outcomes, network size 
variables used are: i) total number of alters (network size) and ii) Group affiliation (as a 
contributor to network size). Table 5.2 summarises network composition variables at the 
household level. 
 
Table 5.2 Network Size Variables – Household Level 
Variable name Definition Mean St. dev 
size Total number of network partners cited across all role relationships 
(interaction, employer, employee, migration, marketing, social support, 
information)   
11.3 6.2 
affil Group Affiliation variable. Membership of village-level and other formal or 
informal groups (number of groups household has membership in) 
2.4 1.6 
 
5.2.2 Network Size and Outcomes 
 
This section considers relationships between the network size variables described above 
and the outcome variables: socio-economic status; market participation; and level of 
market participation. Only statistically significant relationships are reported. Table 5.3 
sets out social network composition characteristics of individuals by socio-economic 
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status and level of crop marketing, reporting the mean values for each of the variables: 
network size; group affiliation (total number of groups). 
 
Potential endogeneity cannot be ignored. Generally, more „successful‟ people tend to 
attract more followers, while a bigger network may enable people to achieve a higher 
socio-economic status through greater resource access. The research returns to 
endogeneity in the multivariate analyses in Chapter 6. 
 
Table 5.3 Mean Household Network Composition and Outcomes 
Respondent attributes: Total Number of 
Households 
Network size Group affiliation (number of 
group memberships) 
Socio-economic status 
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
42 
46 
48 
 
8.9 
11.7 
13.2 
 
1.5 
2.9 
2.9 
Crop Marketing 
Zero 
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
22 
63 
30 
21 
 
8.8 
10.9 
11.9 
14.6 
 
1.5 
2.3 
3.1 
3.0 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Those with a high socio-economic status tend to have bigger networks than those with a 
low socio-economic status, as indicated in Table 5.3. Breaking down the network size 
variable into a categorical variable with four categories of network size, people of 
medium socio-economic status relative to the sample as a whole are over-represented in 
the >15 and 6-10 network size categories, and under-represented in the 5 or less and 11-
15 categories (Table 5.4). Correlation between network size and socio-economic status 
is only significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Table 5.4 Distribution of Network Size and Group Affiliation by Socio-Economic Status (% 
households) 
Socio-
economic 
status 
Network Size (number of Alters) Group Affiliation 
5 or less 6-10 11-15 >15 No Yes 
Low 31.0 35.7 23.8 9.5 14.3 85.1 
Medium 10.9 39.1 23.9 26.1 2.2 97.8 
High 10.4 35.4 25.0 29.2 2.1 98.0 
Total 16.9 36.8 24.3 22.1 5.9 94.1 
   Chi-sq=11.6; Pr = 0.071 Chi-sq=7.75 Pr = 0.021 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
The group affiliation variable here is a simple dummy variable taking a value one if the 
respondent is a member of community-level groups, clubs and societies, and zero if not. 
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It does not distinguish between those who are members of just one or many groups, 
between those who are group leaders or members, nor the degree of participation in 
groups. Group membership is commonly used as a measure of social capital. Group 
affiliation correlates significantly with socio-economic status, although those in groups 
are only slightly over-represented in the higher socio-economic categories (Table 5.4). 
 
Most households (94.1 per cent) are involved in groups at the village level, and are 
slightly over-represented in the group of sellers (95.6 per cent). Cross-tabulations also 
show that sellers are also slightly over-represented in the group of farmers‟ group and 
cooperative members than the distribution across the sample as a whole would suggest, 
though some non-selling households are still members of such groups. Overall, only 
37.5 per cent of households surveyed are members of farmers groups and co-operatives 
(Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5 Distribution of Network size and Group Affiliation by Crop Market Participation (% 
households) 
 
Network size 
(%) 
Group affiliation 
(%) 
Member of farmers 
group  (%) 
Participation 
in crop 
marketing 
5 or 
less 6-10 11-15 >15 no yes no yes 
No 40.9 27.3 18.2 13.6 13.6 86.4 86.4 13.6 
Yes 12.3 38.6 25.4 23.7 4.4 95.6 57.9 42.1 
Total 16.9 36.8 24.3 22.1 5.9 94.1 62.5 37.5 
 Chi-sq=10.8; Pr = 0.013 Chi-sq=2.85; Pr = 0.091 Chi-sq=6.38; Pr = 0.012 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
More non-sellers have fewer than six network partners compared with those selling 
crops (Table 5.5). As farmers move into higher levels of commercialisation measured in 
terms of value of crops sold, the associated network size grows (Table 5.6). Once again, 
the direction of causality is not clear here, but if higher levels of crop sales imply lower 
transactions costs (both fixed and variable) then logically a larger social network is also 
associated with lower transactions costs. Farmers operating at lower levels of 
commercialisation are over-represented in the category of 6-10 network partners; 
farmers at medium levels of commercialisation are over-represented in the category of 
11-15 networks partners; and those at highest levels of commercialisation are over-
represented in the category of more than 15 network partners. 
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Table 5.6 Distribution of Network Size and Group Affiliation by Crop Sales (% households) 
Crop sales 
Network size (%) 
(number of people) 
Member of farmers 
group (%) 
Group affiliation 
dummy (%) 
  5 or less 6-10 11-15 >15 no yes no yes 
Zero 40.9 27.3 18.2 13.6 86.4 13.6 13.6 86.4 
Low 14.3 44.4 23.8 17.5 66.7 33.3 6.3 93.7 
Medium 10.0 26.7 40.0 23.3 53.3 46.7 0.0 100.0 
High 9.5 38.1 9.5 42.9 38.1 61.9 4.8 95.2 
Total 16.9 36.8 24.3 22.1 62.5 37.5 5.9 94.1 
 Chi-sq=22.4; Pr = 0.008 Chi-sq=12.2; Pr = 0.007 Chi-sq=4.33; Pr = 0.227   
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Sellers of higher volumes of crops also tend to be over-represented in farmer group or 
cooperative membership, although only 37.5 per cent of households reported such 
memberships (Table 5.6). 
 
So far, the data on the whole appear to bear out hypothesis 1, that bigger networks are 
related to better outcomes, both in terms of socio-economic status and levels of crop 
marketing. Both larger networks and group affiliation are associated with higher socio-
economic status, being a crop selling household and having higher levels of crop 
income. 
 
 
5.3 Hypothesis 2: Friends in High Places 
 
The second hypothesis states „there are benefits to having friends in high places‟. 
Positive social capital results from accessing network members with high prestige (Lin, 
2001). This relates to „bridging‟ or „linking‟ networks: links with individuals who are 
dissimilar to „ego‟ and provide access to a more diverse flow of resources (See 
Woolcock, 2003).  
 
5.3.1 Social Network Measures: Prestige and Influence 
 
Prestige networks are captured as a dummy variable signifying the presence or absence 
of influential kin or friends, and a categorical variable for location: - whether they live 
in ego‟s own community (village) or elsewhere. Summary statistics for the measures at 
household level are given in Table 5.7: 
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Table 5.7 Prestige Network Variables – Household Level 
Variable Name Definition Mean St.Dev 
kininf Whether or not respondent’s network comprises influential kin or 
friends 
0.71 0.46 
kinloc Location of influential kin/ friend 0.96 0.74 
 
5.3.2 Influence and Outcomes 
 
Table 5.8 reports the percentage of households reporting an influential alter in their 
networks, by socio-economic status and level of crop marketing. A higher proportion of 
households with high socio-economic status report having an influential alter compared 
with those falling in the medium or lower socio-economic status categories.  
 
Table 5.8 Percentage of Outcome Group with Influential Alters  
Respondent attributes: % of Households Influential alter  
Socio-economic status 
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
31 
34 
35 
 
59.5 
65.2 
85.4 
Crop Marketing 
Zero 
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
16 
46 
22 
15 
 
45.5 
68.3 
76.7 
95.2 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Sellers are slightly over-represented in the group of those with „prestige‟ networks 
captured as kin or friends in an influential position (Table 5.9). Locations of these 
influential alters were also recorded, that is, whether they lived in the respondents‟ 
community or elsewhere, to get a sense of exactly how „bridging‟ these relationships 
might be in terms of linking into wider networks in different locations. For non-sellers 
influential alters are split relatively evenly between own village and other locations, 
whereas sellers had a higher proportion of influential alters in their own community 
(47.4 per cent compared with 25.7 per cent living elsewhere), but were still slightly 
over-represented in the sub-sample of those with influential alters elsewhere than the 
distribution as a whole would suggest. This makes sense in the context of the research 
in signifying the value to smallholder farmers in remote regions of having people close 
by to help get things done in everyday cultivation activities, such as providing labour, 
transport, help with trading. Further, if selling is seen as a desirable attribute by other in 
the village this could attract influential alters. 
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Table 5.9 Distribution of prestige networks by crop market participation (% households) 
 Influential alter Location of influential alter 
Participation in 
crop marketing no yes 
no 
influential 
alter 
own 
village 
other 
location 
No 54.5 45.5 54.5 22.7 22.7 
Yes 24.6 75.4 24.6 49.1 26.3 
Total 29.4 70.6 29.4 44.8 25.7 
 Chi-sq=7.99; Pr = 0.005   Chi-sq=7.43; Pr = 0.024 
 
Disaggregating by level of crop sales, medium and high sellers are relatively more 
likely to have kin in an influential position and in a location other than the households‟ 
own community than the distribution across the sample as a whole would suggest 
(Table 5.10).  
 
Table 5.10 Distribution of prestige networks by level of crop sales (% households) 
Crop sales Influential alter Location of influential alter 
 no yes 
no 
influential 
alter 
own 
village 
other 
location 
Zero 54.5 45.5 54.5 22.7 22.7 
Low 31.7 68.3 31.8 44.4 23.8 
Medium 23.3 76.7 23.3 50.0 26.7 
High 4.8 95.2 4.8 61.9 33.3 
Total 29.4 70.6 29.4 44.9 25.7 
 Chi-sq=13.5; Pr = 0.004   Chi-sq=14.4; Pr = 0.026 
 
Prestige networks, measured as whether or not ego has an influential alter and the 
location of this alter, appear to be associated with higher socio-economic status as well 
as higher levels of crop income. In terms of location of influential alters, those with 
higher levels of crop income are also more likely to cite influential alters living outside 
of ego‟s immediate community (location), than those at lower levels of crop income. 
The bivariates suggest therefore that friends in high places matter, especially those 
living close to the respondent. People living close by are more likely to be accessible on 
a day-to-day basis and therefore potentially more useful when it comes to everyday 
cultivation and marketing activities, thus helping to reduce ego‟s transaction costs.  
 
 
5.4 Hypothesis 3: The Strength of Heterogeneous Networks 
 
This hypothesis states those with heterogeneous networks are better able to attain their 
goals. The greater the diversity of the network (in terms of social resources accessed 
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through the network or range of network relationships), the more chance there is that 
someone in the network has something that the „ego‟ needs. High diversity implies 
integration into several spheres of society or social circles/ contexts and this is 
considered to be advantageous for mobilising resources and for instrumental actions like 
gathering information (Lin et al, 1981; Campbell et al., 1986; Kadushin, 1982). This 
relates to Granovetter‟s “Strength of Weak Ties” argument (Granovetter, 1973; 1983). 
Weak ties between alters provide access to other people‟s clusters of closely knit friends 
and thus act as a crucial bridge to novel information „from distant parts of the social 
structure‟, an advantage in competitive environments (see also Burt, 1992). By contrast, 
alters with strong ties to each other tend to know the same things ego knows. The denser 
the ties in ego networks, the stronger these ties tend to be, implying that the network is 
more insular and therefore more homogeneous. This may restrict the different types of 
help a person can obtain via their network. 
 
5.4.1 Social Network Measures: Diversity in Composition and Function 
 
Variables that allow exploration of heterogeneous networks hypothesis can reflect the 
differing personal attributes of alters, that is diversity of composition, or differences in 
the ties between alter and ego: functional diversity.  These are discussed in Chapter 4, 
and in relation to outcomes below.  
 
B. Diversity of Composition 
 
Heterogeneity or dispersion measures of network partner attribute variables are the most 
direct measures of the diversity of alters that ego can contact within his/her personal 
environment. Respondents‟ networks may be highly heterogeneous in some respects yet 
homogeneous in others. This gives some idea of the range of someone‟s social network 
- that is, potential access to social resources (based on the „strength of weak ties‟ 
argument outlined above). Size can also be used as a measure of range. In general, 
heterogeneity increases with network range. Network heterogeneity is captured by 
diversity in age and sex of network partners, and kin composition of networks (Table 
5.11). 
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Table 5.11 Composition Diversity Variables – Household Level 
Variable Name Definition Mean St.Dev 
agehet Age heterogeneity of network partners (standard deviation of 
network partner ages, across each network) 
11.96 4.81 
sexhet Sex heterogeneity of network partners (Simpson’s Index of 
Qualitative Variation in sex of network partner, across each 
network) 
0.23  0.18 
propkin Proportion of network members who are kin  0.40      0.27 
 
 
B. Functional Diversity 
 
Functional diversity of a network can be captured by measures on tie attributes, 
describing the quality of relations between the respondent and network partners.  
 
Diversity in the ties between the respondent and their network partners is measured 
using a variable capturing multiplexity in the relationships between the respondent and 
their network partners. Functional diversity (multiplexity) measures at the household 
level constructed from the survey data based on tie characteristics are summarised in 
Table 5.12.  
 
Table 5.12 Functional Diversity Variables 
Variable Name Definition Mean St.Dev 
multiplex Total number of multiplex ties 2 1.5 
multidum Dummy variable for the existence of multiplex ties 0.9 0.4 
propmult Proportion of total number of ties that are multiplex 
(multiplex/size) 
0.2 0.1 
ressum Sum of resources accessed across network (max=20) 13.3 3.5 
multcont Average number of  ‘contents’ ie network roles  per alter 
(max=7) 
3.5 0.9 
 
The next section sets out descriptive statistics for both composition and functional 
diversity in relation to outcomes.   
 
5.4.2 Network Diversity and Outcomes 
 
Table 5.13 sets out social network characteristics of households by socio-economic 
status and level of crop marketing, reporting the mean values for each of the variables: 
age and sex heterogeneity; network multiplexity. 
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Table 5.13 Mean Network Diversity and Outcomes 
Outcomes: Age 
hetero-
geneity 
Sex 
hetero-
geneity 
Ratio of 
kin to 
non-kin 
Number 
of 
multiplex 
ties 
Proportion 
of 
multiplex 
ties  
Sum of 
accessed 
resources 
Average 
no. of 
roles per 
alter 
Socio-economic 
status 
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
 
13.3 
11.5 
11.6 
 
 
0.22 
0.21 
0.28 
 
 
0.49 
0.42 
0.37 
 
 
1.71 
2.07 
2.19 
 
 
0.19 
0.18 
0.19 
 
 
11.1 
14.5 
14.0 
 
 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
Crop Marketing 
Zero 
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
14.8 
11.5 
12.4 
10.6 
 
0.20 
0.24 
0.23 
0.29 
 
0.40 
0.48 
0.39 
0.32 
 
1.41 
2.16 
2.13 
1.95 
 
0.18 
0.19 
0.22 
0.14 
 
11.2 
13.4 
14.4 
13.4 
 
3.1 
3.5 
3.6 
3.6 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03. Note: The higher the score the more diverse the network 
on the dimension in each column. 
 
The network heterogeneity hypothesis suggests that the more diverse the network the 
more valuable it is, for example by providing novel information. Mean values of the 
network partner heterogeneity variables given in Table 5.13 show that while networks 
that are more mixed in terms of sex of network partner appear to be associated with 
higher levels of socio-economic status (significant at only 10 per cent), respondents 
have on average more homogeneous networks in terms of age of network partners. 
Households with higher socio-economic status and households selling higher values of 
crops also tend to have a lower ratio of kin to non-kin network members implying 
greater relational diversity. Higher socio-economic status also has slightly higher 
average levels of network multiplexity, in terms of number of multiplex ties. However 
this is not significant. While sellers appear to access more resources through their 
networks than non-sellers, there appears to be little variation in network multiplexity 
measured as proportion of multiplex ties and as average number of contents per alter.  
 
Turning to crop market participation, non-sellers tend to have the most age 
heterogeneous networks, while those with highest levels of crop sales are over-
represented in lower age-heterogeneity categories (Table 5.14).  
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Table 5.14 Distribution of age heterogeneity of alters by crop market participation and crop sales (% 
households) 
 
Age heterogeneity 
(%) 
Participation in 
crop marketing <5 5-<10 10-<15 15+ 
No 0.0 18.2 31.8 50.0 
Yes 6.1 33.3 41.2 19.3 
Total 5.1 30.9 39.7 24.3 
 
Crop sales 
Chi-sq=10.3; Pr = 0.016 
Zero 0.0 18.2 31.8 50.0 
Low 6.3 30.2 47.6 15.9 
Medium 0.0 36.7 40.0 23.3 
High 14.3 38.1 23.8 23.8 
Total 5.1 30.9 39.7 24.3 
 Chi-sq=18.6; Pr = 0.029 
 
The variable measuring sex heterogeneity in respondents‟ network partners – the index 
of qualitative variation in sex of network partner – takes values between zero and one. 
The more diversity there is between network partners the closer the score is to one. In 
cross-tabulations this variable had no statistically significant relationships at the 5 per 
cent level with the outcome variables, and significant relationships with just two of the 
respondent attribute variables, those related to sex and household status of respondent, 
and at the 10 per cent level with sex of household head. These variables are highly 
correlated with each other (see Appendix E for bivariate relationships between social 
networks variables and individual and household level attributes). 
 
In examining social networks variables in relation to outcome variables for socio-
economic status and crop marketing, broad patterns are beginning to emerge in relation 
to the types of network characteristic related to positive outcomes.  Higher levels of 
commercialisation measured as value of crops sold, and higher socio-economic status, 
are associated with a larger network and group affiliation (Hypothesis 1; Bigger is 
Better). Large networks imply that ego has more chance of accessing resources needed 
to lower transactions costs of cultivation and marketing. Prestige networks also appear 
to be associated with higher socio-economic status and higher levels of crop income, 
and sellers are more likely to have influential alters living within their immediate 
community (village), than non-sellers. The bivariates appear to uphold Hypothesis 2, 
that „friends in high places‟ matter for better outcomes, especially those living close to 
the respondent. Being able to draw on valuable network links locally can contribute 
towards higher crop sales by reducing ego‟s transaction costs in their daily cultivation 
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activities. Turning to network heterogeneity (Hypothesis 3: the strength of 
heterogeneous networks), higher socio-economic status is associated with having a 
more mixed network gender-wise.  Non-sellers‟ networks are more age-diverse, in 
contrast to households with higher incomes from crop marketing whose networks tend 
to be less so. While the above bivariate relationships suggest positive associations 
between social networks and outcomes related to transactions costs effects, the direction 
of causality is still not clear. 
 
The above analysis suggests broad patterns in the social networks characteristics of 
sellers and non-sellers. The research is interested in how social networks might provide 
access to resources that enable farming households to participate in markets and/or 
participate in markets at a higher level of commercialisation. Implicit in this is the 
question of how might social networks enhance households‟ existing endowments, 
inputs such as labour for example, or make up for deficiencies in productive resources 
allowing households to overcome constraints to market participation. Similarly, might 
an absence of certain types of networks or network resources act as constraints on crop 
marketing behaviour regardless of resource access? 
 
Before turning to causal analysis of social networks in relation to transaction costs in 
agricultural commercialisation in Chapter 6, the remainder of this chapter delves further 
into the links between social networks and crop market outcomes by grouping 
households according to their command over resources in addition to their economic 
behaviour. This allows the research to identify households that might be doing better or 
worse than their resource status would suggest, and explore whether social networks 
help to explain why. 
 
The next section uses a typology of households to create categories relating level of 
commercialisation with command over resources. These categories are then used in a 
multinomial Probit, which includes social networks measures as explanatory variables, 
to explore further the potential role of social networks in achieving positive outcomes. 
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5.5 Smallholder Commercialisation and Command over Resources 
 
The preceding analysis has focused on general patterns in relationships between 
network attributes and different categories of socio-economic status and crop market 
participation. Interesting questions arise in relation to households falling outside the 
broad patterns emerging from the bivariate analysis and summarised above. One of the 
over-arching motivations for the research is to explore the relevance of social networks 
in the economic lives of households in rural sub-Saharan Africa, households that on the 
surface appear to be similar, especially in terms of their asset base or command over 
resources, but might have markedly different socio-economic outcomes. The focus here 
is on crop marketing income. What is it that sets certain households apart from their 
neighbours, specifically, households that, due to relatively poor access to resources such 
as land, labour and other types of capital, one would reasonably expect to find it more 
difficult to overcome transactions costs as barriers to entry to markets and thus have low 
levels of crop marketing, but instead engage in a high level of marketing? Are such 
households able to overcome these barriers because of social networks? Or are other 
factors at play? The next section explores this by deepening the analysis through 
categorising households in relation to both their output levels and input use. This allows 
the research to identify so-called „atypical‟ households - badly-resourced high-
commercialisers, well-resourced low-commercialisers - and potentially uncover the 
value social networks might have in overcoming deficiencies or cancelling out 
advantages in productive resource endowment. 
 
5.5.1. A Typology of Smallholder Farming Households 
 
The previous analysis suggests there are positive associations between social networks 
and outcomes of smallholder farming households in the study sites. However, the 
analysis so far does not distinguish among the group of commercialised farmers in 
terms of resources. Do the benefits of social networks go hand-in-hand with other 
positive attributes such as command over resources (labour, farm inputs), or do they 
reduce transactions costs in selling by mitigating resource constraints? 
 
The descriptive statistics in Appendix E examining correlations between endowments 
and market participation suggest that while it is true that highly commercialised farmers 
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seem better endowed, and the low commercialised are not so well endowed, there are 
exceptions to this. Cross-tabulations between the crop market participation dummy and 
various productive inputs are given in Table E2.2 (Irrigation, fertiliser, hybrid seed) and 
E2.3 (storage and large tools). These show significant correlations between crop 
marketing and inputs. For these inputs, the largest groups are those without these assets 
but are still marketing produce, and there is a small percentage of respondents who do 
possess such assets but do not market at all. When the crop sales variable is broken 
down into the categories for level of crop marketing, a similar pattern emerges. While 
better-endowed households are over-represented in the categories of higher levels of 
commercialisation, there are once again notable numbers of households without such 
endowments who are also marketing at comparably high levels, as well as those 
endowed with resources who market at very low levels, if at all. Further, there is a very 
weak correlation between level of crop sales and total landholding (rho= 0.12). 
 
The differences may partly be explained by location. Communities were sampled 
purposively to represent three levels of market access: Ngulula with good market 
access; Kabila with poor market access; Lufubu somewhere between the two. The 
breakdown of the crops sold variable reflects this, with much higher average levels of 
crop sales for Ngulula, the geographically better-connected community, compared with 
Kabila and Lufubu (Table 5.15). 
 
Table 5.15 Value of crops sold, by community „000 Kwacha 
Community Mean St. dev Min Max 
Kabila 162.83       183.98           0 607.83 
Ngulula 1681.92 2400.9 0 9439.5 
Lufubu 615.47 897.38 0 5074.14 
 
The kernel density distribution of value of crops sold variable by community suggests 
three different distributions (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Kernel density estimate for crops sold, by community 
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The chi-square statistics from a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test 
indicate that there is a statistically significant difference among the three study sites 
(chi-sq(2)=21.39; and 21.49 with ties). 
 
However, location does not tell the whole story. While none of the households sampled 
in Kabila are achieving “high” levels of commercialisation, there are households in 
Lufubu who are achieving levels of commercialisation comparable with the higher 
levels achieved by their more advantaged Ngulula counterparts. All three communities 
have households who grow but do not sell crops, and have households who are not well 
resourced (and in the case of Kabila and Lufubu, with disadvantaged market access) but 
do sell at medium and high levels of commercialisation (not shown). Social Networks 
may provide an explanation. 
 
In order to examine further the role social networks might have in reducing transactions 
costs in the context of poor, smallholder households facing resource-constraints and 
incomplete or missing markets for key productive resources, alternative clusters of 
households are identified in the data by creating a typology based on categories for low 
and high levels of marketing and low and high command over inputs. A multinomial 
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probit is used to identify potential correlates for each group of households. This allows 
further disaggregating of the households into different kinds of groups that go beyond 
the very simple seller/ non-seller categories. Given obvious issues with endogeneity 
(importantly, circular causality and mutually reinforcing relationships, as well as 
selectivity bias) already touched on earlier in this chapter, the aim here is not to 
establish causal relations and thus endogeneity is not addressed econometrically at this 
stage. The research returns to the issue in the next chapter. For now, the aim is to draw 
initial insights from the data to use in the subsequent multivariate analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
Asset accumulation enables smallholder farmers to respond to incentives to 
commercialise (see Chapoto et al, 2011; Moser and Dani, 2008; Leavy and Poulton, 
2007; Jayne et al, 2003; Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). If production and hence 
marketing are highly dependent on command over inputs, especially labour, then a 
typology of farmers can be given by: 
 
Table 5.16 Farmer Clusters - Typology 
Marketing Command over inputs 
(labour and bought inputs) 
High (H) Low(L) 
High (H) A (HH) B (LH) 
Low (L) C (HL) D (LL) 
 
One would expect most farmers to fall within categories A (HH) (high command, high 
marketing) or D (low command, low marketing). What is it about the household that 
leads them to be in this position? What types of farming households fall at the two 
extremes: struggling to get by and not selling anything i.e. very poor; or those who are 
relatively well-off and cultivating with every intention of selling? And what of 
discontinuities - that is, those farmers falling in categories B (low command, high 
marketing) or C (high command but low marketing)? Are such farmers the exceptions? 
Or can distinct groups be identified, with common characteristics related to their social 
networks? If social networks do mediate access to markets then one might expect social 
networks to have an effect in isolation from other assets and inputs. 
 
Households were clustered according to their command over purchased inputs - 
fertiliser, hybrid seed and group labour – using simple dummy variables for each input. 
This was informed by commercialisation studies that consider farmers to be 
commercially oriented when they participate in commercial input markets i.e. purchased 
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inputs (von Braun and Kennedy, 1994. See also Jayne et al, 2003). Land was not 
included as an input given the customary land tenure system in two of the villages and 
the nature of land allocation in Lufubu resettlement scheme means land distribution has 
low variability between households. A household scoring zero would be labelled low 
command in that input, and a score of one denotes command over that input (labelled 
„high‟). Command over inputs is calculated as a simple additive term over the three 
input dummies. Scores of zero or 1 are considered low, a score of 2 or 3 is high. In 
terms of marketing, those whose value of crops sold was less than 800,000 Kwacha are 
considered to be „low‟ marketers, those selling crops to the value of 800,000 Kwacha 
and above are „high‟ marketers. As discussed in Section 5.1.3 above, this is a reasonable 
cut-off in the context of the research in that 800,000 Kwacha is the amount needed to 
invest in an asset such as a head of cattle plus a margin for other farm inputs and some 
consumption. Table 5.17 shows the numbers of households falling within each cluster. 
 
Table 5.17 Farmer Clusters (number of households) 
Marketing Command over inputs 
(number of households) 
High (H) Low (L) 
High (H) 66 19 
Low (L) 15 36 
Pearson chi2(1) =  30.8   Pr = 0.000 
 
As expected, of the 136 households most farmers fall in either the HH or LL clusters. 
Nineteen households are high marketers but score low on the inputs variable (LH 
cluster); fifteen households are low marketers but score highly on command over inputs 
(HL cluster). These „LH‟ and „HL‟ households are those that seem to follow an 
unexpected path: one has resources but does not appear to sell (HL), and the other is 
selling but does not appear to have good resources (LH). What factors therefore are 
holding them back/helping them up? 
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5.5.2 Cluster Determinants 
 
What determines which cluster households fall into? Do social networks play a role? To 
explore this, a multinomial Probit model
39
 is estimated using as the dependent variable 
the cluster variable for the four categories shown in Table 5.17: LL (low command, low 
marketing); HL (high command low marketing); LH (low command high marketing); 
HH (High command high marketing). This model is intended only as an exploratory 
tool to examine patterns in the data rather than any causal relationships, and care must 
be taken to interpret results bearing this in mind (for example, the relatively small 
numbers of households contained in clusters would render many statistical tests 
invalid). 
 
Theoretical models of crop market participation focus on household characteristics as 
well as transactions costs related to marketing (see literature review in Chapter 2). 
These include: information, transport availability and costs, input use, land cultivated, 
access to storage facilities (see: Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; Bellemare and 
Barrett, 2006; among others). The qualitative exercise carried out during fieldwork 
provides interesting insights for the empirical analysis of correlates of crop market 
engagement in the three study sites (Appendix C). Important factors identified by the 
communities include having basic needs met (health and water), access to tools, and 
people – with an emphasis on relationships: cooperation between people. Determinants 
identified are a mixture of factors necessary to meet immediate, basic material needs, in 
terms of consumption and production, such as transport, cash, food, productive assets 
and inputs (land, tools, water/ irrigation), education – in agreement with the theoretical 
model. However, in contrast to the theoretical models, people also stressed the 
                                                     
39
 Initially, multinomial logit models were estimated but they failed the Small-Hsaio test of the 
IIA property – independence of irrelevant alternatives – which underlies the MNL. The Small-
Hsaio test tests the hypothesis H0: odds (outcome J vs outcome K) are independent alternatives. 
An alternative test is the McFadden Hausman test of the IIA assumption (H0: difference in 
coefficients is not systematic). However, Hausman cannot be performed on weighted or 
clustered data so only the Small-Hsaio test was carried out. Sometimes the Hausman and the 
Small-Hsaio tests can give conflicting results: see Long and Freese (2006). In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary the research assumes the Small-Hsaio test results to be correct and in 
the case of these data one cannot plausibly assume that the four categories are distinct (and the 
alternatives are dissimilar). This suggests multinomial probit (or a nested logit) is more 
appropriate, potential identification issues notwithstanding, to avoid the IIA assumption 
especially without strong a priori beliefs about the relationships between the disturbances for the 
clusters/ categories (Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2003). 
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importance of more „intermediate‟ factors, focusing on personal and relational attributes 
such as honesty, industriousness and cooperation. However, these personal and 
relational attributes are seen to be necessary for fostering and maintaining good 
relations with others, which in turn leads to improved access to assets, labour, 
information – in other words lowering transactions costs in market access. 
 
Social networks potentially impact directly on outcomes, for example by providing 
access to a pool of labour at key points in the cultivation calendar, and also indirectly 
via their effect on transactions costs, for example enabling access to resources through 
networks such as information on prices and marketing or lowering search and 
„recruitment‟ costs of farm labour. In this way, social networks could also proxy for 
transactions costs. 
 
The household survey does not contain any direct measures of transactions costs, the 
direct costs to the household of market exchange such as transfer (transport and storage) 
costs, or those associated with making and enforcing contracts. The research relies 
instead on proxies. This is in line with other empirical studies of transactions costs in 
smallholder agricultural commercialisation (see also: Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 
2000; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; among others). Proxies for transactions costs in the 
household survey include: Ownership of radio (radio) – obtaining information about 
markets, prices, climatic conditions is easier to obtain if one possesses a radio; Access 
to crop storage facilities (store); Ownership of bicycle (bike); household employs farm 
labour (employer); Non-farm income („000 kwacha) (nfy); Proportion of land cultivated 
(propland); Use of hybrid seed (hyseed); Large livestock ownership (livelarg). 
Productive farm inputs such as hybrid seed and draught animals may help to increase 
productivity and thus marketing volumes, which in turn can lower transactions costs via 
economies of scale. The implication is that these factors have a positive effect, that is 
they are associated with lower transactions costs, thus there should be a positive 
relationship between the transactions costs proxies and output levels. If social networks 
do indeed lower transactions costs then we should observe a positive relationship 
between the social networks measures and these proxies for transactions costs.  
 
The table of correlation coefficients below (Table 5.18) shows significant positive 
correlations between propland and social network size, and with one of the multiplexity 
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variables (multcont), between non-farm income and network size, and between large 
livestock ownership and relatively larger kin networks (propkin). There are some 
negative correlations but these are never statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.18 Correlation Coefficients: Social Networks and Transactions Costs 
 
propland nfy 
large 
livestock 
propland 1.00 
  nfy 0.01 1.00 
 livelarg 0.03 -0.09 1.00 
agehet -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 
IQVst2 0.06 0.08 -0.01 
propkin 0.22* -0.13   0.19* 
affil -0.15 0.14 -0.06 
size -0.10 0.17* 0.01 
propmult 0.15 0.04 -0.12 
multiplex 0.06 0.07 -0.11 
multcont 0.29* 0.14 -0.11 
ressum -0.01 0.10 0.01 
* significant at 5 per cent 
 
Chi-Square statistics suggest significant correlations between social networks and 
transactions costs as categorical/ dummy variables, with those possessing assets 
associated with lower transaction costs over-represented in the categories for higher 
values (bigger, more diverse etc) of the social network variable
40
. 
 
Certain features of social networks therefore do appear to go hand-in-hand with the 
ability to lower transactions costs as captured by the proxy variables. Because of these 
potential direct and indirect effects of social networks on crop incomes, they are 
included in the empirical estimations alongside other determinants of crop incomes, 
including the transactions costs proxies, and can also be considered as direct proxies for 
transactions costs. 
 
                                                     
40 Chi-Square Statistics are as follows: Social network size and: crop storage (chi2(3) = 13.89); 
bicycle ownership (chi2(3) = 7.49: 10%); employee dummy (chi2(3) = 6.79: 10%); employer 
dummy (chi2(3) = 20.64). Group affiliation and: storage (chi2(1) = 3.80: 10%); bicycle 
ownership (chi2(1) = 8.51); employer dummy (chi2(1) = 7.61); employee dummy (chi2(1) = 
2.93). Influential kin and: bicycle ownership (chi2(1) = 3.49); employer dummy (chi2(1) = 
4.68); uses hybrid seed (chi2(1) = 6.75). 
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Bivariate analysis (see Appendix E for tables of descriptive statistics) identifies a range 
of household characteristics and proxies for transactions costs with significant 
relationships to crop sales, including: sex of household head, education level, access to 
inputs (fertiliser, hybrid seed, storage, large tools); transport (bicycle); information 
(working radio); access to labour including working in reciprocal groups. Of the social 
networks measures captured in the survey, total network size, network diversity (age 
and sex heterogeneity of networks), group affiliation, and various elements of  kin 
networks (ratio of kin to non-kin, influential kin, location of influential kin) are 
significant. These encompass more „traditional‟ social capital measures (group 
membership, for example, and location of influential kin as a bridging social capital 
measure) as well as measures rooted in social network analysis techniques. 
 
These relationships of course do not point to any direction of causality, rather there is 
likely to be an association. In fact the relationship could run in either (both) directions – 
for example more successful households are so because they have influential kin or 
successful households are more likely to have kin who get into influential positions 
because of the commercial success of the household. This issue is revisited in Chapter 6 
in the multivariate analysis.  
 
5.5.3 Multinomial Probit  
 
To analyse the determinants of a household falling into a particular cluster according to 
the typology set out above, a Multinomial Probit model is used. 
 
Under the Multinomial Probit model, assume a multivariate normal distribution on the 
latent variables, y*i = (y*i1, . . . ,y*i,j−1).  
 
The Multinomial Probit model can be given by the latent variable y*ij for the jth 
alternative: 
 
ijijij ey  '* βX   
(5.1) 
where ei  ~ N(0, Σ) and y
*
i ~N ( βX ij , 2) and i=1, ........, n 
Choices j=1...j; j>2 
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Where: 
Xi is a (j − 1) × k matrix of covariates 
β is a k × 1 vector of fixed coefficients 
ei is (j−1)×1 vector of disturbances; and 
Σ is a (j−1)×(j−1) positive definite matrix. 
 
For the model to be identified, the first diagonal element of Σ is constrained, σ11 = 1. 
The response variable, yi, is the index of the choice of individual i among the 
alternatives in the choice set. This is modelled in terms of this latent variable, y*i, via: 
 
 
 (5.2) 
 
where yi = 0 corresponds to a base category. 
 
The model is first estimated excluding social networks variables and then with social 
networks variables. Regressors include: household demographic characteristics (age of 
household head); human capital (whether or not maximum level of education in the 
household exceeds primary school); assets (crop storage; radio access/ownership; 
proportion of land cropped as fixed and variable transactions costs); a dummy variable 
for whether or not the household has non-farm income and one to denote whether or not 
the household is in Ngulula, the village with better market access. Social networks 
variables include: log of total network size (for Hypothesis 1: bigger is better); location 
of influential kin (for Hypothesis 2: benefits to having friends in high places); and sex 
heterogeneity of network partners as a measure of network diversity (for Hypothesis 3: 
the strength of heterogeneous networks). Because of the relatively small sample size in 
the HL and LH clusters, a parsimonious model was estimated. Other variables were 
tried but not included in the final estimation because they were not significant, in all 
likelihood due to lack of variation. These include: community categorical variable; 
livestock ownership; sex of household head; access to or ownership of bicycle; network 
diversity in terms of age of network partners; dummy variable for membership of 
village level groups and societies (affiliation networks); network multiplexity; sum of 
resources accessed/relationships across network. 
159 
 
 
 
 
Summary statistics for the dependent variable and regressors are given in Table 5.19: 
 
Table 5.19 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables and Regressors Multinomial Probit 
 Unit Mean/ dist Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable:    
Farmer Cluster Low Resource Low Marketing (LL) 
High Resource Low Marketing (HL) 
Low Resource High Marketing (LH) 
High Resource High Marketing (HH) 
48.5 
14 
11 
26.5 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
    
Regressors: 
 
   
Farm Capital: Assets and labour    
Fixed transaction costs:    
Ownership of radio 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 44.85 .. 
Access to crop storage facilities 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 30.88 .. 
    
Variable transaction costs:    
Non-farm income (‘000 kwacha) Number 34.29 83.57 
Proportion of land cultivated Share 0.35   0.35 
 
Human Capital (variable transaction costs) 
   
Maximum education level in household 
 
0 = Up to Grade 4 
1 = Grades 5-7 
2 = Secondary/ College 
8.09 
42.65 
49.26 
.. 
.. 
.. 
Social Networks    
Network Diversity/Composition    
Diversity of network in terms of sex of alters Index  of Qualitative Variation of 
alters’ sex 
0.23 0.18 
Size    
Network Size Number 11.35 6.21 
Network Size (log) Number 2.28 0.57 
 
Household Demographics 
   
Sex of household head 1 = Female 0= Male (% female) 17.65 .. 
 
Location 
   
Categorical variable for location 1 = Kabila 
2 = Ngulula 
3 = Lufubu 
27.21 
29.41 
43.38 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
Marginal effects are given in Table 5.20, the reference category is low marketing, low 
control (LL).41 Coefficient estimates are given in Appendix F
42
. 
                                                     
41
 The model chi-square statistics suggest that neither model is a particularly good fit, chi-
squares are slightly high. The multinomial logit estimates gave a much better fit – but these 
models violate the IIA assumption. Probit coefficients greater than 2, reported for some 
variables, should be treated with caution. 
42
 Coefficient estimates relate household characteristics to their preference for each cluster/ 
outcome, and give the effect of an infinitesimal change in each characteristic on the probability 
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Table 5.20 Multinomial Probit Results: Determinants of Farmer Cluster 
                               Multinomial Probit Resultsa – Marginal Effects 
              
 Independent Variables                              Without social networks  With social networks 
                               HL LH HH  HL LH HH 
HH access to storage      -.032  .193***  .090*   .103  .191***  .144** 
Age of Household head                 -.004 -.002* -.005**  -.003 -.001 -.004 * 
Non-farm income                          1.49e-06 8.31e-07** 1.16e-06**  2.26e-06* 8.80e-07** 1.14e-06** 
Proportion of land 
cropped                   
-.093 -.136** -.074  -.095 -.057 -.052 
Access to working radio  .012  .141***  .274***   .0107  .121***  .252*** 
Ngulula  .050**  .033**  .560***   .082***  .058***  .575*** 
Post-primary education                    -.063  .019  .121  -.031  .012  .093 
Network size (log)                            .072  .074  .033 
Sex heterogeneity of 
network 
    -.825* -.328*** -.084 
Influential kin nearby      .090*  .128**  .156** 
Influential kin far location      .303***  .064*  .274*** 
        
Observations = 135; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
a Cluster base category is LL 
 
 
Taking first the basic model before introducing social networks variables, access to 
storage facilities has a significant and positive effect on the “choice” between LL and 
LH (1 per cent significance level), and between LL and HH (10 per cent level of 
significance), however there are endogeneity issues here. Low marketers may not be in 
need of crop storage in the first place, the demand for crop storage may be generated by 
having a larger marketable, or marketed, surplus. Non-farm income is also important for 
being able to market higher values of crops despite low command over inputs, as is 
radio ownership and living in Ngulula (significant for all three clusters compared with 
the base category). This suggests that even if a household has little command over farm 
inputs, in an advantageous market setting - with good, lower-cost access to markets, 
decent roads, short distances and available transport - they are more likely to succeed in 
terms of higher marketed volumes compared with a better endowed household in 
another location. Age of household head is negative (10 per cent level of significance) 
for LH households compared with LL – younger households with low control over 
                                                                                                                                                           
of the household being in a particular cluster over the base category (LL: Low command, Low 
marketing), holding all other things constant. 
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resources are more likely than their older counterparts to market high. For LH 
households, proportion of land cropped is also significant, though negative: when a 
household has a low command over resources, farming a smaller area more effectively 
may be the key to success, especially if this goes hand-in-hand with labour constraints. 
Whether or not the household has a member with post-primary education is not 
significant. 
 
In the estimation including social networks, age of household head is only important for 
HH compared with LL households, and now only at 10 per cent. The sign is negative 
suggesting the older the household head the less likely the household is to be in the 
well-resourced high-marketing cluster compared to LL. This suggests that younger 
farmers have an edge over their older neighbours. This could be due to greater physical 
capabilities of younger farmers. The effects of non-farm income and radio ownership 
are the same as previous results. Storage access is now more significant for HH 
compared with LL. Household location in Ngulula, with better market access overall, is 
now significant (at 1 per cent) across the board. Land is no longer significant. Two out 
of the three social networks variables affect the probability of a household falling within 
a particular cluster – prestige networks and network composition captured as diversity 
of network in terms of sex of network partner. Network size is not significant. Sex 
heterogeneity of network is negative and significant for HL (10 per cent) and LH 
households (1 per cent) compared with the base category LL. Thus, sex heterogeneous 
networks lower the likelihood of being in LH compared to LL. In the context of the 
rural communities in the study a more sex heterogeneous network is likely to be 
associated with higher numbers of kin and therefore a more homogeneous network, as 
traditional social norms prevalent in rural areas mean it is considered to be somewhat 
inappropriate for members of the opposite sex to conduct friendships etc unless they are 
related. Therefore, rather than a diverse network in this respect overcoming poor 
resource access and enabling greater market participation, more kin network partners 
links to poor outcomes. This lends some support to emerging work suggesting a „dark 
side‟ to social capital, with more obligations to kin creating a disincentive to accumulate 
or acting as a drain on resources (see: DiFalco and Bülte, 2011; Baland et al, 2011). 
 
Influential kin variables (both nearby and in far locations) compared with having no 
influential kin are significant and positive for all clusters compared with the low-
162 
 
 
 
control, low-marketing base category. This suggests prestige networks are important for 
command over resources as well as marketing outcomes (though Probit values greater 
than 2 on these coefficients, and the sex heterogeneity variable coefficient estimates, 
should be treated with caution as they imply extremely high probability effect, as 
illustrated by the marginal effects shown). An interesting result here is the lack of 
significance of the network size variable across all categories.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The analysis suggests that using social networks variables allows us to capture a more 
detailed picture of social integration going beyond membership of groups and societies, 
and helps to uncover not just relationships at a superficial level but the kinds of 
functions these relationships can potentially and actually do perform in relation to 
economic activity and, following from this, in achieving welfare outcomes. This can be 
insightful in circumstances where markets may be thin or under-developed and 
important institutions are missing.  From the analysis so far, clear patterns appear to be 
emerging around social network „types‟, welfare outcomes and the characteristics of 
respondents achieving these outcomes. 
 
The hypotheses set out in the chapter suggest that larger, more diverse networks are 
associated with positive outcomes, and to a certain extent this appears to be borne out 
by a very preliminary analysis of the data. Network size and diversity measures (with 
the exception of age diversity of network partners) do indeed seem to be associated with 
good outcomes as captured by an index of socio-economic status and by level of crop 
marketing. People who have networks associated with good outcomes tend to be male, 
or in male-headed households, married, employers of group labour, with higher levels 
of education and have not always lived in their current community. Women tend to 
report more diverse networks in terms of sex of network partners (Appendix E). 
 
Issues surrounding inequality of access to informal social institutions and social 
networks, and links to vulnerability and exclusion seem especially pertinent; 
particularly, who has access to which institutions and to what effect? Institutions here 
are broadly defined to encompass both informal and formal institutions and 
organisations, including social networks. What does this mean in terms of livelihoods 
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and welfare? The policy relevance lies in the usefulness of this information in targeting 
poor people. An issue that deserves attention is what is meant by exclusion. Lack of 
accessibility of formal institutions often impacts on a whole community in a covariate 
way, which can help to explain the role of informal mechanisms, for example to 
improve information flows.  
 
There is a positive correlation between value of crops sold and network size, and with 
group affiliation, and a negative correlation with higher proportions of kin in the 
network, suggesting some support of the „strength of heterogeneous networks‟ 
hypothesis. Novel and hence more valuable information is purported to be contained in 
networks where alters have weaker links between each other. A network consisting of 
many kin members implies not only strong links between the focal individual 
(respondent or ego) and alters, but also strong links between alters. Entry into crop sales 
markets is also positively correlated with larger social networks. The analysis of 
correlations between social networks variables and proxies for transactions costs 
(notably crop storage, bicycle and radio ownership, use of hybrid seed) suggests that 
higher values of the social networks variables do appear to go hand-in-hand with lower 
transactions costs. However, the analysis of household clusters according to command 
over resources and marketing levels, while pointing to the importance of networks in 
affecting both control over resources and the ability to sell higher volumes of output 
given resources available, suggests that network size per se is not the factor that 
differentiates between success or not in terms of crop marketing. How people use their 
networks is arguably more important. This is an interesting result and will be explored 
further in subsequent analyses in Chapter 6 using interactive variables. Households 
participating in markets and those selling higher values of crops appear to be more 
likely to have prestige networks, captured as kin in an influential position. 
 
......................... 
 
Chapters 6 presents empirical results of a multivariate, causal analysis of the potential 
role of social networks in reducing transaction costs and mediating access to markets. It 
builds on the preliminary analysis contained here to consider whether the network 
variables have predictive value in the analysis of returns to social networks, captured as 
household crop market participation, and whether social networks may help or hinder 
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access to, or competition in, markets, focusing on trading.  Endogeneity is likely to be 
an issue. This will be explored, and Instrumental Variable Estimation given as a 
possible solution. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Empirical Model of Household Crop Marketing and Social Networks 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of a model of crop market participation, 
examining the role of social networks in market exchange of smallholder farming 
households. The overarching question is whether or not social networks help to 
determine household agricultural commercialisation in settings where there is little 
variability between households on endowments such as land, labour and farm inputs, in 
contexts of incomplete or missing markets. Do social networks, by mediating market 
access, help to explain differences between households? 
 
Descriptive results in Chapter 5 showed sellers are more likely to have bigger social 
networks in general, with relatively more non-kin members, more mixed-sex networks 
(though less diverse in terms of age), and be members of multiple village groups and 
societies. These all go hand-in-hand with operating at higher levels of crop sales. Here, 
the research builds on this with causal analysis incorporating social networks variables 
into a model of agricultural commercialisation with transactions costs. 
Commercialisation is measured by the total value of output sold across all crops, using 
data collected during both rounds of the household survey
43
.  
 
The overarching question of the research is: what is the role of social networks in 
economic life? In the context of market participation this can be focused as what is the 
role of social networks in potentially reducing transactions costs thus allowing greater 
participation in markets. This chapter explores the value of being able to access 
resources through personal social networks. Does this improve the institutional 
environment for households, leading to better economic outcomes in the form of higher 
crop sales, through reducing transactions costs and mediating access to markets? 
 
There is a debate about how useful networks are in economic terms. They may serve to 
help people access information, technical know-how, resources, but there is potentially 
                                                     
43
 Maize; Hybrid Maize; Cassava; Millet; Sorghum; Mixed beans; Soybean; Sweet potato; Irish 
potato; Ground nut; Cabbage; Mango; Banana; Plantain; Squash; Orange; Tomato. See Table 
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a „dark side‟. This relates to the role of social networks in engendering obligations 
between network partners. As a result people may feel burdened by responsibilities and 
thus adopt strategies that purposefully do not lead to an excess of wealth or income 
(diFalco and Bülte, 2011; Baland et al, 2011). Social networks can also be a basis for 
exploitation and social marginalisation (Kabeer, 2000). The research posits that social 
networks may help reduce transactions costs enabling higher crops sales. The three 
hypotheses set out in chapter 4 suggest three channels through which social networks 
could have beneficial outcomes: 1) Bigger is Better: larger networks are associated with 
better outcomes; 2) There are benefits to having „friends in high places‟, defined as 
links to persons with prestige or influence; and 3) Heterogeneous networks: network 
diversity means greater access to novel information and increased likelihood of being 
able to draw on diverse resources through networks. These hypotheses will be explored 
through the econometric models. Interaction terms could potentially highlight how 
social networks might reinforce other factors, and vice-versa, and these will be 
explored. A significant challenge in estimating the relationships between social 
networks and outcomes of smallholder farming households is in establishing direction 
of causality and correcting for other forms of endogeneity such as selectivity bias.  
 
The chapter first sets out the empirical model of agricultural supply response (Section 
6.1), followed by a discussion in Section 6.2 of challenges in estimating the model, 
focusing on: endogeneity, separability and identification.  Section 6.3 sets out the 
methodology. Instrumental Variable Analysis as a potential solution to some of these 
challenges is discussed in Section 6.4. The empirical model is estimated using 
Generalised Method of Moments with instrumental variables and results are presented 
in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes. Results of estimations assuming exogenous 
regressors but correcting for potential selectivity bias using i) Heckman selection 
model; and ii) Censored Tobit are given in Appendix K.  
 
 
6.1 Empirical Model 
 
The empirical model is based on a basic static model of the agricultural household 
incorporating transaction costs, following the methodology of Goetz (1992) and later 
                                                                                                                                                           
E2.8 in Appendix E for a breakdown of percentage households selling each crop and average 
prices. Table E2.9 shows mean values of each crop sold. 
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extended (see Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). Key, 
Sadoulet and de Janvry (2000) modify and extend the basic static agricultural household 
model to incorporate transactions costs. In this model, transactions costs are defined as 
being either fixed (costs are fixed regardless of the amount exchanged) or variable 
(costs vary with the amount exchanged). 
 
Following Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry (2000), the empirical estimation is a simple 
model of agricultural supply response including transactions costs in determining crop 
market participation. The approach here differs from more mainstream approaches to 
modelling agricultural commercialisation in that it incorporates social networks in 
addition to more conventional variables as proxies for transactions costs. The theoretical 
model is set out in Appendix G. The empirical model is given by the reduced form 
equation: 
 
iii uy  X  
(6.1) 
 
where yi is the measure of farm household commercialisation, value of aggregate crop 
sales; ui is the error term; Xi is a vector of observed explanatory variables (K, H, S, D, 
L), with: 
 
K = Farm Capital (including assets, labour, transactions costs) 
H = Human Capital 
S = Social Networks 
D = Household Demographics 
L = Location 
 
Social networks potentially impact directly on outcomes, and also indirectly via their 
effect on transaction costs, see discussion in Chapter 5. In this way, social networks 
could also proxy for transactions costs. Thus, in the notation above and in the 
subsequent analysis, social networks variables appear separately. 
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6.2 Challenges in Estimating the Empirical Model 
 
In estimating the empirical model, analytical issues arise related to the underlying 
model, to sampling methods, and to the data themselves. This section discusses: i) 
Endogeneity; ii) Separability; iii) Identification. Other data-related issues including 
sample survey design, and those arising from the choice of estimation procedure will be 
examined later. 
 
6.2.1 Endogeneity 
 
An explanatory variable xj contained in the vector Xi is said to be endogenous if it is 
correlated with the error term ui, thus invalidating the orthogonality assumption. 
Endogeneity usually arises as a result of: i) sample selection bias; ii) simultaneity; iii) 
measurement error; and/or iv) omitted variables (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, for 
a review). 
 
i. Sample Selection Bias 
There is potentially a sample selection problem in the research to the extent that there is 
a restricted, non-random sample of sellers. The observed distribution of income from 
selling crops is a truncated distribution because the dependent variable for crop income 
yi is only observed for those selling crops. People self-select into “sellers” and “non-
sellers”. Selectivity bias arises if (6.1) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares based on 
the observations for which crop income yi is available because the dependent variable is 
censored by an unobserved latent variable, so estimators of the parameters will be 
inconsistent. Using least squares without correcting for selectivity bias leads to invalid 
estimates of the parameters for the full sample. The estimated intercept is also biased 
because means are not zero. 
 
This can be dealt with using two types of econometric model: i) those taking a censored 
dependent variable, such as a Tobit model; ii) two-stage procedures such as Heckman 
selection model or treatment-effects models. The assumption underlying the Tobit 
model is that households are unconstrained. That is, the choice to sell or not to sell is 
exogenous. If zero values of the dependent variable are a rational choice of households 
then a censored Tobit model might be the more appropriate model. If this is not 
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plausible then a Heckman selection model might be more suitable. The rationale behind 
the Heckman selection model is to estimate market surplus conditional on market 
participation, where market participation is estimated with a reduced form equation (see 
also Goetz, 1992). The probability of participation is modelled using Maximum 
Likelihood Probit to obtain the Inverse Mills Ratio. This is included as a „selection 
term‟ in the second stage, modelling the degree of participation given that the household 
participates at all. This provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimators for all 
parameters (Greene, 2003; Maddala, 1983; Heckman, 1990). 
 
ii. Simultaneity 
This is a specific type of endogeneity problem, occurring when the explanatory variable 
is jointly determined with the dependent variable. Regressors included in the outcome 
model are thus also potentially choice variables. They are therefore likely to be 
correlated with unobservables contained in the error term. There is theoretical and 
empirical evidence that this is likely to be true of social networks (and other) variables. 
Literature on network formation, discussed in Chapter 2, suggests that networks tend to 
be fluid by nature. Depending on the circumstances, people may switch focus between 
networks, and may also react to a deterioration of their position in one network by 
joining another or by creating new networks. Further, are those with certain types of 
social network better able to participate in markets, or does more participation in 
markets result in better social networks; that is, networks facilitating successful market 
participation? Because of inherent simultaneity bias standard regression techniques will 
confound these two effects. If this is indeed the case then estimates of coefficients on 
variables will in general be biased leading to over- or underestimation of the true causal 
effects of the regressors on the outcome of interest. 
 
iii. Measurement Error 
In general, it is “assumed … that the data used to estimate the parameters of our models 
are true measurements on their theoretical counterparts” (Greene, 2003: 83). In practice, 
many measurement problems may be present in empirical data. Observing only 
imperfect measures of variables can be due to: recall problems; „noisy‟ measures; over- 
and under-estimation; and because there is simply no tangible measure of the household 
or individual-level characteristics to be included in the model. Measurement error can 
introduce at the very least less precision in estimated coefficients and a lower t-statistic, 
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and in some cases severe biases (Deaton, 1997). Evidence from social networks studies 
suggests they are inherently prone to measurement error, which is likely to be correlated 
with individual observable and unobservable characteristics. Studies estimate that as 
much as fifty per cent of what people report about their own particular interactions is 
incorrect. However, when the content of reported interactions is examined it tends to 
relate to their perceptions of stable, long-lasting relationships and not to specific, 
usually one-off, instances, thus giving a better snapshot of the core of people‟s social 
networks without the „noise‟ of single, superficial interactions (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994:57. See also Brewer, 2000). Other research suggests that what is reported by ego 
and alter usually corresponds (Marsden, 1990). Self reported crop incomes may also be 
prone to measurement error. In the research, income data were reported in survey 
modules administered at the individual level, with respondents (usually household head 
and spouse) interviewed separately. The reported volumes of crops sold by the 
household and prices received coincided. It can be assumed therefore that reported crop 
incomes are reasonably accurate and any measurement error will be non-systematic and 
therefore not correlated with the error term (see also Moore et al, 2000). The research 
also includes non-farm income as a regressor, which will be strongly correlated with 
household incomes, but not with measurement errors in crop incomes. 
 
iv. Omitted variables 
An omitted variable is one that might influence the dependent variable but is not 
included as an explanatory variable in the regression. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates will be unbiased as long as the omitted variables are uncorrelated with the 
included explanatory variables. However, if omitted variables are correlated with the 
included explanatory variables this means there is a compound disturbance term. It 
includes the unobserved variables as well as the standard random disturbance term. In 
this case OLS generally produces biased and inconsistent estimates of impact of 
observed variables. Estimates include not only their true effects but also effects of any 
correlated unobserved variables, for example unobserved social skills or entrepreneurial 
ability or other farmer characteristics. Usually such variables are omitted due to data 
unavailability. Many aspects of social networks are personal and individual choices, for 
example giving and receiving social support, becoming a member of a group or society. 
These will therefore depend on personal preferences, which may not be observable. 
They might also be things that do not vary over time, for example household ability, but 
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are not included in the model, also called unobserved (neglected) heterogeneity. This is 
relevant to the analysis here as unobserved heterogeneity might be introduced because 
the determinants of Social Networks=0 are not known. If this is the case then estimates, 
for example in the first stage Probit of a Heckman selection model, will be inconsistent, 
which has no impact on directions of effects or relative effects, but could be problematic 
for partial effects. This is only a problem where the magnitudes of i have meaning (See 
Wooldridge, 2002: page 471).  
 
There are a number of ways of dealing with endogeneity empirically: If panel data are 
available, unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for using random or fixed effects. 
Experimental approaches can also be used to establish causal links and account for 
selection bias. However, neither panel data nor experimental approaches are possible 
with the household survey data collected for the research. Sample selection bias can be 
corrected by using two-stage or censored models such as Heckman Selection Models 
(Heckman, 1979) or a Tobit. Other forms of endogeneity may be addressed by 
incorporating instrumental variables into the model. Instrumental variables can account 
for time-varying unobservable factors of households by inducing random variation in 
the endogenous social networks variables. A suitable instrument is one that is correlated 
with the endogenous explanatory variable, uncorrelated with the error term and does not 
affect the outcome of interest conditional on the included regressors. That is, it affects 
the outcome only through the endogenous variable (exclusion restriction). 
 
Estimations include instrumental variables to attempt to control for reverse causality 
and unobservable household characteristics correlated with the social networks 
variables and outcomes. Finding suitable instruments is challenging and the chapter 
returns to this in more detail in section 6.4. The research also attempts to address 
potential selectivity bias by estimating a Heckman selection model and censored Tobit. 
 
6.2.2 Separability 
 
Do households make market participation and volume decisions simultaneously or 
sequentially? This is essentially an empirical question. If the decision is made 
sequentially the analysis needs to be broken down into sub-periods, otherwise the model 
will be misspecified. This makes it a two-stage decision problem – consumption and 
production decisions are separable. Most empirical studies of commercialisation assume 
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separability. First the producer decides whether or not to participate in markets as a 
seller and once this decision has been made, decides how much to sell, conditional on 
participation (see: Goetz, 1992; Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; Heltberg and Tarp, 
2002; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006). 
 
The research is interested in this question insofar as the way one believes producers to 
make marketing, production and consumption decisions has implications for the way 
behaviour is modelled. Deciding whether the model should be based on separability or 
nonseparability conditions can be guided by empirical evidence. A useful summary is 
given by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995): 
 
“…If the market is used for a transaction, the household behaves as if it were deciding 
sequentially: production first and consumption/ work after. Production decisions are 
identical to those of a pure producer. Consumption decisions are affected by the level of 
income reached in production. For both decisions, market prices serve as decision 
prices. The relevant price is the sale price if the household is a net seller and the 
purchase price if it is a net buyer.” 
Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995:151) 
 
This implies that if there are no market failures and a study is only interested in farm 
household production, the separability condition holds and removes the need for the 
household approach. Instead resource allocation is assumed to take place “exactly as 
proposed in the pure production theory of the firm” (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995:159). 
While non-separability holds for those households not selling crops in market, for those 
who do, in the presence of market failures, the separability condition breaks down. The 
household approach is therefore useful as production and consumption must be 
estimated simultaneously. 
 
Studies on market participation focusing on the separability question tend to look at 
three mutually exclusive production decisions. The household or individual is either: net 
buyer; net seller; or neither (autarkic). This thesis is not concerned with the production 
versus consumption decision so much as how social networks help determine how 
households can make a living out of farming – looking at the production decision alone. 
It makes sense therefore to approach the problem from the perspective of seller versus 
non-seller. 
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6.2.3 Identification 
 
For a model to be identified the estimation must trace out the correct relationship 
between the variables. That is, we can actually calculate the coefficients from the 
observations. Failure to address identification has been a criticism of social capital 
empirical studies that purport to provide evidence of a role for social capital in socio-
economic outcomes (Durlauf, 2002). Failure to identify the parameters of the model is 
also an effect of endogeneity. Thus, using relevant and valid instruments can help to 
identify the parameters of the model. 
 
When modelling crop market participation decisions using a two-stage procedure in 
particular, such as a Heckman selection model, one must consider how to correctly 
identify the selection and outcome equations. In terms of identifying the selection (first 
stage) equation of the Heckman selection model there should be at least one continuous 
variable present in the selection equation that does not appear in the subsequent 
outcome equation (Deaton, 1997). That is, a variable that affects the decision to sell but 
not how much. Key et al (2000) distinguish between Fixed Transaction Costs (FTCs) 
and Variable Transaction Costs (VTCs) as determinants of crop market participation. 
Both types of transactions costs affect market participation but only VTCs affect the 
amount sold decision, conditional on participation. So FTCs are omitted from the 
outcome equation, and used econometrically to identify market participation (see also 
Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). The Inverse Mills ratio calculated in the first stage of the 
estimation is a nonlinear function of the regressors in the first-stage Probit model, so by 
including it in the second stage equation means the latter is identified but only if the 
assumption of normality in the Probit model holds. Therefore to make clearer the source 
of identification of the second stage equation one needs ideally to include at least one 
other variable in the second stage that is not present in the first stage. 
 
The next section describes the methodologies for the multivariate analyses, first noting 
sampling weights used to take account of complex survey design. The choice of models 
is set out briefly, followed by a discussion of variables: dependent variables, exogenous 
regressors, endogenous regressors and instruments. 
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6.3 Methodology 
 
6.3.1 Complex survey design
44
: 
 
Villages were purposively sampled, with households randomly sampled within each 
village so that each sample is representative of its village. Ignoring sampling design and 
assuming simple random sampling will likely underestimate standard errors, possibly 
leading to results that seem to be statistically significant, when in fact, they are not. The 
survey aimed to be representative of the areas surveyed, so sample weights based on the 
reciprocal of the ratio of sample size to village size are used and are given in Table 6.1 
(see also the explanation in Chapter 3). 
 
Table 6.1 Sampling weights 
Community Weight 
Kabila 5.56 
Ngulula 2.40 
Lufubu 1.08 
 
6.4.2 Choice of models 
 
Two-stage procedures such as the Heckman Selection Model (Heckman, 1979), also 
called a generalised Tobit, can be used to estimate both market participation and the 
value of sales given market participation, thus addressing potential selectivity bias. The 
first step is to model selection into sellers and non-sellers (a discrete, binary decision).  
Second, model the continuous decision of how much to sell, conditional on 
participation. Quantity sold is therefore analysed for the sub-sample of selling 
households.  
 
The Heckman model assumes lack of data on the subsample of non-seller households. 
However, in this research, even though the dependent variable „value of crops sold‟ is 
not observed (is equal to zero) for the sub-sample of the data not selling crops during 
the survey period, the regressors are observed for these farm households. This suggests 
that a censored Tobit model might be an appropriate estimation procedure, rather than a 
selection model (Greene, 2003; Maddala, 1983). Here, it is assumed that data on the 
dependent variable is unavailable (or limited) but not data on the regressors. The 
                                                     
44
 A Chow test to test whether the parameter estimates are the same whether we pool the data or 
estimate the model for each village separately is not possible due to degrees of freedom 
problems. A categorical variable for community is sufficient. 
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assumption underlying the Tobit is that households are unconstrained. That is, in 
contrast to the Heckman model, the choice to sell or not to sell is exogenous and zero 
values of the dependent variable are a rational choice of households 
 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is a semi-parametric method that allows a 
relaxation of restrictive, parametric assumptions and generates estimators that are 
“robust to some variations in the underlying data generating process” (Greene, 2003: 
525). In contrast to standard IV estimation GMM is efficient when „heteroskedasticity 
of unknown form‟ is present, the effect of which is inconsistent estimates of standard 
errors rendering invalid diagnostic tests for validity (endogeneity) and relevance (see 
Baum et al 2003; 2007). Under GMM, test statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
Unlike the Heckman and Tobit specifications, here selection is assumed to be 
exogenous. This assumption can be tested by comparing the results of the selection 
model with those of the GMM. 
 
Choice of the most appropriate model will be made on consideration of the need for and 
success in addressing endogeneity concerns in the estimation, and minimisation of bias. 
This includes: significance of the inverse mills ratio in the second stage of the Heckman 
selection model; the ability to instrument for potential endogenous regressors in 
combination with dealing with complex survey design; general properties of the 
estimation procedures. 
 
6.3.3 Choice of variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The choice of indicator of household level commercialisation is largely an empirical 
question (see Chapter 1 of this thesis and also Leavy and Poulton, 2007, for a 
discussion). Following Heltberg and Tarp (2002), and in line with previous studies of 
smallholder commercialisation in Northern Province discussed in Chapter 5, the models 
in this chapter use yi equal to the log of the aggregate value of crop sales as the 
endogenous (dependent) variable. Quantities of crops grown and sold, and prices 
received by the household were collected where possible from more than one family 
member and responses checked carefully for inconsistencies. Because household 
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portfolios consist of multiple crops, quantities sold cannot be aggregated across 
different crops in any meaningful way unless converted to values. This was done using 
market prices at the time of the two rounds of surveys, collected via price questionnaires 
administered at the community level. The household surveys also reported price data, 
but there were many gaps. The community level price data was checked against prices 
reported by the households and found to be consistent. These prices act as implicit 
weights. This approach, however, tells us nothing about underlying causal mechanisms 
for cultivation decisions (Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). In the selection stage of the 
Heckman two-stage model (Appendix K), the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
denoting whether or not the household sold crops at all.  
 
The mean output of sellers compared with non-sellers, in terms of value of crops grown, 
is considerably higher (Table E2.7 in Appendix E). Sellers on average grow crops to a 
value of 2 million kwacha, with a maximum of 10.9 million kwacha, compared to an 
average crop value of 174 thousand kwacha for non-sellers, with a maximum of 1.5 
million kwacha. Kernel density estimates for the value of crops sold variable suggest 
wide variability in crop incomes across households in the sample who sold over the 
survey period. These are given in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
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Figure 6.1: Kernel Density Estimate – Value of crops sold  
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Figure 6.2: Kernel Density Estimate – Value of crops sold (log) 
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Regressors 
 
Determinants of household crop marketing can be grouped as: household demographic 
characteristics; human capital; farm capital; social networks; location: 
 
 
Household 
Demographics: 
Household size and dependency ratio
45
, sex and age of 
household head 
 
Human Capital: Maximum level of education in the household 
 
Farm Capital: FTCs Ownership of radio; Access to crop storage facilities; 
Ownership of bicycle 
 
Farm Capital: VTCs Labour dummies: household members work as farm 
labourers, household is an employer of farm labour;  
Non-farm income („000 kwacha), Value of fertiliser used 
(Kwacha), Proportion of land cultivated
46
, dummy 
variable for use of hybrid seed, Large livestock ownership 
(Number of animals) 
 
Social Networks: Network size, network diversity (by age and sex of 
network partners), membership of formal and informal 
groups, proportion of total network members who are kin, 
kin in influential position and their location, proportion of 
links that are multiplex; average content multiplexity of 
network partners; sum of resources accessed across 
network. These are all calculated as the maximum value 
for the household 
 
Location: categorical variable for community 
 
 
                                                     
45
 The household dependency ratio is calculated as the number of people in a household aged 15 
or less plus those aged over 60 divided by the number aged 15-60. 
46
 Proportion of land cultivated is used rather than total area cropped due to lack of variability in 
the latter variable. Out of 137 households, 34 households have landholdings of less than 2.5 
hectares. There are some outliers – five households report between 30 and 50 hectares and one 
household 75 hectares of land. Forty five households report landholdings of exactly 10 hectares. 
These are all farmers in Lufubu Resettlement Scheme, reflecting the way land is allocated as a 
standard parcel of land. The standard deviations reflect differences in variability by location. 
Ngulula has a mean landholding of 9 hectares with a standard deviation of 11.04 for the full 
sample, and without outliers a mean landholding of 7.14 hectares, standard deviation 7.32. 
Kabila‟s mean landholding is 4.8 hectares, standard deviation 12.7, and without outliers 2.8 
hectares on average with a standard deviation of 4.5. Lufubu Resettlement Scheme‟s average 
plot size is 12.5 hectares, standard deviation 6.45, and without outliers has a mean landholding 
of 11.5 hectares with a standard deviation of 3.45. 
 
179 
 
 
 
Following Key et al (2000), farm capital variables are subdivided into Fixed and 
Variable Transaction Costs, under the hypothesis that household relationships to the 
market can differ because of market transaction costs. Variable transaction costs include 
factors such as distances and transport. Fixed transaction costs include information 
variables. Transaction costs are at best only partly observable so proxies are used. 
Herbicide, pesticide and other chemical application to fields rarely appear in the sample 
and are therefore omitted from the estimation due to lack of observations. Because of 
cash constraints these are also likely to take place only when there is a problem, thus 
reactively rather than routinely, and so will be endogenous and have a negative 
correlation with crop output. 
 
Social networks variables include: network size, network diversity (by age and sex of 
network partners), membership of formal and informal groups, proportion of total 
network members who are kin, kin in influential position and their location, network 
multiplexity measured as: number of multiplex ties, the average number of ties per alter, 
the sum of resources accessed/relationships across network. These are all calculated as 
the maximum value for the household. A variable is also included for group affiliation. 
Group membership as a proxy for social capital has been linked to outcomes, and the 
empirical literature provides examples of both positive and negative effects (see: 
Coleman 1990; Burt 1992; Massey and Espinoza, 1997, among others). Positive effects 
of group membership include: generating and pooling knowledge; providing 
information about reputation and reliability of agents; establishing institutional 
structures (norms and rules) for collective action (see Collier, 1998). Evidence of direct 
links between group membership and per capita household income is provided by: 
Haddad and Maluccio (2002), using longitudinal data for Kwazulu-Natal; Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) for Tanzania, instrumenting for group membership with trust, (although 
Haddad and Maluccio find no evidence that trust is “contemporaneously important for 
income generation”); Grootaert, (1999); Grootaert et al, (1999). By contrast, groups 
may perpetuate hierarchies and inequalities to the detriment of its members, or non-
members, and members may be bound to obligations with negative economic 
consequences. 
 
Interaction terms are also included in the model to allow for shifts in the slope of 
agricultural supply function according to various characteristics, positing that discrete 
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jumps in supply are possible for those with access to information and/or greater 
potential to interpret and use information that also have larger social networks. This is 
captured with an interaction term between: i) radio ownership and network size; and ii) 
education level and network size. Table 6.2 sets out the variables used in the models and 
basic descriptive statistics. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables and Potential Regressors.  
N=136. Unit Mean/ 
dist 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent Variables:    
Market participation (market) 1=Yes; 0=No (% yes) 83.82 .. 
Total annual sales agricultural food crops (ln) (logcsold) Thousand Kwacha (ln) 5.87 1.55 
Total annual sales agricultural food crops (csold) Thousand Kwacha 805.98     1541.69 
Regressors:    
Farm Capital: Assets and labour    
Fixed transaction costs:    
Ownership of radio (radio) 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 44.85 .. 
Access to crop storage facilities (store) 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 30.88 .. 
Ownership of bicycle (bike) 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 70.59 .. 
Variable transaction costs:    
HH member is farm labourer (egoemp) 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 65.44 .. 
HH Employs farm labour (egoboss) 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 77.21 .. 
Non-farm income (‘000 kwacha) (nfy2) Number 34.29 83.57 
Value of fertiliser used (‘000 kwacha) (fertval) Number 57.26    146.23 
Proportion of land cultivated (propland) Share 0.35   0.35 
Uses hybrid seed (hyseed) 1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 33.83 .. 
Large livestock ownership (livelarg) Number 2.25   4.40 
 
Human Capital (Variable transaction costs) 
   
Maximum education level in household (maxedhh) 
[also: Dummy variable max HH education is secondary 
and above (education)] 
0 = Up to Grade 4 
1 = Grades 5-7 
2 = Secondary/ College 
8.09 
42.65 
49.26 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
Social Networks 
   
Network Diversity/Composition    
Diversity of network in terms of sex of alters (agehet) Index  of Qualitative Variation of 
alters’ sex 
0.23 0.18 
Diversity of network in terms of age of alters(IQVst2) St,dev of alter ages in years 11.96  4.81 
Kin as proportion of network (propkin) Proportion 0.4     0.27 
Size    
Group Membership (dummy) (affil2) 
Group Membership (No of groups) (affil) 
1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 
Number 
37.50 
2.44 
.. 
1.59 
Network Size (size) Number 11.35 6.21 
Network Size (log) (logsize) Number 2.28 0.57 
Functional Diversity    
Proportion of ties that are multiplex (propmult) Proportion 0.19 0.13 
Average content multiplexity of alters (multcont) No. of ‘network functions’ alter 
appears in 
3.49 0.85 
Resource access – instrumental networks    
Sum of resources accessed across network (ressum) 
Prestige Networks 
Influential Kin dummy (kininf) 
 
No of resource types accessed 
by ego through alters 
1=Yes; 0=No  (% yes) 
 
13.27 
 
70.6  
3.53 
 
.. 
Household Demographics    
Sex of household head (hh_sex) 1 = Female 0= Male (% female) 17.65 .. 
Age of household head (hh_age) Years 44.50 13.58 
Household size (hh_size) Number 7.01 3.12 
Household dependency ratio (depend) Number 0.51     0.21 
 
Location 
   
Categorical variable for location (comid) 1 = Kabila 
2 = Ngulula 
3 = Lufubu 
27.21 
29.41 
43.38 
.. 
.. 
.. 
Interaction Terms    
Network size*Radio Ownership    
Network size*education    
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The next section discusses endogeneity in the proposed independent variables. 
 
6.3.4 Regressor Endogeneity 
 
Addressing endogeneity is the primary challenge in modelling the relationships in this 
study. It would be unusual in such a study for all of the variables in the cross-sectional 
model to be exogenous, that is, regressors statistically independent of the residuals, a 
standard assumption in regression analysis. Consequently, parameter estimates will be 
biased and inconsistent. Most elements of people‟s lives, their resource access, socio-
economic characteristics, are going to be related to each other in some way. People‟s 
lives are complex, relationships between variables will be mutually reinforcing and it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle effects and establish a direction of 
causality. For example, farm inputs such as fertiliser and other chemicals, tend to be 
endogenous, their use determined in part by income and also by unobserved factors 
such as shocks. 
 
To model relationships econometrically it is necessary to establish causal links and 
therefore potential endogeneity needs to be addressed. If not, parameter estimates are 
likely to be biased and inconsistent. The likely presence of endogeneity between 
outcomes and regressors, notably, social networks, has been discussed briefly. Of the 
regressors described in Table 6.2 above, the following are likely to be exogenous and 
therefore the direction of causality clear: education, sex and age of household head, 
community, non-farm income. These are all likely to determine output/ outcomes.  
 
Social networks variables related to attributes of network partners, network 
multiplexity, age and sex heterogeneity, proportion of network partners who are kin and 
prestige networks (dummy and location of influential kin), are assumed to be exogenous 
as they are largely beyond the household‟s control or predate substantially the time-
frame of the model. 
 
The exogeneity of other variables are more debatable. Labour and other purchased 
inputs (fertiliser, hybrid seed) are determined to a great extent by the availability of cash 
and therefore value of the output that the household manages to sell, while at the same 
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time the use of purchased inputs potentially increases production thereby increasing 
crop income. However, within the timeframe of the model one would argue that current 
labour, seed and fertiliser use is determined by past crop income. Therefore, these 
variables are assumed to be exogenous. Household size is also arguably endogenous. 
More successful households may be more likely to attract more people, especially 
extended family members/ kin. This can have the effect of increasing the household‟s 
available labour and there could be social benefits to having „many followers‟ as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Conversely, it may have the effect of increasing the household‟s 
dependency ratio and thus have socio-economic costs – for example, more mouths to 
feed. Such obligations to kin may pressure households to increase incomes, but could 
also act as a disincentive to accumulate (see also diFalco and Bülte, 2011). 
 
The proportion of land owned that is cropped is potentially endogenous. Land is 
relatively accessible in Northern Province, allocated by the Chief of an area to 
Headmen, who in turn allocate land to villagers. So on the whole households do not 
have a choice of landholding. However, if someone is able to cultivate more land then 
they can request more land from the Headman and therefore may receive a further 
allocation. This implies that more successful farmers will be those cultivating a greater 
proportion of their total land allocation, which in turn feeds back into their success as a 
farmer creating a „virtuous‟ circle, though there will be a point at which additional land 
allocation will mean the more successful farmer may then be cultivating a smaller 
proportion of land than someone relatively less successful, so the relationship will not 
be linear. It could also plausibly be argued that as cultivated area is usually determined 
at the start of the season it is reasonable to assume that it is exogenous to the value of 
output sold for that season, which occurs at some point in the future. 
 
Radio ownership is also potentially endogenous as households with higher crop incomes 
are more likely to be able to afford and hence have bought a radio. Generally, asset 
ownership tends to reflect accumulated past income. Radio ownership also potentially 
provides access to more information (on markets, prices etc) thereby helping to generate 
higher incomes. In their model of agricultural supply response in Mozambique, 
Heltberg and Tarp (2002) use radio ownership to proxy for fixed transaction costs 
(access to information). They do not instrument for it although they do note that while 
significant and related positively to food crop market participation, direction of 
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causality is indeterminate. Looking at the descriptive statistics, those participating in 
crop markets are just as likely to own a radio as not: fifty per cent of households selling 
crops have a working radio. Given the impossibility of finding an instrument for radio 
in the dataset, it will be assumed that radio ownership predates the period of the 
research, in that data on working radio ownership was gathered in round 1 of the survey 
whereas data for the crops sold variable was gathered in both round 1, referring to the 
previous 6 month recall period, and round 2, referring to the period since the initial 
survey, and aggregated. 
 
Finally, endogeneity of social networks: One of the major criticisms of work on social 
capital is its failure to adequately address endogeneity.47 Two of the social networks 
variables may be endogenous – network size and household membership of village level 
groups and societies. Network size is potentially endogenous because i) those engaging 
with markets are more likely to interact with more people thus increasing their chances 
of having a larger network and ii) „successful‟ people are more likely to attract others 
into their network. However, one could also reasonably argue that social networks are, 
on the whole, established and embedded relationships and as such are likely to pre-date 
substantially the time-frame of the research, and have existed before commercialisation 
of the farm household began. Group affiliation may be endogenous to income given 
group membership usually involves paying a subscription or fee of some kind, hence 
income will determine whether or not a household can actually afford to be in a group. 
Further, many groups are farmer/ cultivation groups and therefore level of production is 
likely to have an effect on whether or not a smallholder farming household member 
decides to become a group member. Assuming there are commercial benefits to being a 
member of a farming group (through increased access to information, labour etc) then 
group membership may lead to higher crop incomes.  
 
To summarise, network size, proportion of land cropped and group affiliation are 
therefore assumed to be endogenous and the research attempts to find suitable 
instruments for these potentially endogenous regressors. The dataset, despite its 
richness, holds limited scope for instruments that are appropriate econometrically but 
also plausible in a real world sense. The next section sets out conditions for instrument 
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validity and relevance, and associated statistical tests, followed by a description of 
potential instruments in the dataset. 
 
 
6.4 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
Instrumental variable analysis provides a general solution to problems of omitted 
variable bias, measurement error and endogenous explanatory variables. Observed 
explanatory variables believed to be correlated with the random disturbance term are 
replaced by their predicted values, thus removing correlations between observed 
explanatory variables and the disturbance term. These predicted values are obtained 
from a first stage regression of the endogenous variables on a set of observable variables 
(the instruments) that are not correlated with the random disturbance term. 
 
6.4.1 Instrument Validity 
 
Instruments must be both relevant and valid.  For an instrument to be relevant it must be 
sufficiently correlated with the observed endogenous regressors to provide reasonably 
accurate predicted values. Thus the partial correlation between the endogenous 
regressor and the instrumental variable should be nonzero. If it is nonzero but very 
small then the instruments are possibly weak. Consequently they will be poor predictors 
of the endogenous variable and obtained predicted values will have very little variation 
(see Murray, 2006). For an instrument to be valid it must be orthogonal to the errors, 
that is, uncorrelated with the disturbance term of relation being estimated. Further, 
instruments should not already appear in the relationship being estimated and there must 
be at least one instrumental variable for every observed endogenous explanatory 
variable in the relation being estimated. 
 
Choice of instruments is one of the main challenges in empirical work, and in many 
ways is an art. The next section sets out tests for instrument relevance and validity 
(exogeneity), followed by a discussion of the choice of instrumental variables in the 
research. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
47 See Durlauf‟s (2002) comprehensive exploration of estimation problems in empirical work on 
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6.4.2 Diagnostic Tests 
 
Once suitable instruments are found, one needs to test for instrument relevance (F- test) 
and validity (exogeneity). Also of concern is whether or not instruments are only 
weakly correlated with the potentially endogenous variable, which will result in large 
standard errors and 2SLS results biased towards the OLS estimator (see Murray, 2006). 
Tests for instrument relevance, weak instruments and validity are: 
 
i) F-test of joint significance of excluded instruments in the first stage IV 
regressions to assess instrument correlation with endogenous regressors. H0: 
variables jointly=0; 
ii) F-test of the equation in the second stage. H0: variables jointly=0; 
iii) Cragg-Donald weak identification test (see Stock and Yogo, 2002). H0: equation 
weakly identified. This also provides a test statistic for weak instruments; 
iv) In over-identified models, the Hansen J-statistic has a χ2 distribution under the 
joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, uncorrelated 
with the error term, and excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation i.e. instruments are orthogonal to the error. This is also a test 
of over-identifying restrictions. H0: instruments are valid i.e. orthogonal to the 
error term; a significant statistic indicates that one or more of our instruments 
are not valid (assuming that the model is otherwise correctly specified; see also 
Sargan test statistic). Estimates should be treated with caution as either the 
model is misspecified or some instruments are invalid. 
v) Hausman test for exogeneity. H0: exogeneity. 
 
The underlying dependent variable equation (6.1) can be rewritten to separate out 
variables contained within the vector Xi as an additional regressor(s) (Z), suspected to 
be endogenous: 
 
iiii eZy  'βX  
(6.2) 
X is the vector of exogenous explanatory variables, dimensions of X is (Nxk) 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
social capital. 
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Note that: 
 
iii uWZ  '  
(6.3) 
Wi is a vector of exogenous variables including a set of identifying instruments, 
dimensions (Nxm). When k=m the model is just identified; where k>m the model is 
over-identified. 
 
Assuming normality, we can express the random disturbance ei as a function of the 
randomness in (6.3) and some other term: 
 
  ei  = ui + i   
(6.4) 
 
where  is a constant and i  are normally distributed errors independent of ui.  
For instruments to be valid the following conditions must be met: 
 
Relevance: Cov (Zi,Xi)≠0 or plim1/N(Z‟X)= ∑ZX≠0 
Exogeneity: Cov (Zi,εi)=0 or plim1/N(Z‟ε)= 0 
 
These conditions ensure that the part of X that is correlated with Z contains only „good‟ 
variation. However, while relevance is testable, as are over-identifying restrictions, 
exogeneity is not fully testable so it is necessary to argue plausibility. 
 
The exogeneity hypothesis implies that the two sources of randomness are independent 
and this forms the basis for testing instrument validity.  This ultimately reduces to a 
restriction =0.  This can be implemented by first estimating 6.3 and obtain the 
residuals iu

, then estimate a second stage equation: 
y
*
i
  = βx'i  + zi +  iu

   +  i   
(6.5) 
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A t-test is then constructed on the restriction =0.  If we fail to reject this null 
hypothesis then the exogeneity restriction is upheld.  However, if the t-test is significant 
this confirms there is an endogenous variable present and instrumentation is required.  
 
Returning to equation (6.3), the instrumenting equation is: 
iii uWZ  '  
Where Wi is a vector of exogenous variables including a set of identifying instruments. 
 
The predicted value of the endogenous independent variable from the instrumenting 
equation, Z*=g(W), is used as a regressor in the main model.  
 
6.4.3 Potential instruments 
 
There are a number of options for valid and relevant instruments. If panel data are 
available then using lagged values of the regressor may address endogeneity, although 
some lagged variables may still be endogenous. Behaviour or outcomes in the past may 
be correlated with current outcomes. For example, ownership of radio one year ago is 
likely to be highly correlated with crop sales because information received by radio may 
have informed crop planting and marketing decisions today. This links to unobserved 
heterogeneity (Murray, 2006). 
 
If appropriate lagged variables are not available then in general to find suitable 
instruments one needs to use a priori reasoning to choose instruments that make sense 
from a statistical point of view supported by theory and other evidence (quantitative or 
qualitative). Ideal instruments successfully capture an exogenous source of variation in 
Y that either derives from true or pseudo-randomisation, usually predetermined or fixed 
characteristics out of the control of the household. Using qualitative and quantitative 
materials together, “essential in untangling causality in social science” (Durlauf, 2002: 
270), may help to develop the case for using a specific instrument or for asserting 
direction of causality. Given the often joint determination of social networks and 
socioeconomic outcomes, qualitative evidence can help to determine the conditions 
under which there are social network effects on outcomes. During fieldwork for this 
research the qualitative exercise described in Appendix C, with its discussion of 
determinants of successful commercial farming, gives clues to the role played by social 
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networks. This qualitative data suggests people ascribe a causal link between having 
particular network characteristics and outcomes: “you need people, no matter what” and 
“the famous always get their work done”48. The models in this chapter allow this to be 
examined quantitatively and potentially make robust empirical claims about linkages. 
 
Recall, instruments need to be independent of the residual (that is, exogenous or at least 
predetermined) and not impact directly on the value of crop sold, only affecting the 
dependent variable through their effect on the endogenous regressor. Ideal instruments 
when estimating relationships related to agriculture and rural livelihoods include 
variables for distances, weather, and prices. However, given that there are only three 
locations, the community identifier variable acts as a proxy for elements measured at the 
community level. So the usual challenge in finding possible instruments, variables 
exogenous within timeframe of the model, is exacerbated by the nature of the sample. 
Correlation coefficients of the potential instruments, endogenous regressors and the 
outcome variables help to identify potentially weak instruments. The correlation matrix 
for potential instruments in the research is given in table 6.3 below. 
 
An instrument type used in relation to social capital measures is the non-self cluster 
mean. These are values on a given endogenous variable calculated as mean over all 
other households in a community, that is, without the household‟s score. Thus the 
variable is a community average that varies at the household level (Christiaensen and 
Alderman, 2001). Recall, measurement error in social capital and, analogously, social 
networks variables, is likely to be correlated with individual observable and 
unobservable characteristics. However, the averages of social capital (or social 
networks) over the other members of the community are unlikely to be correlated with 
individual observable and unobservable characteristics. They are likely to be correlated 
with social networks “as they are the product of the same social context in which the 
individual lives” (see d‟Hombres et al, 2010). As long as there appears to be a strong 
correlation between the instrument and endogenous variables in the first stage 
regression then we can assume the effect is not in fact a local average treatment effect. 
 
 
                                                     
48
 DPhil Fieldwork, Northern Province Zambia, 2002-2003 
190 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Correlation Matrix dependent variable, endogenous regressors, instrumental variables  
 
Log 
csold propland 
Log 
size 
Logsize 
*ed2 
Logsize* 
rad affil areatot IQVst2 
Log 
meansize 
Log 
yearcomm iqvrad iqved fire water wild 
dom 
time 
logcsold 1 
               propland -0.07 1 
              logsize 0.11 -0.09 1 
             logsizeed2 0.3 -0.07 0.33 1 
            logsizerad 0.47 -0.07 0.33 0.35 1 
           affil 0.29 -0.15 0.46 0.24 0.28 1 
          areatot 0.29 -0.33 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.15 1 
         IQVst2 0.02 0.06 0.71 0.25 0.12 0.29 0.08 1 
        logmeansize 0.01 -0.42 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.32 0.26 -0.08 1 
       logyearcomm 0.14 0.3 -0.16 -0.25 -0.12 -0.02 -0.22 -0.01 -0.49 1 
      iqvrad 0.38 -0.03 0.41 0.32 0.81 0.3 0.16 0.45 0.13 -0.05 1 
     iqved 0.17 -0.01 0.63 0.61 0.19 0.3 0.16 0.86 0.01 -0.08 0.46 1 
    fire 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.32 0.32 0 0.11 1 
   water 0.18 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.39 1 
  wild -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.1 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.22 -0.04 0.05 0.53 0.43 1 
 domtime 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.03 -0.1 0.26 -0.03 0.07 0.76 0.64 0.93 1 
 
Notes: logcsold=log of value of crops sold; propland=proportion of land that is cultivated; logsize=log of household network size; 
logsizeed2=interaction term between log of network size and household secondary education dummy; logsizerad= interaction term between 
logsize and radio; affil= number of household group memberships; areatot=total land area farmed; IQVst2= sex heterogeneity of network; 
logmeansize=log of non-self cluster mean of network size; logyearcomm= log of years in community; iqvrad= interaction term between IQVst2 
and radio; iqved= interaction term between IQVst2 and education; fire= household time spent collecting firewood, average hours daily; water= 
household time spent collecting water, average hours daily; wild= household time spent collecting wild food, average hours daily; domtime: time 
spent on collecting firewood, water and wildfood, average hours daily. 
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Exogenous social networks variables may be used to instrument for endogenous SN 
measures, given that some social network features may determine network size directly, 
for example diversity of networks, and outcomes only indirectly through their effect on 
network size. For social network size a potential instrument is sex heterogeneity of 
network partners. Intuitively, more mixed networks will bring the household into 
contact with more people.  Further, this variable does not correlate with the value of 
crop sold variable but does correlate highly (correlation coefficient of 0.7. Table 6.3) 
with the (ln) network size variable, suggesting it might be a suitable instrument for 
network size. Any effect of this variable on crop output sold is likely to be through 
overall network size. 
 
A second potential instrument for the endogenous social network variable and for group 
affiliation is church membership. As an instrument for social networks and/or group 
membership this is likely to significantly predate the research. However, all but one 
household in the sample profess to be members of a church, with the majority (130 
households) of Christian denomination, suggesting there is not enough variability in the 
variable to consider inclusion in the estimation. Instead, tithe payments could possibly 
stand as a proxy to denote active church membership, taken as a dummy variable 
because it is not clear the extent to which tithe payment is related to income. However, 
church membership may not be a valid instrument due to potentially a direct impact on 
outcomes through the work ethic (for example, see Weber‟s thesis linking a protestant 
ethic and a capitalist spirit: 1904/5, 1930; subsequent work by Tawney, 1925, as well as 
more recent studies relating religion to socio-economic outcomes, such as Barro and 
McCleary, 2003). 
 
Following Haddad and Maluccio (2002), a further instrument for the group affiliation 
variable (measured as the number of groups the household is present in) is time spent in 
area (log). The rationale is that spending longer in an area increases exposure to the 
possibility of joining community groups, and thus increases likelihood of group 
membership. 
 
There are potentially two instruments for proportion of land cropped: i) total land area 
owned – this is related to the proportion of land cropped, but not directly to crop sales 
(see Isham, 2002). The Pearson correlation coefficient suggests that this variable is 
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moderately correlated with the land proportion variable and only weakly correlated with 
the value of output sold (-0.42 and 0.3 respectively); and ii) average time spent per day 
collecting firewood (in minutes): households who spend more time collecting firewood 
are likely to have less family labour available to cultivate a larger proportion of their 
landholding (see Brück, 2004). The Pearson correlation coefficients between this 
variable and the land and output variables are 0.2 and 0.09 respectively, suggesting little 
or no correlation with value of output sold, and just a weak correlation with proportion 
of land cropped. This instrument is potentially weak and could prove problematic in the 
estimation. The model was estimated using as an IV first the firewood variable, and then 
in its place an aggregate measure that is the sum of time taken collecting firewood, 
water and wild food (however, time spent collecting water and wild food is likely to be 
endogenous to household size for example, as a larger family means greater demand, 
and in turn more time spent collecting). GMM results are reported in Appendix H and 
diagnostic tests in Appendix I from estimations that „rotate‟ the instruments. These 
show that on balance omitting these instruments gives slightly better diagnostic test 
results in the first stage for the endogenous land variable. 
 
Instrument sets for the potentially endogenous regressors are given in Table 6.4: 
 
Table 6.4 Instrument Sets for Potentially Endogenous Regressors 
Endogenous regressor Instrument 
Network size (size) Diversity of network in terms of sex of alters (IQVst2) 
Non-self cluster mean network size (logmeansize) 
Land cropped (propland) Total land holding (areatot) 
Time spent collecting firewood/water/wildfood (fire; water; 
wild; domtime) 
Group affiliation (dummy; number of groups) (affil2; 
affil) 
Logarithm of time spent in area (logyearcomm) 
Church membership (tithe) 
Network size*education IQVst2*education (iqved) 
Network size*radio IQVst2*radio (iqvrad) 
 
 
The next section present results and analysis of the empirical model of the relationship 
between social networks and crop market participation estimated by general method of 
moments (GMM). 
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6.5 Results and Analysis 
 
The model was estimated using a Heckman Selection Model. The Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR) is not significant in the second stage regressions, suggesting there is no selection 
bias in the sample. However, just 21 out of 136 households reported no crop sales over 
the survey period, which may explain the selection term‟s lack of significance. Further, 
it is not possible to achieve convergence when estimating either the Heckman or the 
censored Tobit model with the data using survey weights and instrumental variables. 
Therefore the Heckman and Tobit models have been estimated under the assumption of 
exogeneity. Results are given in Appendix K. 
 
6.5.1 GMM estimation 
 
The model is estimated using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
This gives efficient estimates of the coefficients as well as consistent estimates of the 
standard errors because of its use of the optimal weighting matrix, the over-identifying 
restrictions of the model, and it relaxes the i.i.d. assumption. GMM is the most efficient 
estimator within the class of instrumental variables estimators.  
 
Variables are selected in order to test the three hypotheses set out in Chapter 4 relating 
social networks to outcomes. Recall: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Bigger is better 
A bigger network is better for ego‟s "individual goal attainment" (Bourdieu, 1986; and 
Burt, 1992). 
Hypothesis 2: There are benefits to having ‘friends in high places’ 
Positive social capital results from accessing network members (alters) with high 
prestige (Lin, 2001). 
Hypothesis 3: The strength of heterogeneous networks 
Those with heterogeneous networks are better able to attain their goals (Granovetter, 
1973; 1983; Lin et al, 1981; Campbell et al., 1986). 
 
Choice of variables is driven by theory and previous empirical studies, but there are 
data-driven concerns to take into account. Given the sample size too many dummy 
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variables increases the likelihood of small cell sizes, leading to an identification 
problem. Many of the variables available in the dataset are dummy or categorical 
variables. As discussed above, many of these are also potentially endogenous. The 
research therefore omits some dummy and categorical variables for farm assets (fixed 
and variable transactions costs) that do not have significant bivariate relationships with 
the outcome variable and/or much variation across the sample (namely ownership of 
large livestock, ownership or use of bicycle, use of hybrid seed, employer and employee 
dummy variables). Omitting these variables has trade-offs. While their omission allows 
the model to be estimated and convergence to be achieved, IV estimation will be biased 
if an omitted relevant variable is correlated either with the included non-endogenous 
explanatory variables or the instrumental variables. Access to crop storage, and radio 
ownership are retained as proxies for fixed transactions costs, and non-farm income and 
proportion of land cultivated as proxies for variable transactions costs. 
 
To test the first hypothesis that a larger network is linked to positive outcomes, 
variables included are: log of the total number of network partners; group affiliation 
(household membership on community groups). A dummy variable for whether or not 
the household has influential kin or friends is included to test the potential effect of 
prestige networks (hypothesis 2). To test hypothesis 3, the benefits of having a more 
diverse network, three measures of network heterogeneity are included to capture 
diversity along two dimensions: diversity in composition (age heterogeneity of network 
partners and proportion of alters who are kin), and functional diversity or network 
multiplexity (number of multiplex ties as a proportion of total number of ties). Bivariate 
analysis in chapter 4 shows that other multiplexity variables are not significant, and only 
very weakly correlated with outcomes. Sex heterogeneity of network is used as an 
instrumental variable. 
 
In estimating the relationship between the regressors and value of crop sold, in relation 
to the above hypotheses one would expect network size, group affiliation and influential 
kin variables to have positive signs. In the context of the research, age heterogeneity of 
network members may signify a less diverse network in that a network composed of 
many kin alters is highly likely to be more diverse in age range while being relatively 
homogeneous in other respects.  The same reasoning applies to proportion of kin 
network partners – a high proportion of kin implies a less diverse network. There is 
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evidence to suggest there is a relationship between obligations towards kin and 
disincentives to accumulate (see Lewis, 1955; diFalco and Bülte, 2011). This is 
discussed in the context of the research in the results section below. As multiplex ties 
tend to occur among strong ties, that is, alters more likely to be like ego, for example 
kin and close friends, similarly one would expect in the context of the research for the 
functional diversity (multiplexity) measure to have a negative sign. 
 
Location is captured as a community categorical variable, to control for institutional and 
other factors common to households in the three communities. Given the purposive 
nature of sampling of the survey locations, the location variable also proxies for market 
access. Recall, Ngulula was selected for its relatively good market access as it is located 
close to the provincial capital and just off the tarmac road. Kabila, by contrast, has poor 
market access due to its remote location. Lufubu Resettlement Scheme falls between the 
two and is considered to have „medium‟ market access as it is located along the road 
and has reasonable access to the district capital Luwingu. One would expect Ngulula 
category to have positive correlation, Kabila negative. Human capital (education) of the 
household is captured as a dummy variable for whether or not a family member has 
completed at least secondary level schooling. Household demographics are given by age 
of household head and the household dependency ratio. The sign on both of these 
variables is expected to be negative. 
 
Two interaction terms are included to explore potential effects of social network size 
given differential ability to process information (education level) and differential access 
to information: log of network size interacted with education; log of network size 
interacted with radio ownership. 
  
The model is estimated with probability weights for each village, with the set of seven 
instrumental variables for the five potentially endogenous regressors, including the 
interaction terms. Results are given in Table 6.6. The estimates with instruments are 
compared with OLS estimates without instruments, that is, assuming all regressors are 
exogenous. OLS results are given in Appendix J. Larger standard errors on the 
potentially endogenous variables in the non-instrumented regression may indicate weak 
instruments.  
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Diagnostic tests for instrument relevance (including weak instruments) and validity, as 
well as over-identifying restrictions, are carried out at both stages of the two-stage 
estimation procedure and given in Table 6.5 below. Instruments should be reliable and 
valid, that is, i) be significant in equations; ii) not predict current market participation. 
Instrument relevance is tested via the first stage F test. The test for over-identification is 
via the Sargan or Hansen J test. Exogeneity is tested using the test of endogeneity under 
the „endog‟ option used with the ivreg2 command in Stata 11.2. Like the Hausman test, 
the null hypothesis is exogeneity of regressors
49
.The test statistic is distributed as chi-
squared, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested. If significant, 
reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative of endogeneity. Otherwise, uphold 
exogeneity and there is no need to instrument.  
 
Table 6.5 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity: GMM with social 
networks variables 
First-stage regressions Proportion 
of land 
cultivated 
(propland) 
Log network 
size 
(logsize) 
Log 
network 
size* 
education 
Log 
network 
size*radio 
Group 
affiliation 
(affil) 
Partial R-squared of excluded 
instruments 
0.35 0.89 0.96 0.98 0.40 
F-test of excluded instruments ~F(  7,    
92) 
2.49 41.15     13.65     19.15     2.70     
Under-id Angrist-Pischke Chi-sq(  3) 14.59    26.12    14.09    67.79    3.32    
Weak-id Angrist-Pischke F(  3,    92) 3.99 7.15 3.86 18.56 0.91 
Underidentification tests 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi-
sq(3) 
2.41 
Weak identification statistics Ho: equation is weakly identified 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 0.31 
F-statistic ~  F(7,92) 2.47      
Chi-sq(7) 21.07      
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 17,    94)  7.62 
Endogeneity test of  endogenous 
regressors Chi-sq(5) 
7.18 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(2) 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments):  
0.64 
 
Instrumented: propland logsize logsize*education logsize*radio affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age propkin _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 kininf education store radio nfy propmult 
agehet 
Excluded instruments: areatot IQVst2 logmeansize logyearcomm tithe iqvrad iqved 
 
 
                                                     
49
 The Hausman test is not available with ivreg2. However “under conditional homoskedasticity, 
this endogeneity test statistic is numerically equal to a Hausman test statistic; see Hayashi 
(2000, pp. 233-34)” (Stata help for ivreg2, www.stata.com, last accessed 19th September 2011; 
see also Baum et al, 2003). 
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The endogeneity test of endogenous regressors (propland logsize logsizeed2 logsizerad 
affil), under the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be 
treated as exogenous, fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (Chi-sq(5)=7.18).  
However, it is unlikely that these regressors are exogenous, and likely that instruments 
are weak. Diagnostics from the first stage equations for the land and group affiliation 
variables do indicate potentially weak instruments: first stage F statistics are less than 
five: 2.49 and 2.70 respectively (Table 6.5). Coefficients on the instruments in the first 
stage regression show mixed results in terms of significance and there are some large 
standard errors. There are also large standard errors in the OLS estimation (Appendix J). 
As a set, these instruments may prove to be problematic: weak instruments are poor 
predictors of the endogenous variable and obtained predicted values will have very little 
variation (Murray, 2006). However, there is a strong possibility of Type II errors in the 
estimation due to the sample size. Further, it is very unlikely that the estimation will 
proceed with the full set of instruments and further testing is carried out to see if the 
approach successfully addresses the potential endogeneity problem. Proceeding with 
instrumental variable analysis risks losing efficiency in estimation, and IV estimates 
will converge towards those of OLS. 
 
Diagnostic tests reject under-identification, weak identification, and fail to reject 
Sargan-Hansen over-identification test of all instruments (Chi-sq=0.64), so instruments 
appear to be valid. 
 
Results are given in Table 6.6 below. For comparison, the model was also estimated 
omitting all social networks variables, retaining just the group affiliation variable. 
Diagnostics test results are given in Appendix L. 
 
Turning to the GMM estimation in the second stage, the results are somewhat surprising 
given the significant, positive associations identified in Chapter 5 between outcomes 
and social networks. The variable for kin as a proportion of network is significant at 5 
per cent, and is positively related to output, which is a surprising result and contrary to 
hypothesis three, and the bivariates in Chapter 5, that those with heterogeneous 
networks are better able to achieve their goals. One would thus expect having a higher 
proportion of kin in ones network, signifying less network diversity, to be less „useful‟ 
in terms of achieving goals, in this case crop output.  This is contrary to recent work on 
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the „dark side of social capital‟ (diFalco and Bülte, 2011), which suggests tentative links 
between extensive kinship networks and lower incomes. The authors find “that 
households try to evade their „sharing obligations‟ by (i) accumulating durables that are 
non-sharable at the expense of durables that may be shared and (ii) reducing savings in 
liquid assets. By attenuating accumulation incentives, kinship sharing may come at the 
expense of income growth – if so, a culturally-induced poverty trap can possibly 
eventuate” (diFalco and Bülte, 2011: 1128). 
 
Table 6.6 Estimation Results: GMM regressions with instrumental variables 
 
  
VARIABLES logcsold 
  
Proportion of land cropped (propland) -1.65 
 (1.132) 
Log of Network Size (logsize) -1.53* 
 (0.879) 
Network size*education (logsizeed2) 1.57* 
 (0.933) 
Network Size*radio ownership (logsizerad) 0.35 
 (0.769) 
Group Affiliation (affil) 0.72 
 (0.639) 
Household dependency ratio (depend) -0.46 
 (0.706) 
Log of Age of household Head (loghh_age) -0.12 
 (0.447) 
Kin as proportion of network (propkin) 1.18** 
 (0.510) 
Ngulula (comid=2) 1.16* 
 (0.610) 
Lufubu (comid=3) -0.79 
 (0.926) 
Influential Kin dummy (kininf) 0.48 
 (0.336) 
Secondary education dummy (education) -3.30* 
 (1.995) 
Access to crop storage (store) 0.30 
 (0.473) 
Radio ownership (radio) 0.15 
 (1.742) 
Nonfarm income (nfy) 0.00 
 (0.000) 
Multiplex ties as proportion of network (propmult) -0.90 
 (1.130) 
Age heterogeneity of network (agehet) -0.02 
 (0.028) 
Constant 7.60*** 
 (2.002) 
  
Observations 112 
R-squared 0.331 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results in the thesis research could suggest that kin networks, while homogeneous 
in terms of ethnicity, may in fact be more diverse in other respects (including in gender 
and age), than assumed here. Kin relationships between men and women for example 
means interaction is more socially acceptable. Another possibility is that the situation in 
the study sites in this research is different compared to the context of DiFalco and 
Bülte‟s study of poor black households in KwaZulu-Natal. However, relationships 
between other social networks variables and crop income potentially corroborate 
DiFalco and Bülte‟s story, discussed below. Other network diversity measures, age 
heterogeneity and multiplexity, are not significant, so cannot tell us anything about 
Hypothesis Three. 
 
Estimates with a significance level of 10 per cent are also discussed. Log of network 
size is significant at 10 per cent and the sign is negative. This suggests rejection of the 
first hypothesis that good outcomes are associated with larger networks. The negative 
coefficient here may be picking up the disincentive for households to accumulate if 
there are many calls on someone‟s resources, in that crop income is lower for the 
average farmer with larger social networks. During qualitative fieldwork one participant 
described the effect of his relative prominence in the community, the household head is 
the elected chairman of Lufubu Resettlement Scheme (analogous to headman), has had 
on his household: “You would expect us to be top in this community but we‟re not, 
we‟re more in the middle because we have extra people in our household now, and other 
people in the community expect me to help them”. Indeed, according to the survey data 
the household is relatively successful in crop farming, with the second highest value of 
crops sold in the community. However, this is not reflected in the household‟s 
„medium‟ socio-economic status as calculated from the survey data using various asset 
indicators (see Appendix D). 
 
Qualitative fieldwork in Kabila village also uncovered evidence of culturally and 
socially embedded constraints on agricultural production, related to belief in witchcraft. 
This goes beyond fear of „imagined‟, „supernatural‟ entities, and superstition, to the 
very real threat of action by other people, ruining crops, killing animals and making 
people sick. This acts as a deterrent both to the recipient of the „witchcraft‟ and also to 
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those around them who witness their „bad luck‟. Kabila villagers said that as a result of 
these fears they grow “just enough” and “not too much”. However, growing “just 
enough” does not leave much of a margin of error leaving households even more 
vulnerable to production risk including pests and disease. When questioned about 
holding these fears despite evidence of people in the village growing a substantial 
surplus and „getting away with it‟, respondents explained that for many this was not 
enough to overcome the fear of  reprisals for being seen to be too successful. 
Information about witchcraft at the personal level is very difficult to uncover; the 
subject is so sensitive it requires a degree of trust between the interviewers and 
interviewees.  While witchcraft beliefs featured similarly in Ngulula and Lufubu, the 
extent to which it is linked to livelihood constraints in these sites is unclear. The social 
networks variables may be picking up this effect. While having many kin in one‟s 
network may reinforce belief in and fear of superstition, having many kin may also 
mean a household is more able to risk a lower margin of error because kin can 
potentially help them out if they face (idiosyncratic) shocks. 
 
Turning to the interactive terms between network size and education and radio 
ownership, do they offset the apparent negative effect of larger social networks on 
outcomes? Interaction of network size with radio ownership is not significant, and one 
might expect this to have only a weak effect on the value of crops sold in contexts such 
as this: small village communities where everyone knows what everyone else is doing 
and market information is readily available from traders who come to the village.  The 
interaction between social networks and the secondary education dummy is only 
significant at 10 per cent, and is positive. The secondary education dummy is also 
significant at just 10 per cent but has a negative sign. Thus the effect of social network 
size on output also potentially depends on the ability to interpret information through 
education level. The result suggests that on average, there is a higher (positive) effect of 
social networks on output for farmers with higher education levels in their household 
compared to farmers in other categories.  Households where the highest level of 
education is secondary and above, who also have larger social networks, are likely to 
sell more crops. Having larger social networks per se does not help (as demonstrated by 
the negative sign on the significant social network size variable) and the offsetting 
effects in the interactive terms may be capturing independence from these networks.  
The transaction costs argument here is linked to the way information lowers transactions 
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costs. More novel information is provided through a larger social network and the 
ability to interpret and use this information is enhanced by higher education levels. 
 
The results of the GMM estimation do not provide enough information to be able to 
make a judgment on hypothesis 2 that prestige networks („linking‟ social capital) are 
associated with good outcomes. The influential alters variable is not significant. One 
reason for this could be that the perception of „influential‟ may not in practice amount to 
very much in terms of the function performed by such alters and the survey might have 
benefited from further probing questions related to the functionings of prestige 
networks. The group affiliation variable is also not significant in the estimation. 
 
The only other non-social networks variable that was significant (again at only the 10 
per cent level) was the coefficient on the community variable for category 2, Ngulula, 
relative to the base category Kabila, which was the village with the worst market access. 
This suggests that aside from social networks, nothing really matters for good 
commercialisation outcomes apart from being in a good location. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to establish causal links between social networks and 
commercialisation outcomes, measured by the value of crops sold, to explore the 
potential role of social networks in reducing transaction costs and mediating household 
access to crop markets.  Do social networks, by reducing transactions costs and 
mediating market access, help to explain differences between households? 
 
The three hypotheses introduced in chapter 4 suggest three channels through which 
social networks might have beneficial outcomes: 1) Bigger is better: larger networks are 
associated with better outcomes; 2) There are benefits to having „friends in high places‟, 
defined as links to persons with prestige or influence; and 3) Benefits of heterogeneous 
networks: network diversity means greater access to novel information and increased 
likelihood of being able to draw on diverse resources through networks. Bivariate 
analysis in Chapter 4 suggests patterns emerging relating social networks characteristics 
to outcomes in support of the three hypotheses:  sellers operating at higher levels of 
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crop sales are more likely to have bigger social networks in general, with relatively 
more non-kin members, more mixed-sex networks (though less diverse in terms of age), 
and be members of multiple village groups and societies. These lend support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
 
The analysis in this chapter builds on this with causal analysis incorporating social 
networks variables into a model of agricultural commercialisation with transactions 
costs. A significant challenge in estimating the relationships between social networks 
and outcomes of smallholder farming households is in establishing direction of causality 
and correcting for other forms of endogeneity, such as selectivity bias. The empirical 
model of crop market participation is estimated using Generalised Method of Moments 
with instrumental variables. This is chosen as the preferred estimation procedure as it 
allows an instrumenting regression combined with survey weights. A selection model 
and censored Tobit were also explored as potential strategies. The selection term in the 
second stage of a Heckman procedure is not significant (Appendix K). This may signify 
that selection bias is not a problem in the sample.  However, the relatively small 
subsample of non-sellers is likely to be having an effect here. With this in mind, 
coupled with the difficulties in achieving convergence when estimating both the 
Heckman and the Tobit models with instrumental variables, the analysis is based on the 
GMM results. The small sample size and some potentially weak instruments may also 
be driving the failure to reject exogeneity in the endogeneity tests of the GMM 
estimation. It is highly unlikely in the context of the research that relationships 
considered to be potentially endogenous are in fact exogenous, notably between crop 
incomes and: i) social network size; ii) area cultivated iii) group membership. The 
research therefore proceeds in estimating the model using instrumental variables. The 
trade-off here is in efficiency terms. If exogeneity is indeed upheld, then by 
instrumenting the relationships the estimation is less efficient and results converge to 
OLS.  
 
With these limitations in mind, do the network variables have predictive value in the 
analysis of returns to social networks, captured as household crop market participation? 
Once the analysis controls for other variables and possible endogeneity, the results 
suggested by the bivariates in chapter 5 fall down. In contrast to the descriptive 
statistics, the analysis here suggests larger networks in fact have a negative effect on 
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crop sales. This potentially provides support for findings emerging in other studies that 
find negative effects of social capital/ social networks (diFalco and Bülte, 2011; Baland 
et al, 2011). Interacting the network size variable with the education variable suggests 
that larger networks go hand in hand with higher levels of crop sales only for those 
households that have at least one member with secondary-level education. Households 
where the highest level of education is secondary and above, who also have larger social 
networks, are likely to sell more crops. Group affiliation and age heterogeneity of 
network partners are no longer significant in the multivariate analysis, in contrast with 
the bivariates in Chapter 5. 
 
The relationship between having a larger proportion of kin in ones network and crop 
sales is now positive. This may suggest that in relation to Hypothesis 3, „the strength of 
heterogeneous networks‟, either kin networks do have value in that they are potentially 
more easily mobilised than so-called „weaker‟ non-kin ties, or that kin networks may 
not be as homogeneous as the research assumes in relation to the resources and 
networks contained, and accessed, within them.  
 
......................... 
 
The next and final chapter concludes. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Summary of the study  
 
In this thesis I have attempted to examine the relationship between social networks and 
economic life in rural Zambia.  The overarching question is whether or not social 
networks help to determine household agricultural commercialisation in settings where 
there is little variability between households on endowments such as land, labour and 
farm inputs, in contexts of incomplete or missing markets. Do social networks, by 
mediating market access, help to explain differences between households? 
 
The role of social networks in economic life presents an interesting empirical question. 
Research in anthropology, economic sociology and social capital research in economics 
suggest that social context and social networks play a crucial role in exchange 
behaviour where markets and institutions are missing or incomplete. In such contexts 
the literature, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2,  suggests social networks mediate access to 
markets and resources in environments characterised by an absence of functioning 
credit and insurance markets, cash constraints and a lack of assets. They may serve to 
help people access information, technical know-how, and resources. However, 
emerging research that contributes to debates about the „dark-side‟ of social capital 
suggests social networks can also potentially have negative economic consequences. 
This relates to obligations towards family, kin and friends that are embedded in social 
networks. People may feel burdened by responsibilities and such obligations can 
represent a drain on a household‟s resources and thus lead households to adopt 
strategies that purposefully do not lead to an excess of wealth or income (diFalco and 
Bülte, 2011; Baland et al, 2011). Social networks can also be a basis for exploitation 
and social marginalisation (see, for example, Kabeer, 2000). Negative externalities of 
social networks/social relations may impact directly on welfare outcomes of smallholder 
farming households through non-optimal behaviours including: disincentive to 
accumulate assets, crime, taking health risks, educational underachievement (see also: 
Portes, 1996; Fine, 1999; Carroll and Stanfield, 2003; Torpe, 2003). 
 
205 
 
 
 
The inherent difficulties in formalising socially-embedded market transactions within 
the standard neoclassical economics framework provide further motivation for the 
study. 
 
The empirical study examines rural production systems in three predominantly Bemba 
villages in Northern Province, Zambia, focusing on agricultural commercialisation and 
market participation. Primary data collection took place during fieldwork for the thesis 
research over three periods totalling four months between March 2002 and May 2003, 
using both a household survey and qualitative methods to gather data on social networks 
and other farm household attributes. Social network analysis techniques are used to 
construct variables capturing characteristics of people‟s social networks, which are 
incorporated into models of commercialisation based on a transactions cost framework 
(Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; Key et al, 2000; Goetz, 1992). The research is informed 
by in-depth qualitative material gathered during extended stays in the study sites. While 
the sample is by no means nationally representative, the case studies presented here 
yield insights applicable to other smallholder farmers living in similar conditions and in 
similar ways. 
 
 
7.2 Challenges in undertaking the research 
 
Challenges faced in undertaking the research were many, spanning the conceptual, 
methodological and analytical domains. 
 
Conceptual: The research is premised on the notion that „economic‟ exchanges take 
place within the social realm and social interactions, institutions and relations go 
beyond a narrow, binary way of thinking in terms of possessing or not possessing a 
certain attribute. Rather, the research, drawing on insights from anthropology and 
economic sociology, considers people to be embedded within their social sphere, 
operating on economic, political, cultural and social levels in relation to others who are 
also socially embedded, in their sense of „self‟ and in their actions. It was hoped that 
using a social network analytical approach would allow features of the institutional 
environment, not just „capital‟ aspects of social networks, to be captured. This is 
achieved through measuring interactions, transactions and exchanges through networks 
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themselves, as well as the attributes of the different actors and the relations between 
them. In this way the network is viewed not only as something an actor (ego) uses but 
also something they experience. A transactions costs approach to modelling 
commercialisation offers a conceptual framework that allows incorporation of the social 
context into the analysis. In practice, this still amounts to stripping back interactions and 
experiences through networks to possession or not of an attribute, in that the interaction 
becomes an attribute of ego (the household). The approach is necessarily reductionist in 
order to be able to relate social networks phenomena to outcomes within an economics 
framework. However, questions remain concerning whether or not we will ever really 
get to the heart of social interactions and what they mean, and consequently their true 
impact on, and relationships with, outcomes. It is true that interpretation of some of the 
results in this research would be difficult without qualitative findings to provide 
clarification. Does this matter? If we can achieve an approximation of the experiential, 
and it is informed by in-depth, contextual data, then surely this is enough? 
 
Methodological: Individual, household, group and community level data were 
collected, including social networks data, using a combination of quantitative (survey) 
and qualitative methods and instruments. It was an ambitious exercise, requiring 
considerable resources and time. In terms of social networks analysis, resource 
constraints meant that the collection of complete network data was not possible, that is, 
data on all actors in a network and all of the links between them. Instead the research 
had to take an egocentric approach. This also meant focusing on only first-order direct 
ties and not ties between alters. However, one must bear in mind there may be good (or 
bad) resource access through second order ties. These are implicit in the research, rather 
than explicit. Resource constraints also ruled out attempting to uncover more 
„psychosocial‟ information about households and individuals, such as personality traits, 
which may affect social networks. 
 
Once the data were collected, data cleaning and construction of the social networks 
dataset were incredibly time-consuming. There was no roster of all possible network 
partners, so social networks data collection included recording names of network 
partners, self-reported by respondents. These subsequently were coded manually to 
convert the names to alter identification numbers in order to create a dataset where each 
case was a particular alter. What made the task particularly time consuming was 
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multiple spellings for the same name and the use of nicknames. The latter had not been 
foreseen in the design of the first round of the survey, so extra questions and prompts 
were included in Round 2 of the survey to capture people‟s nicknames and allow for 
accurate coding of alters. Recording names also lengthened the time it took to conduct 
interviews, trading off sample size for more in-depth information. Because the research 
aims to be generalisable to smallholder farmers similar to those living in the study sites, 
this is not believed to be a problem. However, the relatively small sample size (136 
households in total) means that some of the diagnostic tests may not work as well as 
they could. 
 
Analysis: Addressing endogeneity is the primary challenge in modelling relationships in 
this study. The focus on just three study sites ruled out the use of community-level 
variables as instrumental variables. An „approximation‟ to lagged dependent variables 
was also considered, by using regressors from round 1 of data collection and crop sales 
outcomes reported in round 2 of the survey, with a recall period of the previous six 
months, since the last survey. Most crops were sold prior to round 1 of the survey, 
which took place in September, in the post-harvest period. The ability to sell all year 
round might signal a higher level of commercialisation; farmers able to hold back some 
of their output can take advantage of seasonality in prices: lower near harvest time in 
August, higher later in the year. However, the sample size was not large enough to do 
this. 
 
Stepping away from standard economic theory in relation to endogeneity and causality, 
work originating in other disciplines, notably psychology and neural networks, suggests 
that rather than thinking about cause and effect in a model of the world embedded 
within a logic-based framework, one should consider actors as operating within a 
systemic world with complex chains of social interaction, and the importance of 
feedback in maintaining these systems.
50
 These ideas were taken up by anthropologist 
Gregory Bateson in relation to study of human systems such as the family.
51
 Crucially, 
systems are believed to stay stable by constantly adapting to changing conditions and 
                                                     
50  John Bowlby‟s work in psychology for example stems from the belief that to understand 
people one also has to understand their environment – the need for contextual data is very much 
in step with what is generally accepted in social sciences, including economics. 
51 Bateson also asserts that “logic is a poor model of cause and effect” (from Bateson‟s 
exploration of epistemology „Mind and Nature, a necessary unity‟, 1980). 
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they do this through feedback about what works and what does not. The system as a 
whole therefore can be seen as circular and not linear. Rather than breaking a system 
into separate parts, and treating them as if they function in isolation, it makes more 
sense to understand that systems are connected to and determine each other. It follows 
that cause and effect depend on one‟s position, and, crucially, on where one starts in the 
loop, as well as how much information is included or excluded. A neural networks 
approach to mathematical modelling may be appropriate in this context, particularly in 
modelling social network formation.  Neural networks, in economics, have mainly been 
used for prediction in time series, for example forecasting in capital markets, but they 
can also be applied to network formation in relation to social institutions (See Angus et 
al, 2007). However, this is for future exploration and well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
 
7.3 Summary of the findings 
 
Economic exchange takes place on a reciprocal or kinship basis throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa. This certainly typifies market activity of individuals and communities living in 
the study area. Social networks variables, constructed using social network analysis 
techniques, provide insights into the social context, going beyond more simplistic 
measures typically used in social capital studies, for example group membership. The 
analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrates that how social networks are measured matters. 
Different social networks attributes are important for different people. The research then 
demonstrates that relationships between social networks and outcomes depend on the 
measure being used. The constructed social networks measures allow the research to 
test hypotheses linking different social networks characteristics to specific outcomes: 
The first hypothesis is concerned with network size: „bigger is better‟. The second links 
influential network partners to positive outcomes: „benefits to having friends in high 
places‟. The third hypothesis refers to network diversity: „the strength of heterogeneous 
networks‟.  
 
The hypotheses suggest that larger, more diverse networks are associated with positive 
outcomes, and to a certain extent this appears to be borne out by patterns emerging from 
bivariate analysis of the data, which identifies relationships between social network 
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characteristics and crop market participation: both entry into market and degree of 
participation in terms of crop sales. Network size and diversity on the whole do indeed 
seem to be associated with good outcomes captured as socio-economic status and higher 
levels of crop marketing. There is a significant, positive correlation between value of 
crops sold and network size, and with group affiliation, lending support for Hypothesis 
1. By contrast there is a significant, negative correlation with higher proportions of kin 
in the network, suggesting some support of the „strength of heterogeneous networks‟ 
hypothesis, which posits that novel and hence more valuable information is contained in 
networks where alters have weaker links between each other. A network consisting of 
many kin members implies not only strong links between ego and alters, but also strong 
links between alters. More mixed-sex networks (though less diverse in terms of age), 
and household membership in multiple village groups and societies also go hand-in-
hand with operating at higher levels of crop sales. This lends support for Hypothesis 3. 
In line with Hypothesis 2, households participating in markets and those selling higher 
values of crops appear to be more likely to have prestige networks, captured as kin in an 
influential position. 
 
However, the multinomial probit analysis of households clustered according to 
command over resources and marketing levels, while pointing to the importance of 
networks in affecting both control over resources and the ability to sell higher volumes 
of output given resources available, suggests that network size per se is not the factor 
that differentiates between success or not in terms of crop marketing (Chapter 5). The 
content of a network is arguably more important than its size.  
 
The research explores these results further in Chapter 6 via multivariate, causal analysis 
of the potential role of social networks in reducing transaction costs and mediating 
access to markets, to consider whether the network variables have predictive value in 
the analysis of returns to social networks, captured as household crop market 
participation (the total value of output sold across all crops).  
 
A significant challenge in estimating the relationships between social networks and 
outcomes of smallholder farming households is in establishing direction of causality and 
correcting for other forms of endogeneity such as selectivity bias. It is highly unlikely in 
the context of the research that relationships considered to be potentially endogenous 
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are in fact exogenous, notably between crop incomes and: i) social network size; ii) area 
cultivated iii) group membership. Endogeneity is likely to be an issue and the research 
therefore estimates the model of crop market participation using Generalised Method of 
Moments with instrumental variables, even though the endogeneity test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity.  The trade-off here is in efficiency terms. If 
exogeneity is indeed upheld, then by instrumenting the relationships the estimation is 
less efficient and results converge to OLS. There are challenges too in finding 
appropriate instruments: those that are relevant and valid. Diagnostics tests suggest that 
the instrumental variables used in the research are valid but some may be weak. 
 
With these limitations in mind, do the network variables have predictive value in the 
analysis of returns to social networks, captured as household crop market participation? 
Once the analysis controls for other variables and possible endogeneity the relationships 
between social networks and outcomes suggested in the bivariate analysis are not 
upheld. In contrast to the descriptive statistics, the multivariate analysis suggests larger 
networks in fact have a negative effect on crop sales. An interaction of the network size 
variable with education suggests that larger networks go hand in hand with higher levels 
of crop sales only for those households that have at least one member with secondary-
level education. Group affiliation and age heterogeneity of network partners are no 
longer significant in the multivariate analysis. The relationship between having a larger 
proportion of kin in ones network and crop sales is positive once the research controls 
for endogeneity. This may suggest that in relation to Hypothesis 3, the strength of 
heterogeneous networks, kin networks do have value in that they are potentially more 
easily mobilised than so-called „weaker‟ non-kin ties. Another explanation may be that 
kin networks are not as homogeneous as assumed in the research. 
 
On balance, do social networks help or hinder access to or competition in markets, 
focusing on trading?  Particular features of social networks certainly do seem to have a 
causal effect on the level of household crop market participation. Larger networks 
appear to have a negative effect on crop incomes, which could be ascribed to a large 
following translating into a greater call on a household‟s resources, rather than being a 
conduit for resource mobilisation and hence greater returns. The negative effect could 
be due to a disincentive to accumulate as a response to higher levels of obligation 
towards network partners, or the levelling effect of social norms such as belief in 
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witchcraft. On the other hand, network composition is important. Caveats about 
potential endogeneity notwithstanding, Chapter 5‟s analysis of household clusters 
according to command over resources and marketing levels suggests that network size 
per se is not the factor that differentiates between success or not in terms of crop 
marketing. How people use their networks is arguably more important, as is the 
composition of the network demonstrated by the significant coefficients on the 
influential kin variables. The multivariate analysis of the determinants of level of crop 
sales in Chapter 6, controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables, suggests that 
having a greater proportion of kin in the network has a positive effect on household crop 
incomes, implying that in this context strong ties are key. 
 
7.4 Broader implications 
 
The study is based on original, primary data collected by the author. While the role of 
social networks and social capital is widely researched in relation to technology 
diffusion, migration and risk and insurance, relatively little has been done in agricultural 
development. The research potentially makes three clearly defined contributions to the 
literature in social networks in the context of agricultural and rural development: 
1. It is important how we measure social networks: different social network 
characteristics are important for different people; 
2. Relationships between social networks and outcomes depend on the measure 
used; 
3. Results from the empirical analysis potentially provide support for findings 
emerging in other studies that find negative effects of social capital/ social 
networks (see for example: diFalco and Bülte, 2011; Baland et al, 2011). 
 
Methodological insights from the research therefore has potential implications for the 
way we research social networks and social network capital, in particular the 
importance of considering the nature of social networks when trying to look at the effect 
of "connectedness" on economic decisions. Once social network measurement and 
reverse causality issues are taken into account, the research also provides some 
interesting empirical insights into the extent to which social networks or connectedness 
matter. Notably, large networks do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. These 
contributions have important implications for policies and programmes that explicitly 
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function through social structures, for example microfinance schemes operating through 
social models of lending, work linking social protection and informal networks, the role 
of networks in migration and remittances, among others. 
 
Social networks as the basis for exclusion and social marginalisation has been discussed 
in the development literature (see for example Kabeer, 2000). Although the household 
survey did not contain the data to be able to analyse this quantitatively, and in any case 
was probably not the appropriate instrument to uncover this information, qualitative 
evidence from the fieldwork suggests that failure to participate in networks, often for 
reasons of poverty, can result in more disadvantaged community members remaining 
locked in a vicious circle of poverty and exclusion from livelihood opportunities. For 
example not having clean clothes to go to church where many calls for labour are made. 
One woman from the most disadvantaged household in one of the communities said she 
did not attend church even though she‟d like to because “I fear my dirtiness will drive 
people away”. As a result the family would often hear calls for work when it was too 
late.  The ways in which people engage with, or are excluded from, networks thus 
impact crucially on wellbeing. Often it is the stories from people on the „margins‟ like 
this that are most revealing and worthy of further, targeted research. 
 
Turning to the broader, contemporary context for agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
work by Pingali et al (2005) couches the transactions costs challenge faced by 
smallholder farmers in terms of a broad, agri-systems view of agricultural markets. The 
authors argue that a highly integrated, modern agri-food system with its demands in 
terms of standards and contractual requirements, means that potential market 
participants, including smallholder farmers, face “a new set of transaction costs that 
emerge from dealing with a food system characterized by different rules, regulations, 
and players” (Pingali et al, 2005: 2). If certain types of social networks, and the 
functions they perform, are an important determinant in allowing smallholder farmers to 
access markets, are these going to be enough in the context of faster moving markets 
with more stringent entry requirements? Arguably the social networks of the average 
smallholder farmer will not be enough and governments must take responsibility for 
providing the missing or inaccessible institutions social networks appear to be stepping 
in for, to help reduce transactions costs to enable smallholder farmers to participate in 
the global food system. The field research for the thesis was conducted in the pre-
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mobile phone context. An important additional element in couching the research in the 
contemporary setting is to consider the role of technology in relation to networks and to 
market access. How might technology have changed things for the participants in the 
research? What is the role played by mobile technology in reducing transactions costs? 
How might technology interact with social norms and social networks in determining 
who is well connected? The early anthropological literature highlights the importance of 
commanding a following and the key role of prestige in this, enabling people to access 
resources and mobilise labour leading to positive outcomes. Education has latterly 
become an important dimension of prestige and thus an attractor of others. As 
technologies become increasingly accessible and ubiquitous even in the most remote 
rural areas it will be interesting to see whether, and how, the way people use 
technology, in interaction with social norms, changes social roles and relations and the 
way people engage in economic life. 
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Appendix A: Social Networks Survey Module 
7. In this part of the questionnaire we are interested in the people you know. 
 
7.1 First, do you interact with people outside of your immediate household? 0 No  Qn 7.8 
1 Yes  next question 
 
Who are the non-household members you interact with, socialising and/or working, most frequently? FIRST LIST NAMES OF ALL PEOPLE 
MENTIONED FOR QUESTION 7.2, THEN GO ON TO ASK  QUESTIONS 7.3 TO 7.7 ABOUT EACH PERSON MENTIONED 
P 
E 
R 
S 
O
N 
 
I 
D 
7.2 
Please can you give me the 
names of all the people you 
interact with? 
 
 
 
 
7.2a TOTAL NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Name              Last Name 
7.3 
Sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Male 
2 Female 
7.4 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimated 
Years 
7.5 
What do you do with 
these people? 
 
ACTIVITY CODES 
 
(RECORD 
MAXIMUM OF 3. 
LET A1 BE 
ACTIVITY DONE 
MOST OFTEN) 
 
 
 
A1       A2      A3 
7.6 
Thinking 
about the 
activity you 
do most often 
with [NAME], 
how often do 
you do this? 
 
1 Daily 
2 At least once 
a week 
3 Once a month 
4 Less often 
5 Other 
7.7 
What is the relationship of 
[NAME] to you? 
 
RECORD MAXIMUM OF TWO 
 
1 She or he is a friend  
2 She or he is my neighbour 
3 She or he is related (but 
not household member) 
4 She or he belongs to an 
organisation I belong to 
(e.g. Church) 
5 She or he employs me 
6  She or he is employed by 
me 
7 Other (specify) 
      R1              R2 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
6           
7           
8           
9           
10           
11           
12           
13           
14           
15           
16           
17           
18           
19           
20           
 
Activity Codes: 5 Play games 10 Work 
1 Eat meals with outside your home 6 Music/dance 11 Trade 
2 People who visit you at your home or you visit them 7 Do arts/crafts 12 Chores 
3 Attend religious festivals together 8 Talking 13 Other (specify) 
4 Organise festivals/celebrations 9 Drinking   
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7.8 In your opinion who are the three most important people in your community, people that the community looks to for leadership? 
NAME 1  NAME 3  
NAME 2  
7.9 Do you have a friend/kin who: owns a business/ heads a committee/ 
community leader/ other influential position? 
0 No  Qn 7.14 
1 Yes  next question 
 
[RECORD MAXIMUM OF THREE PEOPLE] 
7.10 
Name 
7.11  
What is [NAME’S] Position? 
7.12 What is [NAME’S] 
relationship to you? 
1 Father/Mother 
2 Son/Daughter 
3 Brother/Sister 
4 Other relative/kin 
5 Friend 
6 Other 
7.13 where does [NAME] live? 
 
1 In this village 
2 Another rural area (name place) 
3 Urban area (name place) 
 
CODE               NAME OF PLACE 
P1      
P2      
P3      
 
PARTICIPATION IN GROUPS: Now I would like to ask you about your involvement in local groups and clubs, both formal and informal. 
 
C
hu
rc
h 
/ o
th
er
 r
el
ig
io
us
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
N
ei
gh
bo
ur
ho
od
 
as
so
ci
at
io
n/
 
gr
ou
p 
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
W
or
k 
gr
ou
p 
W
om
en
’s
 g
ro
up
 
Le
is
ur
e 
cl
ub
 
F
ar
m
er
s’
 g
ro
up
 
T
ra
de
rs
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n/
 b
us
in
es
s 
gr
ou
p 
C
re
di
t/f
in
an
ce
 g
ro
up
 
Y
ou
th
 g
ro
up
 
B
as
ic
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
gr
ou
p 
(e
g 
he
al
th
, 
ed
uc
at
io
n,
 
ro
ad
s,
 
w
at
er
) 
S
pe
ci
al
 P
ro
je
ct
s 
(1
) 
- 
S
pe
ci
fy
 
S
pe
ci
al
 P
ro
je
ct
s 
(2
) 
- 
S
pe
ci
fy
 
GROUP CODE: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
7.14 Do you belong to any of 
these groups? 
 
0   I do not belong to such a group 
1   I belong but never participate 
2   I have participated once or twice 
3   I have participated more than twice 
99 group does not exist in this 
community 
             
PROMPT FOR INFORMAL GROUPS, IF NO GROUP MEMBERSHIP  7.22 IF NO GROUPS IN COMMUNITY  7.25 
 
 
RECORD 
GROUP CODE 
OF  GROUPS 
RESPONDENT 
IS A MEMBER 
OF INTO THIS 
COLUMN. 
PROMPT FOR 
REGULAR, 
INFORMAL 
GATHERINGS 
7.15 
How long have 
you been a 
member of 
[NAME] group? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MM           YY 
7.16 
To what extent do 
you participate in 
group’s decision-
making? 
 
0 Not at all 
1 To a very small 
extent 
2 To a small 
extent 
3 Neither small 
nor large extent 
4 To a large 
extent 
5 To a very large 
extent 
7.17 
What is the name of the 
group leader? 
 
IF RESPONDENT IS 
GROUP LEADER 
THEN RECORD 
CODE 0 
 
99 Not applicable 
 
 
 
Name 
7.18 
Do you 
contribute 
money to 
the group? 
 
0 No 
 
IF Yes 
THEN 
ASK: 
How much 
per year? 
 
Kwacha 
7.19 
How many 
group 
members 
are there? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 
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  CODE 
7.20 IF DO NOT BELONG TO ANY GROUPS: Many obstacles keep people from becoming as 
involved in their community as they would like. Thinking about your own life, are there any obstacles 
or barriers that make it difficult for you to be as involved in your community as you would like, or 
not? 
0   No  7.23  
1   Yes  7.21  
2   Do not know  7.21  
99 No answer  7.21  
7.21 Are there any groups which you are not a member of but would like to be? 0   No  7.23  
1   Yes  7.22  
2   Do not know  7.23  
99 No answer  7.23  
7.22 What is the most important obstacle to your involvement in groups?  
1  inadequate childcare 5  age    
2  short of money to pay for what they need 6  feeling unwelcome  
3  lack of info or not knowing how to begin. 7  hard to find time to get together  
4  gender 8  Other (specify)   
7.23 In the past two years have you worked together with others in your immediate community to 
try and get someone to fix or improve something or to address a common issue?  
 
0   No  7.25  
1   Yes  next question  
2   Do not know  7.25  
88 No answer  7.25  
7.24 What did you do?   
1 Road Improvement   5  Work on water supply  
2 Health Issue 6  Conservation work  
3 Worked on school 7  Animal work  
4 Applied for funds for your community or group 8  Other (Specify)   
 
SOCIAL SUPPORT: I am now going to read out some situations where you may need help from other people. Who are you mostly likely to turn 
to for help in each of the situations I am about to read out to you? This could be INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS including family, neighbours, 
friends, priest, teacher, doctor, someone you pay to help, traditional healer, kin, migrant family members living elsewhere, government or social 
services agency, community or church groups, money lender, bank or credit union. 
Who would 
you go to if 
you… 
 7.25 
Name of Individual or group: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF INDIVIDUAL :CHECK TO SEE IF 
INDIVIDUAL IS NAMED IN 7.2.  IF 
SO  7.29 
IF NOT  next question 
IF GROUP  7.29 
IF NO-ONE RECORD CODE 00 
7.26 
Sex: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Male 
2 Femle 
7.27 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EST’D 
YEARS 
7.28 
What is [NAME’S] 
relationship to you? 
 
1 She or he is a friend  
2 She or he is my 
neighbour 
3 household member 
4 She or he is related (but 
not household member) 
5 She or he belongs to an 
organisation I belong to 
(e.g. Church) 
6 She or he employs me 
7 She or he is employed 
by me 
8 She or he is my patron/ 
kangalila 
 
7.29 
What other kinds of help 
could you get from [NAME]? 
 
1 Advice on important 
decision 
2 Advice/ information on 
farming matters 
3 Advice/info on work-
related matters 
4 Advice/info on personal 
matters 
5 Filling out forms 
6 gift 
7 Finding work 
8 Lend money 
9 No other advice 
10 other 
[RECORD MAX OF 3] 
A1           A2         A3 
A …needed a 
lift urgently, to 
go to the 
health centre, 
say. 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
B  if you were 
ill in bed and 
needed help 
at home 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
C If you 
needed to 
borrow quite a 
large sum of 
1        
2        
3        
4        
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money? 5        
 
 
Who would 
you go to if 
you: 
 7.25 
Name of Individual or group: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF INDIVIDUAL :CHECK TO 
SEE IF INDIVIDUAL IS NAMED 
IN 7.2.  IF SO  7.29 
IF NOT  next question 
IF GROUP  7.29 
IF NO-ONE RECORD CODE 00 
 next situation 
7.26 
Sex: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Male 
2 Female 
7.27 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YEARS 
7.28 
What is [NAME’S] 
relationship to you? 
 
1 She or he is a friend  
2 She or he is my 
neighbour 
3 household member 
4 She or he is related (but 
not household member) 
5 She or he belongs to an 
organisation I belong to 
(e.g. Church) 
6 She or he employs me 
7 She or he is employed by 
me 
8 She or he is my patron/ 
kangalila  
7.29 
What other kinds of help could 
you get from [NAME]? 
 
1 Advice on important decision 
2 Advice/ information on farming 
matters 
3 Advice/info on work-related matters 
4 Advice/info on personal matters 
5 Filling out forms 
6 gift 
7 Finding work 
8 Lend money 
9 No other advice 
10 other 
[RECORD MAX OF 3] 
A1           A2         A3 
D …need 
advice or 
information on 
farming or 
work matters 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
E If you 
needed help 
in filling out 
forms 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
F needed to 
find work for 
yourself or a 
member of 
your 
household? 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
G need help 
with getting 
your produce 
to markets  
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
Where do you get information about the following: 
H  Markets to 
sell your 
produce 
1        
2        
3        
I Prices 
 
1        
2        
3        
J Markets for 
inputs  
1        
2        
3        
K Farming 
technologies 
1        
2        
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Who would 
you go to if 
you: 
 7.25 
Name of Individual or group: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF INDIVIDUAL :CHECK TO 
SEE IF INDIVIDUAL IS NAMED 
IN 7.2.  IF SO  7.29 
IF NOT  next question 
IF GROUP  7.29 
IF NO-ONE RECORD CODE 00 
 next situation 
7.26 
Sex: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Male 
2 Female 
7.27 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YEARS 
7.28 
What is [NAME’S] 
relationship to you? 
 
1 She or he is a friend  
2 She or he is my 
neighbour 
3 household member 
4 She or he is related (but 
not household member) 
5 She or he belongs to an 
organisation I belong to 
(e.g. Church) 
6 She or he employs me 
7 She or he is employed by 
me 
8 She or he is my patron/ 
kangalila  
7.29 
What other kinds of help could 
you get from [NAME]? 
 
1 Advice on important decision 
2 Advice/ information on farming 
matters 
3 Advice/info on work-related matters 
4 Advice/info on personal matters 
5 Filling out forms 
6 gift 
7 Finding work 
8 Lend money 
9 No other advice 
10 other 
[RECORD MAX OF 3] 
A1           A2         A3 
3        
L want 
information 
about 
cultivation 
techniques 
1        
2        
3        
M want 
information 
about ew 
crops 
1        
2        
3        
N want 
information 
about farming 
schemes e.g. 
Outgrower, 
PAM. 
1        
2        
3 
       
O want 
information on 
health matters 
 
1        
2        
3        
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Appendix B Descriptive Statistics: Social Networks and Respondent Attributes 
 
The analysis presented here sets out relationships between respondent networks, using the 
categorical variable versions of the social networks variables described in Chapter 4, and other 
individual attributes, reporting only those that are statistically significant. 
 
Network Size 
 
Those with a male household head tend to report larger networks… 
 
Male household heads are slightly over-represented in larger networks, under-represented in the 
smaller category (5 or less; see Table A4.3.1). Most respondents with a female household head 
have a network size of less than ten people (72.9 per cent of those with a female household 
head). 
 
Table B1 Network Size, and i) Sex of household head; ii) Education level (% of respondents) 
Network Size Sex of household head 
 
Level of education 
male female Up to Grade 4 Grades 5-7 Secondary+ 
5 or less 71.2 28.8 43.2 47.7 9.10 
6-10 88.0 12.0 22.3 52.1 25.5 
11-15 86.7 13.3 21.4 57.1 21.4 
>15 88.2 11.8 14.7 44.1 41.2 
Total Sample (%) 84.0 16.0 25.2 50.9 23.8 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
…as do those with a higher level of education 
 
Table B1 presents also the cross-tabulation of network size by educational level of respondent. 
In general, people with a secondary-level education are over-represented in the larger network 
size category (27.5 per cent of the >15 category, compared with 23.8 per cent of the sample), 
and conversely, under-represented in the smaller network size category. Those with lower levels 
of education tend to have smaller networks, 43.2 per cent of people with education up to grade 4 
fall in the 5 networks partners or less category compared with 25.2 per cent of the sample as a 
whole, with those with education to the level of grades 5 to 7 under-represented in the two tails. 
Network size therefore appears to be increasing with level of education. There are exceptions: 
In Lufubu Resettlement Scheme, while people with secondary education are over-represented in 
larger networks (three out of the five households), the person with largest stated network of all 
has education to grade 3-4. 
 
People who have not always lived in their particular community tend to have larger 
networks 
 
In all three communities a network size of more than 20 people coincides with not having 
always lived in that community (and the cross-tabulation, see Table A4.3.2, is also highly 
significant). In the sample as whole most people stated that they had always lived in their 
community, but a sizeable minority (35.7 per cent of respondents) claimed to have not always 
lived there, and these people are over-represented in networks of >15 people: 68.4 per cent with 
networks of 15 people or more had not always lived in that community. The same pattern 
emerges when the data are broken down by community. It is important to consider here what 
exactly “always lived here” means. From qualitative fieldwork it was evident that a response of 
„no‟ to the question “Have you always lived here?” captures those who “went and came back”. 
This is entirely expected given the Province‟s status, especially traditionally, as a labour reserve, 
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with a long history of migration from the area, for example to work in the Copperbelt, returning 
to „the village‟ (although not necessarily the same village) on retirement. 
 
Table B.2 Network Size and i) Residence status; ii) Sex of respondent (% of respondents) 
Network Size 
 
Always lived here? Sex of respondent 
no yes male female 
5 or less 24.2 75.8 36.5 63.5 
6-10 22.0 78.0 48.0 52.0 
11-15 51.9 48.1 62.2 37.8 
>15 68.4 31.6 67.6 32.4 
Total Sample (%) 35.7 64.3 51.1 48.9 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
The nature of Lufubu as a resettlement scheme means that one would expect a far larger 
percentage of the people surveyed to have not always lived there compared to the other two 
study sites, and when the data are broken down by community this is borne out: 57.5 per cent of 
Lufubu respondents had not always lived there compared with 33.3 and 21.4 per cent in Ngulula 
and Kabila respectively. Nevertheless, at first glance this is not as many as one would expect 
given that most people have been allocated their plots since 1991. Respondents‟ interpretation 
of the meaning of „here‟ to mean roughly that area rather than the scheme per se, provides an 
explanation: Settlers are not confined to those retrenched from railway and other industries, who 
have a high chance of originating from elsewhere, many people are settling in the scheme from 
neighbouring villages. 
 
Males report larger networks than females 
 
In the sample there are roughly equal numbers of men and women (slightly more men than 
women: 53.3 per cent male against 46.7 per cent female). Overall, male respondents are over-
represented in the larger network categories and women in the smaller – see Table 4.18. Women 
make up 63.5 per cent of smallest network category and men 67.6 per cent of the >15 network 
partners category. When the data are broken down by community, once again the same pattern 
is evident. 
  
Married people are more likely to report bigger networks than their unmarried 
counterparts 
 
Most respondents are married (84.8 per cent) and those who are married are more likely to have 
bigger networks, making up 94.1 per cent of those with network size greater than 15 people 
(Table B.3). No unmarried people have more than 20 network partners. Married people are 
over-represented in all categories apart from the smallest (five or fewer network partners), 28.8 
per cent of whom are unmarried compared with only 15.2 per cent of the sample as a whole. If 
larger networks are indeed more valuable than smaller networks in terms of accessing resources, 
in particular labour, especially in contexts of relatively thin or underdeveloped labour markets 
where personal connections perform the role of more marketised or institutionalised exchange 
of labour, then this has potential negative implications for households headed by single people, 
in particular female-headed households in the study site settings where access to male labour 
during key points in the cultivation season is crucial for carrying out essential, heavier (and 
therefore gendered) agricultural tasks. It raises important questions of how to counteract a 
socially-embedded „disadvantage‟ in terms of vital resource access. 
 
Table B.3 Network Size and Marital status (% of respondents) 
Network Size marital status 
married not married 
5 or less 71.2 28.8 
6-10 87.0 13.0 
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11-15 88.9 11.1 
>15 94.1 5.90 
Total Sample (%) 84.8 15.2 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Employers of group labour have larger networks 
 
Across the sample as whole, employers of group labour tend to have larger networks (70.6 per 
cent of those with networks of greater than 15 network partners compared with 41.6 per cent of 
sample). Three-quarters of those with 5 or fewer network partners are not employers of group 
labour compared with 58.4 per cent of sample (Table B.4). 
 
Table B.4 Network Size and Group labour involvement (% of respondents) 
Network Size employer of group labour 
No Yes 
5 or less 75.0 25.0 
6-10 67.0 33.0 
11-15 42.2 57.8 
>15 29.4 70.6 
Total Sample (%) 58.4 41.6 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Related to the previous point linking network size and access to crucial resources, it follows that 
this potentially represents a reinforcement of the inherent relative disadvantage of households 
headed by females with smaller networks in accessing the right kinds of labour, in particular for 
heavy, land-clearing tasks, at the appropriate point in the season, with knock-on effects on the 
ability of the household to cultivate a marketable surplus. 
 
Group affiliation and respondent attributes 
 
Turning now to correlations between group membership and other respondent attributes, there 
are significant relationships between group affiliation and a respondent‟s age, as well as group 
affiliation and heterogeneity of network partners. 
 
Older respondents are less likely to belong to community-level groups 
 
From the survey data the majority of respondents are members of at least one village-level 
group or society including church groups, with only twenty-two of the 231 respondents not 
belonging to any group whatsoever. When cross-tabulated with the respondent attribute data the 
group affiliation dummy variable is significantly correlated (at the 5 per cent level) with just one 
attribute variable: age of respondent. From Table B.5 one can see that older respondents are 
more likely to NOT be members of groups than their share of the sample would suggest. The 
over-60s make up 30 per cent of the non-member category compared with just 10.5 per cent of 
the sample as a whole. The remaining two age groups follow closely the sample distribution. 
 
Table B.5 Group affiliation and respondent age (% of respondents) 
group affiliation dummy Age of respondent 
30 and under 31-60 >60 
No 30.0 40.0 30.0 
Yes 28.2 63.2 8.6 
Total Sample (%) 28.4 61.1 10.5 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
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Networks of group non-participants are less diverse 
 
Group affiliation correlates significantly with the network heterogeneity variables. Those not in 
groups are more likely to have less diverse networks in terms of both age and sex of network 
partners (see Table B.6 below).  
 
Table B.6 Group affiliation and heterogeneity of respondent networks (% of respondents) 
group affiliation dummy Age heterogeneity Sex heterogeneity 
<5 5-<10 10-<15 15+ <0.01 0.01-0.9 >0.9 
No 37.5 31.3 12.5 18.8 45.5 36.4 18.2 
Yes 8.30 39.2 36.3 16.2 19.1 55.0 25.8 
Total Sample (%) 10.5 38.6 34.5 16.4 21.6 53.2 25.1 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Group affiliation and the variables for participation in and employment of group labour, 
however, are not significantly correlated. This is surprising: qualitative data from the research 
suggest that group members get a better rate when employing a work group from their club or 
society. Following from this, one might assume that people would be more likely to employ 
these work groups. The data do not appear to bear this out. 
 
Prestige Networks and respondent attributes 
 
Other significant associations between the prestige network dummy variable and other 
respondent attributes are given in Table B.7: 
 
Table B.7 Prestige networks and i) sex of respondent; ii) status in household; iii) employer (% 
of respondents) 
Influential kin dummy Sex of respondent Respondent is 
household head 
Respondent is an 
employer male female 
No 40.2 59.8 48.4 39.1 
Yes 61.2 38.8 65.9 55.0 
Total Sample (%) 52.2 47.8 58.5 48.2 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Respondents reporting an influential friend or kin in their social networks are more likely to also 
be male and/or a household head and/or employ non-household labour for either farm or non-
farm work. 
 
Network Diversity: Composition 
 
A. Age Heterogeneity 
 
Turning first to the variable capturing diversity in age of network partners, the higher the score 
on the age heterogeneity variable, the greater is heterogeneity in age of network partners. 
 
The networks of unmarried respondents are more diverse in terms of age of network 
partner than those of married respondents 
 
Unmarried people are more than three times as likely as one would expect given their share in 
the sample as a whole to have a network age heterogeneity of greater than 15 (38.9 per cent of 
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highest 15+ category compared with 12.7 per cent unmarried in the sample as a whole; see 
Table B.8). 
 
Table B.8 Network age heterogeneity and respondent i) Marital status,; ii) Education level (% of 
respondents) 
Agehet 
 
marital status level of education 
married not married To grade 4 Grade 5-7 Secondary + 
<5 95.7 4.30 27.3 50.0 22.7 
5-<10 91.8 8.20 8.60 54.3 37.0 
10-<15 92.1 7.90 30.1 56.2 13.7 
15+ 61.1 38.9 50.0 33.3 16.7 
Total Sample (%) 87.3 12.7 24.3 51.5 24.3 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
The lower the level of education of the respondent the greater the age heterogeneity of 
their network partners 
 
Conversely, the higher the respondent‟s level of education the lower the age heterogeneity of 
alters. Table 4.21 also sets out the distribution. Those with lower levels of education (up to 
grade 4) make up 50 per cent of those with network age heterogeneity of 15+ compared with 
just 24.3 per cent in sample as a whole. Those with secondary education and higher are over-
represented in the lower age heterogeneity categories. 
 
The older the respondent the more heterogeneous are their network partners in terms of 
age 
 
This relationship warrants some discussion about the direction one would expect it to take as it 
is rather ambiguous: Are older people likely to have more or less age heterogeneity in their 
networks? A traditional concept of „age-mates‟ means that one might expect an older 
respondent to have networks dominated by network partners who are similar in age, both to 
each other and to the respondent themselves. Contrary to this, are the networks of older people 
likely to be characterised by people of diverse ages for such reasons as i) older people are more 
likely to know more people by sheer dint of having been around for a lot longer compared to 
their younger compatriots, and therefore more chance of having people of many ages in their 
network; ii) Older people are more likely to be in a respected position with the result that people 
of all ages interact with them rather than „social circles‟ being confined solely to one‟s own age 
group? iii) demographic factors, that is, there are fewer older people around, coupled with more 
reliance by older people on those who are younger than themselves i.e. the productive age 
group? Work on social support networks suggest that younger people tend to provide older 
people with their labour (Borgatti, 1998). The data show that there is in general more age 
heterogeneity in the networks of those respondents in the over 60 age group. Table B.9 shows 
that 38.9 per cent of over 60s have an agehet of 15+ compared with 9.5 per cent in sample as a 
whole, while younger respondents (age 30 or less) make up nearly half (47.8 per cent) of those 
with an age heterogeneity of networks partners of less than 5, compared with being only 28.6 
per cent of the sample as a whole. 
 
Table B.9 Network Age heterogeneity and i) Age of respondent; ii) Sex of household head (% 
of respondents) 
Agehet 
  
  
Age of respondent Sex of household head 
30 and under 31-60 >60 male female 
<5 47.8 43.5 8.70 95.7 4.3 
5-<10 25.9 72.9 1.20 85.9 14.1 
10-<15 28.9 65.8 5.30 92.1 7.9 
15+ 22.2 38.9 38.9 69.4 30.6 
Total Sample (%) 28.6 61.8 9.50 86.4 13.6 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
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To shed light on this finding it may be helpful to break the network down by network type, and 
examine its component parts. In more traditional settings would expect age heterogeneity of 
alters to be low in interaction networks because of the concept of “age mates”, mentioned 
above.  
 
People from a female-headed household have more age heterogeneity in their networks 
than those with a male household head 
 
Respondents with a female head of household make up just 13.6 per cent of the sample. They 
are over-represented in the highest age heterogeneity category, comprising 30.6 per cent of 
those with age heterogeneity >15 (See Table B.9). The age heterogeneity of networks partners 
of those with a male household head is in general lower: of those with network age 
heterogeneity of less than five, 95.7 per cent have a male household head, compared to 86.4 per 
cent of male household heads in the sample as a whole. 
 
B. Sex Heterogeneity 
 
Women’s networks are more likely to be mixed-sex than those of men 
 
Most men (57.6 per cent) fall in the middle of the distribution, but are over-represented in the 
lower sex heterogeneity category, making up 77.6 per cent of those with low sex heterogeneity 
in their networks (Table B.10). Women make up 79.3 per cent of those with sex heterogeneity 
of greater than 0.9 compared with 48.9 per cent of the sample as a whole. 
 
Respondents who are not head of their household are also likely to have a greater 
variation in sex of network partner 
 
One would expect this variable to follow closely the distribution of the variable for sex of 
respondent because females in the sample tend to be the spouse of a male household head rather 
than the head of a female-headed household. Female-headed households make up just 16 per 
cent of the sample. This is indeed the case: 58.6 per cent of respondents falling in the >0.9 
category are not household heads compared with just 43.3 per cent non-household heads in the 
total sample (see Table B.10). 
 
Table B.10 Network sex heterogeneity and i) sex of respondent; ii) status in household; iii) sex 
of household head (% of respondents) 
Sexhet 
 
Sex of respondent Household status Sex of household head 
male female household head other male female 
<0.01 78.0 22.0 68.0 32.0 94.0 6.00 
0.01-0.9 54.5 45.5 60.3 39.7 82.1 17.9 
>0.9 20.7 79.3 41.4 58.6 79.3 20.7 
Total Sample (%) 51.1 48.9 57.2 42.8 84.0 16.0 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Table B.10 also shows the relationship between diversity in sex of network partner and sex of 
household head. Networks of those with male household heads are likely to have lower sex 
heterogeneity compared with females, who are over-represented in the >0.9 category.  
 
A very simple indicator of multiplexity is taken in which each network partner can have a tie to 
the respondent in each of the seven strands of instrumental network being measured (personal, 
migration, employer, employee, social support, information and market access). The indicator 
takes a value between zero and seven, according to the number of network strands for which the 
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respondent has a stated relationship with other people. A score of “zero” would denote no 
relationships. 
 
Men are likely to have network partners in more of the network types than women 
 
Almost 60 per cent of those involved in five, six or the maximum seven of the networks being 
measured are males compared with 51.1 per cent of respondents being male in the sample as a 
whole (Table 4.3.11).  
 
Those who have not always lived in their village are more likely to be involved in more 
networks 
 
Respondents are more likely to be in 5-7 networks if they have not always lived in their current 
community (see Table B.11). Those who have always lived in their community are over-
represented in the 1-2 network category (85.7 per cent of those with only one or two network 
types fall within the „yes‟ group, compared with 64.3 per cent of the sample as a whole). 
 
Table B.11 Multiplexity of networks and i) sex of respondent; ii) residence status; iii) group 
labour employment (% of respondents) 
Multego Sex of respondent Always lived here? Employer of group labour 
male female no yes no yes 
1/2 31.0 69.0 14.3 85.7 65.5 34.5 
3/4 50.4 49.6 26.5 73.5 66.9 33.1 
5/6/7 59.3 40.7 55.3 44.7 43.2 56.8 
Total Sample (%) 51.1 48.9 35.7 64.3 58.4 41.6 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03 
 
Employers of group labour are also more likely to be involved in many kinds of network 
 
Those employing group labour are over-represented in the larger multiplexity category of five to 
seven of the instrumental networks being studied:  56.8 per cent of respondents involved in 
between five and seven networks employ group labour compared with 41.6 per cent of sample 
(Table B.11). 
 
Table B.12 Network Size and Decision-making Power in groups 
Network Size To what extent do you participate in the group’s decision-making? 
Not at all To a small 
extent 
Neither small 
nor large 
extent 
To a large 
extent 
To a very 
large extent 
5 or less 45.83 20.83        2.08       20.83       10.42 
6-10 14.61        8.99        8.99       38.20       29.21 
11-15 15.91       11.36        6.82       34.09       31.82 
>15 3.33        0.00       10.00       40.00       46.67 
Total Sample 
(%) 
20.38 10.90        7.11       33.65       27.96 
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Appendix C   Qualitative Evidence of Smallholder Market Participation 
 
This appendix sets out findings from qualitative fieldwork in the three study communities, based 
on focus group discussions with formal village-level farming groups, interviews with smallholder 
farmers and their households, and participatory analysis using pair-wise-ranking to identify 
determinants of market participation.  
 
During qualitative fieldwork (focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews with 
individuals and households) farm households, discussing the decision-making process behind 
labour hiring and crop marketing decisions, reported that they first put aside crops for household 
consumption needs. The remainder was divided between crops to keep as in-kind payment for 
farm labour, and crops to sell in the market. Household food security comes first, deciding what 
and how much to consume. If the household cannot meet its own food security needs then they 
have to buy what they need from the market or work in exchange for food. Part of the decision 
by some households to keep back crops as in-kind payments for farm labour rests on the 
premise that some of their neighbours will be in this position. Precarious food markets are not 
just a cross borne by rural residents. Many of the settlers in the Lufubu resettlement scheme 
reported the potential opportunity to achieve food security for the family as one of the main 
motivations behind settling on the scheme, relocating from small „rural‟ towns, with one resident 
saying “Here at least we can feed ourselves” (Lufubu Resident, Fieldwork September 2002). 
 
A pair-wise ranking exercise was carried out in focus group discussions in all three study sites 
during round 2 of the fieldwork, designed to uncover what villagers themselves considered as 
signifying “getting on”, or achieving a successful livelihood. This encompassed what they 
considered “getting on” to be, the factors they believed to be necessary in achieving this, and 
what was the ordered preference of these factors in relation to each other.
 
The exercise was 
conducted in a small group in each village of between ten and thirteen people (ten in both 
Ngulula and  Kabila, thirteen in Lufubu), of mixed sex and ages, initially focusing on what did 
people consider „getting on‟ to mean to them. Participants universally agreed that this meant 
„having a better life‟ and saw the route to this as doing well in their farming. It is worth noting that 
the discussions that people engage in during the course of exercises such as this could be 
considered as more important than the outcome or „results‟ themselves (Chambers, 2003). 
 
To Kabila‟s participants, “getting on” means cultivating more in terms of increased crop output. 
In Ngulula, getting on means „having a better life‟ and again the route to this was considered to 
be through farming. Of all three communities the Ngulula participants alone explicitly mentioned 
the longer term and what doing well meant to them in terms of the next generation. Lufubu 
participants took a broader view of “getting on”, thinking about it in terms of how to access 
economic opportunities, for example  jobs in town, paid work, growing better crops or increasing 
production or starting a new enterprise. However, the emphasis was very much on their farming 
enterprises.  
 
In each group, participants, unprompted, listed all the elements they thought necessary for 
doing well in their farming, which could run into twenty or more factors. These included the 
obvious assets and inputs necessary for cultivation, and also encompassed personal relations: 
cooperation (between people both within and outside the household, working together); people: 
relatives, workers and others more generally; „being famous‟ i.e. popular (thought to be 
necessary for attracting and keeping customers). Personal attributes also appeared in the long-
list produced by Lufubu participants: honesty, sobriety and cleanliness, with a discussion about 
the importance of these for doing business with other people in general. 
 
Participants discussed their list, grouping elements when there was repetition, and then 
choosing what they considered to be the ten most important.  These ten elements or 
determinants were then taken two-by-two and participants were asked to state which was the 
most important element of the pairs in relation to having a successful agricultural livelihood, until 
all pair-wise combinations of the 10 elements had been covered – 45 combinations in all. 
Matrices produced in each of the study sites are given below. Cells contain the „preferred‟ 
element in each pair. The elements were then ordered according to the number of times they 
were preferred over other elements, to give scores for the ten most important determinants to 
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participants. The list was discussed and participants were given the opportunity to rearrange the 
list if they wished. 
 
Kabila 
 Tools Transport Money Food Land Bridge Hard Work Cooperation Education Health 
Tools           
Transport Tools          
Money Money Money         
Food Tools Food Food        
Land Tools Land Land Land       
Bridge Tools Bridge Money Food Land      
Hard work Tools Hard work Hard work Hard work Hard work Hard work     
Cooperation Tools Transport Cooperation Cooperation Land Cooperation Hard work    
Education Tools Education Money Food education education Hard work Education   
Health  Health Health Health Health Health Health Health Health Health  
 
Ngulula 
 Education/ 
skills 
Health Hard work Money Market Transport Educating 
Children 
Assistance Cooperation Water 
Education/ 
skills 
          
Health Health          
Hard Work Hard work Health         
Money Money Health Hard work        
Market Education Health Hard work Market       
Transport Transport Health Hard work Transport Transport      
Educating 
Children 
Education Health Hard work Money Market Transport     
Assistance Education Health Hard work Assistance  Assistance Assistance Educating 
children 
   
Cooperation Cooperation Health Cooperation Cooperation  Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation   
Water Water Water Water Water Water Water Water Water Cooperation  
 
Lufubu 
 Education Capital Land Tools Health Food Water Preparation Honesty People 
Education           
Capital Capital          
Land Land Capital         
Tools Tools Tools Land        
Health Health Health Health Health       
Food Food Food Food Tools Food      
Water Water Water Water Water Water Water     
Preparation Prep Prep Prep Prep Prep Prep Water    
Honesty Education Capital Land Tools Health Food Water Prep   
People People People People People Health Food Water Prep People  
 
 
Scores, rankings and re-ranked lists are given in Table C.1. Scores signify the number of times 
a particular element was chosen as preferred over another. Taking as an example the score of 
7 for tools in Kabila, this means that on seven occasions „tools‟ was chosen as the more 
important factor in determining how well someone does in farming when drawn in a pair with 
other factors. Initial ranking is based on these scores, and the final ranking is the result of 
participants re-ranking following discussion of the rankings based on scores. 
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Table C.1 Scores from matrix ranking of determinants of „economic success‟ 
Kabila Ngulula Lufubu 
SCORES: SCORES: SCORES: 
Health  9 
Tools  7 
Hard work 7 
Land  5 
Money   4 
Food  4 
Education 4 
Cooperation  3 
Transport 1 
Bridge  1 
Health 8 
Cooperation 8 
Water 8 
Hard Work 6 
Transport 4 
Education/ skills 3 
Assistance 3 
Money 2 
Market 2 
Educating children 1 
Preparation 8 
Health 6 
Water 6 
People 5 
Tools 4 
Food 4 
Money 3 
Land 3 
Education 1 
Honesty 0 
INITIAL RANKING: INITIAL RANKING: INITIAL RANKING: 
1 Health 
2=  Tools, hard work 
4  Land 
5= money, food education 
8 cooperation 
9= transport, bridge 
1= Health, water, cooperation 
4 Hard work 
5 Transport 
6= Education, Assistance 
8= Money, Market 
10 Educating children 
1 Preparation 
2= Water/ Health 
4 People 
5= food/ tools 
7= land/ capital 
9 education 
10 honesty 
FINAL RANKING: FINAL RANKING: FINAL RANKING: 
1 Health 
2 Tools 
3 Hard work 
4 Land 
5 Food 
6 Money 
7 Education 
8 Cooperation 
9 Bridge 
10 Transport 
1 Health 
2 Water 
3 Cooperation 
4 Hard work 
5 Education 
6 Transport 
7 Market 
8 Money,  
9 Educating  children 
10 Assistance 
1 Preparation 
2 Water 
3 Health 
4 Tools 
5 Food 
6 People 
7 Land 
8 Capital 
9 Education 
10 Honesty 
 
Kabila and Ngulula participants each included cooperation in their „top ten‟, while Lufubu 
residents grouped all of the elements of their master list related to personal relations under the 
heading „People‟. In the two study sites with poorer market access – Kabila and Lufubu – having 
enough food and meeting basic needs scored highly, in the top five in preference ordering. This 
did not feature in the Ngulula list. Only Ngulula participants included available markets in their 
top ten. Cooperation came joint first in Ngulula, but much lower (8
th
) in Kabila, while people 
were ranked 4
th
 most important for economic success by Lufubu participants. This dropped to 
6
th
 place when participants later re-ranked the list, putting basic needs (food) and productive 
assets (tools) ahead of people. 
 
Determinants identified are a mixture of factors necessary to meet immediate, basic material 
needs, in terms of consumption and production, such as transport, cash, food, productive assets 
and inputs (land, tools, water/ irrigation), education – in agreement with the theoretical model. 
However, in contrast to the theoretical model, which focuses only on household characteristics 
as well as transactions costs related to marketing, people also stressed the importance of more 
„intermediate‟ factors, focusing on personal and relational attributes such as honesty, 
industriousness and cooperation. However, these personal and relational attributes are seen to 
be necessary for fostering and maintaining good relations with others, which in turn leads to 
improved access to assets, labour, information – in other words lowering transactions costs in 
market access. 
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Potential biases notwithstanding, the pair-wise ranking exercise and accompanying discussion 
are potentially useful tools for exploring empirically and in some depth people‟s own 
assessment of what they consider to be the determinants of market participation and directions 
of causality in their particular context.  
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Appendix D  Construction of Socio-Economic Status Variable 
 
The socio-economic status variable is an index constructed using underlying indices based on 
the survey data
52
. The notes below refer to question numbers in the household survey 
questionnaire. 
 
Definition of Constructed Variables 
 
Agricultural Assets Index: 
 
Using constructed variables for Agricultural Implements Index AGIMPI and Livestock Unit Index 
LUI, AGASSETSI is a simple average of the two. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
 
Agricultural implements index:  
 
Using answers to question 3.3 [How many [ITEM]s do you own?]:  
 
AGIMP_OWN =  0.5 x 8 + 9 + 10 + 11+ 2 (12 + 13) + 14 
 
Using answers to question 3.4 [How many [ITEM]s do you own with another household or 
households?] 
 
AGIMP_POWN = 0.5 x 8 + 9 + 10 + 11 + 2 (12 + 13) + 14 
 
AGIMP = AGIMP_OWN + 0.5 AGIMP_POWN 
 
Agricultural implements index is scaled: AGIMPI = AGIMP/AGIMP(max), where AGIMP(max) is 
the maximum value of AGIMP found in the data. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
 
Dependency ratio: the number of people in a household aged 15 or less plus those aged over 
60 divided by the number aged 15-60. 
 
Household size: the total number of people currently resident in the household. 
 
Housing quality 
 
Housing quality, HQ is then the sum of answers to questions 3.7 [What is the main type of 
flooring in your place?], 3.8 [What is the main type of roofing material in your place?] and 3.9 
[What is the main type of wall material in your place?]  plus ten times the number of rooms per 
person (ROOMSPP). The index, HQI = HQ/HQ(max), where HQ(max) is the maximum value of 
HQ found in the data. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
 
Livelihood diversification: constructed as the sum of the following scores (at the household 
level) divided by 50: 
 
2 if LUL > 0 (large livestock unit) 
1 if LUS > 0 (small livestock unit) 
 
2 for each current migrant  
2 for each agricultural employee 
1 for each type of non-farm work engaged in 
0.5 for each type of good produced for outside consumption  
0.5 for each crop produced 
1 for owning fish pond  
1 for collecting forest products 
                                                     
52
 See: White H, J Leavy, M Mulumbi, G Mulenga, Venkatesh Seshamani (2005) Rural Labour Markets 
in Africa: a channel for pro-poor growth? Preliminary findings from a research project in Northern 
Province, Zambia. Discussion Draft. IDS Mimeo. 
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Livestock units:  
 
Using answers to question 3.3 [How many [ITEM]s do you own?]:  
 
LU_OWN = 24 + 0.8 (25 +26) + 0.5 (27 + 28 + 29 + 30) + 0.2 x 31 + 0.05 (32 + 33 + 34 + 35) 
 
Using answers to question 3.4 [How many [ITEM]s do you own with another household or 
households?] 
 
LU_POWN = 24 + 0.8 (25 +26) + 0.5 (27 + 28 + 29 + 30) + 0.2 x 31 + 0.05 (32 + 33 + 34 + 35) 
 
LU = LU_OWN + 0.5 LU_POWN 
 
Livestock unit index is scaled: LUI = LU/LU(max), where LU(max) is the maximum value of LU 
found in the data. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
 
Ownership of consumer durables (CD): the sum of the answers given to question 3.1 [Does 
your household own any of the following (9) items?] divided by 9. The resulting variable is in the 
range 0 to 1. 
 
Rooms per person (ROOMSPP): the number of rooms in the house (question 3.11 How many 
rooms do you have in your place?) divided by HHS. 
 
Transport index 
 
Using answers to question 3.3 [How many [ITEM]s do you own?]:  
 
TRAN _OWN =  16+ 2 x 17 
 
Using answers to question 3.4 [How many [ITEM]s do you own with another household or 
households?] 
 
TRAN _POWN = 16+ 2 x 17 
 
TRAN = TRAN _OWN + 0.5 TRAN _POWN 
Transport index is scaled: TRANI = TRAN/ TRAN(max), where TRAN(max) is the maximum 
value of TRAN found in the data. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
 
Water source: For question 3.10 [What is the main source of drinking water for your household 
for most of the year ] “other” is re-coded as 8 “furrow”. WATER is then the answer to question 
3.10 divided by 7. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
 
Socio-Economic Status 
Socio-economic status (SES): the simple average of CD, AGRIMPI, LUI, HQI, TRANI and 
WATER. The resulting variable is in the range 0 to 1. 
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3. I would now like to ask you about various items which your household may own:  
Does your household own any of the following items? 
 
ASSET CODES 
3.1a 
0  No 
1 Yes 
3.1b 
How Many? 
Number 
1 Chair(s)   
2 Table   
3 Bed(s)   
4 Mattress(es)   
5 Stove/ Cooker/ Charcoal blazer   
6 Working Radio   
7 Working Watch or clock   
Now I’d like to ask you about things your household may own, possibly jointly with other households. FIRST ASK 3.2 
FOR ALL ITEMS 
3.2 
Does your household own any of the following items? 
FOR EACH ITEM THE HOUSEHOLD OWNS GO ON 
TO ASK QUESTIONS 3.3-3.6 ONCE ALL ITEMS ARE 
LISTED 
3.3 
How many 
[ITEM]s do 
you own? 
 
 
 
Number 
3.4 
How many 
[ITEM]s do 
you own with 
another 
household or 
households? 
Number 
3.5 
Have you rented 
out any of these 
[ITEM]s  in the 
last growing 
season? 
No 
Yes 
99      N/A 
3.6 
How many 
[ITEM]s have 
you sold in 
the last 
growing 
season? 
 
Number ASSET CODES 
No 
Yes, own 
Yes, have use of 
8 
Farm Tools e.g. Hoe, Scythes, 
Knives, axes, rakes, sickles, shovels 
     
9 Working Crop Sprayer      
10 Working Hammer Mill      
11 Cart (small – person pulled)      
12 Cart (large – ox pulled)      
13 Plough      
14 Fishing net      
15 Storage shed/Containers      
16 Working Bicycle      
17 Working Motorcycle/scooter/vehicle      
ANIMAL CODES: 
24 Oxen      
25 Donkey      
26 Bull or heifer      
27 Calf      
28 Sheep       
29 Goat      
30 Pigs      
31 Piglets      
32 Duck and Geese      
33 Rabbits      
34 Chickens      
35 Other birds       
36 Other animals       
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IF POSSIBLE RECORD ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 3.7 – 3.9  BY OBSERVATION. IF NOT, ASK RESPONDENT. 
3.7 
What is the main type of flooring in 
your place? 
[CIRCLE ONE] 
3.8 
What is the main type of roofing 
material in your place?  
[CIRCLE ONE] 
 
3.9 
What is the main type of wall material 
in your place? 
[CIRCLE ONE] 
1 Dirt/earth 1 Grass/Straw/thatch/ 1 Brick/concrete 
2 Wood/plank 2 Wood/planks 2 Galvanised iron 
3 Cement/tile 3 Tin/metal 3 Adobe/mud 
4 Other  4 Tiles/slates/concrete/cement 4 Matting/wood/branches 
 (specify)  5 
Other 
(specify) 
 
5 
 
Other 
(specify) 
 
 
3.10 
What is the main source of drinking water for your 
household for most of the year  
[CIRCLE ONE] 
 
1 River, Lake 
2 Unprotected well 
3 Protected well 
4 Borehole 
5 Public tap or neighbour’s tap 
6 Own tap 
7 Other 
(specify)  
 
 
 
3.11 How many rooms do you have in your place? NUMBER 
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Appendix E Descriptive Statistics: 1. Social Networks by Location; 2 Household 
Characteristics by Commercialisation Status 
 
E.1 Descriptive statistics of household social network characteristics by community 
 
The purposive nature of study site selection means location is a proxy for market access.  
N=136 
 
Table E1.1 Social network characteristics of households by location 
 
Respondent 
attributes: 
Network 
size 
Group 
affiliation 
Influential 
kin*  
Community 
 
Kabila 
Ngulula 
Lufubu 
 
9.8 
10 
13.2 
 
1.6 
2.3 
3.1 
 
51.4 
77.5 
78.0 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03; all data reported are means, with the exception of the 
influential kin dummy variable, which is reported as the percentage of respondents reporting 
an influential friend or kin in their network. 
 
Table E1.2 Mean Network Diversity by location 
Outcomes: Age 
heterogeneity 
Sex 
heterogeneity 
Ratio of 
kin to 
non-kin 
Number 
of 
multiplex 
ties 
Proportion 
of 
multiplex 
ties  
Sum of 
accessed 
resources 
Average 
no. of 
roles per 
alter 
Community 
Kabila 
Ngulula 
Lufubu 
 
13.9 
13.2 
10.0 
 
0.24 
0.23 
0.23 
 
0.61 
0.37 
0.29 
 
2.1 
1.7 
2.1 
 
0.21 
0.20 
0.17 
 
11.9 
12.8 
14.4 
 
3.4 
3.7 
3.4 
Source: Household Survey, 2002-03. Note: The higher the score the more diverse the network 
on the dimension in each column. 
 
 
E2 Descriptive statistics of characteristics of seller and non-seller households 
 
Looking across the sample as a whole, crop market participants are overrepresented by male 
household heads, and households who have higher levels of education, despite the common 
perception among farmers interviewed during qualitative fieldwork that “you don‟t need 
education to be a farmer” (Table E2.1). 
 
Table E2.1 Percentage of households marketing crops by sex of household head and highest 
education level in the household 
 
Sex of HH head 
(%) 
Highest level of education in the 
household (%) 
Participation in 
crop marketing male female 
up to grade 
4 grade 5-7 
secondary/ 
college 
No 59.1 40.9 13.6 63.6 22.7 
Yes 86.1 13.9 7.0 38.3 54.8 
Total 81.8 18.2 8.0 42.3 49.6 
  Chi-sq=9.77   Chi-sq=7.46 
 
In terms of productive assets, crop market participants also tend to have irrigation (although this 
is not significant - only 15.3 per cent of households surveyed have irrigation and most of these 
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are in Ngulula), use hybrid seed and fertilizer (Table E2.2), have storage, large tools and own or 
have use of a bicycle (Table E2.3). 
 
Table E2.2 Crop market participation by farm inputs: irrigation, fertilizer, hybrid seed 
 
Irrigation 
(%) 
Fertiliser 
(%) 
Hybrid seed 
(%) 
Participation in 
crop marketing no yes no yes no yes 
No 95.5 4.5 77.3 22.7 90.9 9.1 
Yes 82.6 17.4 50.4 49.6 60.9 39.1 
Total 84.7 15.3 54.7 45.3 65.7 34.3 
 Chi-sq=2.18 Chi-sq=5.19 Chi-sq=7.17 
 
Table E2.3 Crop market participation by farm equipment and transport: storage, large tools, 
bicycle 
 
Storage 
(%) 
Large Tools 
(%) 
Bicycle 
(%) 
Participation in 
crop marketing no yes no yes no yes 
No 90.9 9.1 100.0 .0 50.0 50.0 
Yes 64.3 35.7 75.7 24.3 25.2 74.8 
Total 68.6 31.4 79.6 20.4 29.2 70.8 
 Chi-sq=5.84 Chi-sq=6.50 Chi-sq=5.36 
 
Participating households are only slightly more likely to have non-farm income (not significant). 
Farmers who sell their crops are also more likely to have a working radio, an important source 
of market and farming information for many farmers living in remote rural areas such as these 
(Table E2.4). This is potentially a proxy for transactions costs. 
 
Table E2.4 Crop market participation by access to non-farm income and information  
 Non-farm income (%) Working radio (%) 
Participation in 
crop marketing no yes no yes 
No 54.5 45.5 86.4 13.6 
Yes 47.8 52.2 49.6 50.4 
Total 48.9 51.1 55.5 44.5 
 Chi-sq=0.29 Chi-sq=10.3 
 
There is no significant difference between sellers and non-sellers in terms of their propensity to 
have worked for someone else in a non-farm activity, although not surprisingly sellers are more 
likely to employ non-household farm labour, as well as non-farm employees (Table E2.5). 
 
Table E2.5 Crop Market Participation by Employment (as an individual) 
 
Employs Farm 
labour (%) 
Worked as farm 
labourer 
(%) 
Employed someone 
else in non-farm 
activity 
(%) 
Worked for 
someone else in 
non-farm activity 
(%) 
Participation 
in crop 
marketing no yes no yes no yes no yes 
No 72.7 27.3 63.6 36.4 95.5 4.5 86.4 13.6 
Yes 31.3 68.7 62.6 37.4 72.2 27.8 80.9 19.1 
Total 38.0 62.0 62.8 37.2 75.9 24.1 81.8 18.2 
 Chi-sq=13.2 Chi-sq=0.01 Chi-sq=5.55 Chi-sq=0.39 
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Crop market participants are likely to have both worked in a group and to have employed group 
labour for farm work, reflecting the need for larger groups of workers to carry out heavy work for 
planting, and the importance of being able to mobilise such groups in a timely fashion and 
reciprocate (Table E2.6). In order to employ group labour, households need adequate resources 
to feed the group and also to provide reciprocal labour suggesting that a certain command over 
resources – material and physical – is necessary from the outset and points to potential 
endogeneity between labour variables and welfare outcomes. 
 
Table E2.6 Crop Market Participation by Employment (Group level)  
 
Work in a group 
(%) 
Employed group 
labour (%) 
Participation in 
crop marketing no yes no yes 
No 81.8 18.2 59.1 40.9 
Yes 56.5 43.5 42.6 57.4 
Total 60.6 39.4 45.3 54.7 
 Chi-sq=5.08 Chi-sq=1.93 
 
The mean output of sellers compared with non-sellers, in terms of value of crops grown, is 
considerably higher (Table E2.7). Sellers on average grow crops to a value of 2 million kwacha, 
with a maximum of 10.9 million kwacha, compared to an average crop value of 174 thousand 
kwacha for non-sellers, with a maximum of 1.5 million kwacha.  
 
Table E2.7 Mean output of sellers and non-sellers, „000 Kwacha 
Participation in crop 
marketing 
Value of crops grown (‘000 Kwacha) 
Mean St.dev min max 
No 174.87 344.31 0 1516.11 
Yes 2000.81 2287.867 84.14 10929.34 
 
The correlation between total value of crops sold and total area of land cropped is weakly 
positive at 0.3705, as is the correlation between total value of crops sold and total land area 
owned (0.3464). The customary land tenure system and the relative abundance of land in 
Zambia, as discussed previously, mean that land availability per se is not a constraint on 
production. Rather, farmers are constrained by lack of access to other inputs such as fertiliser 
and labour. In Northern Province land quality is also a constraint. 
 
Table E2.8 Shows the percentage of households selling each type of crop by community over 
the two rounds of the survey, with average prices per kg weight for the six month period. This is 
an average of the maximum and minimum price reported at the community level. In round 1, 
with a recall period encompassing the immediate post-harvest period, prices were identical 
across the three communities. In round 2 prices in Kabila and Ngulula were the same in both 
locations (related to prices in the provincial capital Kasama) but prices in Lufubu differed for 
some crops, suggesting for some crops Lufubu framers are facing different markets. 
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Table E2.8 Percentage of households selling each type of crop, by community 
Round 1 Round 2 
Crop Kabila Ngulula Lufubu Average* 
Price 
Kabila Ngulula Lufubu Average* 
Price: 
Kabila, 
Ngulua 
Average* 
Price: 
Lufubu 
Maize 2.4% 18.6% 19.7% 731 0.0% 14.0% 1.6% 900 528 
Hybrid 
Maize 
0.0% 14.0% 4.9% 731 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 900 528 
Cassava 4.9% 16.3% 11.5% 429 2.4% 14.0% 4.9% 327 365 
Millet 17.1% 18.6% 32.8% 542 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 484 397 
Sorghum 4.9% 4.7% 0.0% 756 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1203 702 
Mixed 
beans 
56.1% 16.3% 77.0% 1149 7.3% 2.3% 27.9% 300 1500 
Soybean 0.0% 23.3% 4.9% 600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 745 461 
Sweet 
potato 
0.0% 53.5% 9.8% 342 0.0% 20.9% 0.0% 619 1003 
Irish 
potato 
0.0% 9.3% 3.3% 328 0.0% 4.7% 1.6% 743 833 
Groundnut 39.0% 16.3% 42.6% 1529 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1667 875 
Cabbage 0.0% 32.6% 3.3% 619 0.0% 20.9% 0.0% 1000 625 
Mango 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2000 0.0% 2.3% 1.6% 1000 320 
Banana 0.0% 23.3% 4.9% 1500 0.0% 11.6% 0.0% 4000 4000 
Plantain 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 1500 0.0% 9.3% 1.6% 2000 2000 
Squash 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 450 0.0% 4.7% 0.0% 400 400 
Orange 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 750 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 722 722 
Tomato 0.0% 18.6% 13.1% 356 2.4% 9.3% 1.6% 732 732 
*Average of minimum and maximum price reported at community-level. 
E2.9 Average crop sales ‘000 Kwacha 
Round 1 Round 2 
Crop Kabila Ngulula Lufubu Average* 
Price 
Kabila Ngulula Lufubu Average* 
Price: 
Kabila, 
Ngulua 
Average* 
Price: 
Lufubu 
Maize 11983 52367 65128 731 0 196074 43 900 528 
Hybrid 
Maize 0 55462 46742 
731 
0 0 0 
900 528 
Cassava 2812 5928 10763 429 240 5459 2291 327 365 
Millet 9099 5834 45532 542 0 0 0 484 397 
Sorghum 1291 6629 0 756 0 0 0 1203 702 
Mixed 
beans 70125 26397 210194 
1149 
3462 140 14472 
300 1500 
Soybean 0 20386 1987 600 0 0 0 745 461 
Sweet 
potato 0 84423 13431 
342 
0 14316 0 
619 1003 
Irish 
potato 0 5866 677 
328 
0 3464 1270 
743 833 
Groundnut 53492 192101 134789 1529 0 0 493 1667 875 
Cabbage 0 98688 2233 619 0 241601 0 1000 625 
Mango 0 0 0 2000 0 4651 1475 1000 320 
Banana 0 427326 82377 1500 0 147093 0 4000 4000 
Plantain 0 11302 0 1500 0 37209 1230 2000 2000 
Squash 0 0 664 450 0 3349 0 400 400 
Orange 0 0 0 750 0 0 0 722 722 
Tomato 0 61106 8335 356 264 11085 2131 732 732 
*Average of minimum and maximum price reported at community-level. 
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Appendix  F Multinomial Probit Coefficient Estimates 
 
 
 
  Multinomial probit resultsa 
              
 Independent Variables                              Without social networks  With social networks 
                               HL LH HH  HL LH HH 
Access to storage 
facilities      
0.29 1.75*** 0.97*  1.11 2.31*** 1.82** 
                               (0.53) (0.53) (0.47)  (0.63) (0.69) (0.66) 
Age of Household head                 -0.03 -0.03* -0.05**  -0.02 -0.03 -0.05* 
                               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Non-farm income                          0.00* 0.00** 0.00**  0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 
                               (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Proportion of land 
cropped                   
-0.80 -1.89** -0.98  -0.66 -1.08 -0.81 
                               (0.70) (0.67) (0.67)  (0.73) (0.68) (0.74) 
Access to working radio 0.78 1.97*** 2.23***  0.67 1.94*** 2.36*** 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.53)  (0.52) (0.59) (0.58) 
Ngulula 1.57** 1.76** 3.46***  1.89*** 2.32*** 4.03*** 
                               (0.50) (0.63) (0.57)  (0.56) (0.65) (0.65) 
Post-primary education                    -0.11 0.33 0.84  -0.00 0.29 0.88 
                               (0.42) (0.52) (0.43)  (0.41) (0.56) (0.50) 
Network size (log)                            0.54 1.28 0.60 
                                   (0.61) (0.78) (0.74) 
Sex heterogeneity of 
network 
    -4.89* -6.27*** -2.73 
                                   (2.00) (1.88) (1.86) 
Influential kin nearby     0.94* 1.97** 1.86** 
                                   (0.48) (0.75) (0.64) 
Influential kin far location     2.19*** 2.00* 2.79*** 
                                   (0.59) (0.89) (0.79) 
Constant               -0.28 -1.71* -1.62  -2.07 -5.62** -4.72** 
 (1.09) (0.71) (0.97)  (1.44) (1.95) (1.74) 
                                               
Model chi-square            72.03        102.40                                
Observations = 135             
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Cluster base category is LL 
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Appendix G Theoretical Model of Agricultural Household with Transactions Costs 
 
The underlying theoretical model for the empirical analysis is a basic static model of the 
agricultural household incorporating transaction costs, following the methodology of Goetz 
(1992) and later extended (see Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). 
 
Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry (2000) modify and extend the basic static agricultural household 
model to incorporate transactions costs
53
. In this model, transactions costs are defined as being 
either fixed (regardless of the amount exchanged) or variable (vary with the amount 
exchanged). 
 
In the absence of transactions costs, households (i=1...N) maximise utility, deciding how much 
to produce, consume and sell in the market: 
 
 
(G.1) 
 
Subject to:  
 
a budget constraint, which states that expenditure on all purchases must not exceed 
sales revenues plus transfers (t): 
 
 
(G.2) 
 
the resource balance (the amount consumed, used as an input and sold of a good is 
equal to production plus any endowment of that good): 
 
; 
(G.3) 
 
and production technology (the relationship of inputs to output): 
 
 
 (G.4) 
 
 
(G.5) 
 
 
Where, for good i: 
 
                                                     
53
 The theoretical model developed by Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry (2000) ignores the role of 
risk and credit constraints. Neither does it consider the case of households that both sell and 
buy a particular good. 
267 
 
 
 
 is value of consumption; 
 is value of production; 
 is value of inputs; 
 is marketing (sales);  if there is a sale of good i and  if good i is 
purchased; 
 is market price; 
 is endowment of good i; 
 are „exogenous shifters‟ in utility and production respectively; 
is production technology; 
 is exogenous transfers and incomes (nonfarm). 
 
 are vectors of household specific characteristics related to consumption (c) and 
production (q) including: labour, other inputs, assets, information, capital, household 
characteristics/ demographics, location, external factors including government support, prices, 
alternative economic opportunities. They can also include „non-quantifiable factors‟ such as 
entrepreneurial spirit, social networks, transactions costs. 
 
Marketing is thus linked with production depending on consumption, as well as command over 
labour and other inputs and access to information. For the household, production minus 
consumption gives marketed surplus. Thus, in the absence of transactions costs, market 
participation takes place in response to observable price signals – it is endogenously 
determined by prices and exogenously by household characteristics. 
 
However, market participation is not cost free, and the decision price (shadow price at which a 
smallholder farmer decides whether or not to be a net buyer, seller or autarkic) faced by the 
smallholder household may be different from observed (market) prices because of transactions 
costs. Transactions costs, for example unobservable transportation and marketing costs, 
increase the price paid by the buyer and reduce the price received by producers/ sellers, 
effectively widening the price band between buyers and sellers. Thus, the household problem 
can be expressed under fixed transaction costs (  and variable transaction costs ( . 
 
Expressing variable transaction costs (VTCs) in monetary terms: 
 
 
(G.6) 
 
The price effectively received by sellers is: 
 
 
(G.7) 
The price effectively paid by buyers is; 
 
 
268 
 
 
 
(G.8) 
 
Where the superscripts b and s denote buyers and sellers respectively; tvi are variable 
transactions costs associated with selling good i in the market and are expressed as a function 
of observable exogenous household characteristics  and , affecting these costs when 
selling and buying respectively. 
 
Rewriting the budget constraint to incorporate both fixed and variable transactions costs: 
 
 
(G.9) 
Where the household pays fixed transaction costs only if it sells good i and pays only if it 
buys it. 
 
From here it is possible to derive supply demand and supply equations conditional on market 
participation of households facing FTCs and VTCs using the Langrangian: 
 
 
(G.10) 
 
The Lagrangian multipliers associated with the resource balance, the technology constraint and 
the cash constraint are denoted by    respectively. 
 
Because the FTCs create discontinuities in the Lagrangian, the optimal solution follows two 
steps: First, solve for the optimal solution based on the form of market participation (sellers; 
buyers; autarkic), and then choose the form of market participation regime leading to the highest 
level of utility. Conditional optimal supply and demand are obtained by solving for FOCs, under 
usual utility and technology assumptions: 
 
FOCs for consumption goods: 
 
  
(G.11) 
 
 
For outputs: 
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,  
(G.12) 
 
For inputs: 
 
,  
(G.13) 
 
 
For traded goods: 
 
,  
(G.14) 
 
 
Following de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991), the decision price can be defined as: 
 
 
 
Profit maximisation subject to the technological constraint given by (4) gives a system of output 
supply equations  and input demand equations . 
 
Utility maximisation subject to the income constraint is: 
 
 
(G.15) 
 
The selling and buying production thresholds  and  can be defined “as the production level 
when the household enters the market as a seller or buyer respectively; i.e. when decision 
prices are at their thresholds  and ”: 
 
 
(G.16) 
 
 
(G.17) 
 
The following inequalities give participation (supply) decisions in relation to price bands for 
seller, autarkic and buyer households. Price bands are larger the greater are transactions costs 
(including: transport costs; search, recruitment and supervision costs and other opportunity 
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costs of selling and buying; mark-ups by traders; costs associated with risk and lack of 
competitions – see de Janvry et al, 1991)
54
.  
 
If  
 
That is, the shadow price is below the price band, then the household sells, and supply is given 
by: 
  
 
 
However, if: 
 
 
 
(G.18) 
The shadow price falls within the price band, then the household is autarkic, and supply is given 
by:  
 , with  defined by  
 
 
If : 
, 
 
The shadow price is above the price band and the household purchases, and supply is given 
by: 
  
 
The theoretical model thus implies that transactions costs, as well as household characteristics, 
affect decisions on buying, selling and autarky (self-sufficiency), and helps to distinguish 
between the roles played by fixed and variable transactions costs in household marketing 
decisions: 
 
 The supply equation is a function of fixed transaction costs when the household makes 
the decision whether or not to participate in the market. Fixed transactions costs thus 
shift the threshold at which market participation can take place. When the household 
effectively participates, the amount sold depends on both fixed and variable 
transactions costs. 
 
 For sellers, high transactions costs, especially fixed transactions costs, may push down 
their decision price to the extent it may not be worthwhile participating in the market. 
Further, because transactions costs effectively raise purchase prices, and increase the 
                                                     
54
 The subscript on the transaction cost variable t in the q_
b
 function should be f and not s as 
given in Key et al‟s original paper. The notation presented here corrects for their typo. 
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costs of selling, more own-production is likely to be consumed under transactions costs 
than without transactions costs. 
 
 Social networks enter into the model as household characteristics (zq and zc) that affect 
a household‟s ability to deal with the constraints of missing markets and transactions 
costs. While they enter the model as exogenous variables, in reality social networks are 
likely to be endogenous and this will be explored later. 
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Appendix H GMM Results: Rotating the Instrumental Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logcsold logcsold logcsold logcsold logcsold logcsold 
       
propland -1.65 -1.55 -1.67 -1.78 -1.77 -1.66 
 (1.132) (1.018) (1.155) (1.286) (1.205) (1.142) 
logsize -1.53* -1.45* -1.51 -1.71 -1.70* -1.57** 
 (0.879) (0.757) (0.970) (1.051) (0.887) (0.755) 
logsizeed2 1.57* 1.69** 1.53 1.70 1.61 1.59* 
 (0.933) (0.831) (1.141) (1.089) (1.034) (0.927) 
logsizerad 0.35 0.41 0.37 0.20 0.36 0.34 
 (0.769) (0.656) (0.834) (0.894) (0.844) (0.777) 
affil 0.72 0.52 0.70 0.99 0.86 0.75 
 (0.639) (0.600) (0.697) (0.809) (0.634) (0.523) 
depend -0.46 -0.52 -0.47 -0.18 -0.39 -0.44 
 (0.706) (0.632) (0.715) (0.878) (0.755) (0.685) 
loghh_age -0.12 -0.24 -0.12 -0.24 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.447) (0.439) (0.445) (0.523) (0.485) (0.451) 
propkin 1.18** 1.18** 1.18** 1.21** 1.19** 1.18** 
 (0.510) (0.478) (0.516) (0.567) (0.543) (0.513) 
_Icomid_2 1.16* 1.32** 1.18* 1.04 1.06* 1.14** 
 (0.610) (0.574) (0.668) (0.693) (0.630) (0.562) 
_Icomid_3 -0.79 -0.53 -0.77 -1.20 -0.99 -0.83 
 (0.926) (0.885) (0.972) (1.172) (0.888) (0.781) 
kininf 0.48 0.50* 0.48 0.38 0.44 0.47 
 (0.336) (0.299) (0.337) (0.401) (0.356) (0.336) 
education -3.30* -3.55** -3.23 -3.60 -3.42 -3.34* 
 (1.995) (1.781) (2.393) (2.336) (2.204) (1.975) 
store 0.30 0.40 0.31 0.16 0.28 0.29 
 (0.473) (0.444) (0.481) (0.565) (0.512) (0.463) 
radio316 0.15 -0.00 0.10 0.49 0.12 0.16 
 (1.742) (1.490) (1.886) (2.023) (1.911) (1.762) 
nfy2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
propmult -0.90 -0.72 -0.90 -1.12 -0.90 -0.92 
 (1.130) (1.078) (1.125) (1.292) (1.212) (1.109) 
agehet -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) 
Constant 7.60*** 8.10*** 7.59*** 8.10*** 7.77*** 7.63*** 
 (2.002) (1.871) (1.997) (2.412) (2.153) (1.983) 
       
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.331 0.447 0.340 0.097 0.215 0.309 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix I Diagnostic Tests, Rotating the Instrumental Variables 
 
Diagnostic Test Results for instrument relevance and validity Equation 1 are presented in Table 
6.6 in Chapter 6.  
 
Table I.1 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity: 
Equation 2, Without tithe 
 First-Stage F-test (Underid)             (Weak id) 
Variable F(  6,    93)   P-val AP Chi-sq(  2) P-val AP F(  2,    93) 
Proportion of 
land cultivated 
(propland) 
2.89     0.0125 14.42    0.0007 5.99 
Log network 
size (logsize) 
50.07     0.0000 23.41    0.0000 9.72 
Log network 
size*education 
15.91     0.0000 13.72    0.0010 5.70 
Log network 
size*radio 
22.12 0.0000 56.37    0.0000 23.41 
Group affiliation 
(affil) 
3.57     0.0031 2.33    0.3126 0.97 
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 17,    94)   
Sargan-Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(1) 
(overidentification test of all instruments):  
0.27 
Instrumented:         propland logsize logsizeed2 logsizerad affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age propkin _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 kininf education store radio316 
nfy2 propmult agehet 
Excluded instruments: areatot IQVst2 logmeansize logyearcomm iqvrad iqved 
 
Table I.2 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity: Equation 3, 
Without logyearcomm 
 First-Stage F-Test (Underid)             (Weak id) 
Variable F(  6,    93)   P-val AP Chi-sq(  2) P-val AP F(  2,    93) 
Proportion of 
land cultivated 
(propland) 
2.51     0.0267 14.46    0.0007 6.00 
Log network 
size (logsize) 
47.02     0.0000 19.93    0.0000 8.27 
Log network 
size*education 
16.01     0.0000 10.78    0.0046 4.48 
Log network 
size*radio 
20.09     0.0000 64.56    0.0000 26.81 
Group affiliation 
(affil) 
2.91     0.0121 2.49    0.2877 1.03 
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 17,    94)   
Sargan-Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(1) 
(overidentification test of all instruments):  
0.644 
Instrumented:         propland logsize logsizeed2 logsizerad affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age propkin _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 kininf education store radio316 
nfy2 propmult agehet 
Excluded instruments: areatot IQVst2 logmeansize tithe iqvrad iqved 
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Table I.3 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity: Equation 4, 
Without logmeansize 
 First Stage F-test (Underid)             (Weak id) 
Variable F(  6,    93)   P-val AP Chi-sq(  2) P-val AP F(  2,    93) 
Proportion of 
land cultivated 
(propland) 
2.63     0.0210 14.53    0.0007 6.03 
Log network 
size (logsize) 
22.74     0.0000 34.02    0.0000 14.12 
Log network 
size*education 
14.68     0.0000 14.18    0.0008 5.89 
Log network 
size*radio 
10.16     0.0000 33.32    0.0000 13.83 
Group affiliation 
(affil) 
2.04     0.0675 2.85    0.2410 1.18 
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 17,    94)   
Sargan-Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(1) 
(overidentification test of all instruments):  
0.002 
Instrumented:   propland logsize logsizeed2 logsizerad affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age propkin _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 kininf education store radio316 
nfy2 propmult agehet 
Excluded instruments: areatot IQVst2 logyearcomm tithe iqvrad iqved 
 
Table I.4 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity:  
Equation 5, With domtime 
 First-Stage F-Test (Underid)             (Weak id) 
Variable F(  8,    
91)  
P-val AP Chi-sq(  4) P-val AP F(  
4,    
91)  
Proportion of 
land cultivated 
(propland) 
1.94     0.0640 15.74    0.0034 3.20 
Log network 
size (logsize) 
17.58     0.0000 134.73    0.0000 27.37 
Log network 
size* education 
12.16     0.0000 31.16    0.0000 6.33 
Log network 
size*radio 
9.14     0.0000 95.72    0.0000 19.44 
Group 
affiliation 
(affil) 
1.55     0.1512 13.37    0.0096 2.72 
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 17,    94)   
Sargan-Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(1) 
(overidentification test of all instruments):  
0.697 
Instrumented:         propland logsize logsizeed2 logsizerad affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age propkin _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 kininf   education store radio316 
nfy propmult agehet 
Excluded instruments: areatot domtime IQVst2 logmeansize iqvrad iqved logyearcomm tithe 
 
 
Table I.5 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity:  
Equation 6, With firewood variable 
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 First-Stage F-test (Underid)             (Weak id) 
Variable F(  8,    91)  )   P-val AP Chi-sq(  4) P-val AP F(  4,    91) 
Proportion of 
land cultivated 
(propland) 
1.91 0.0681 15.98    0.0030 3.25 
Log network 
size (logsize) 
18.07     0.0000 131.06    0.0000 26.62 
Log network 
size* education 
12.44     0.0000 32.22    0.0000 6.54 
Log network 
size*radio 
9.03     0.0000 91.09    0.0000 18.50 
Group affiliation 
(affil) 
1.70     0.1099 16.75    0.0022 3.40 
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 17,    94)   
Sargan-Hansen J statistic Chi-sq(1) 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments):  
0.635 
Instrumented:         propland logsize logsizeed2 logsizerad affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age propkin _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 kininf education store radio316 nfy 
propmult agehet 
Excluded instruments: areatot fire IQVst2 logmeansize iqvrad iqved logyearcommTithe 
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Appendix J OLS Results 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES logcsold logcsold 
   
depend -0.691 -0.533 
 (0.482) (0.550) 
loghh_age -0.265 -0.389 
 (0.358) (0.378) 
propkin 0.880**  
 (0.422)  
2.comid 1.583*** 1.465*** 
 (0.275) (0.320) 
3.comid 0.230 0.209 
 (0.360) (0.347) 
kininf 0.620**  
 (0.244)  
education -1.817** 0.156 
 (0.872) (0.265) 
store 0.432* 0.168 
 (0.247) (0.275) 
radio316 -0.431 1.094*** 
 (0.844) (0.226) 
nfy 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
propmult -1.064  
 (0.842)  
agehet -0.016  
 (0.021)  
propland -0.404 -0.623* 
 (0.298) (0.358) 
logsize -0.844**  
 (0.374)  
1.education#c.logsize 0.938**  
 (0.384)  
1.radio316#c.logsize 0.622*  
 (0.356)  
affil 0.145 0.165 
 (0.095) (0.104) 
Constant 7.002*** 6.110*** 
 (1.380) (1.355) 
   
Observations 112 113 
R-squared 0.595 0.490 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
277 
 
 
 
 
Appendix K Heckman Selection and Censored Tobit Models of smallholder market 
participation with transactions costs 
 
 
K.1 Heckman Selection Model 
 
The model is estimated using the two-stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979). 
Consider a household‟s crop marketing decision separated into two stages – whether or 
not to sell; then, given that they do sell, how much. This can be shown by the following:  
 
Outcome equation: 
iii uy  X   if y
*
i >0 
(K.1) 
yi = not observed otherwise 
 
Whether or not the value of the outcome equation (K.2) is observed can be denoted by a 
dummy Di. Observation of the dependent variable yi is a function of a value of another 
equation – the selection equation (6.3), which relates a latent variable y*i (propensity to 
be included in the sample) to some observed characteristics Zi. The variables in Xi and 
Zi may overlap, but if they are identical the model may not be identified.
55
 
 
Selection equation: 
iii ey  Z
*  
(K.2) 
Di = 1   if y
*
i >0 
Di = 0   otherwise 
 
Where Zi is a vector of observed variables that determine whether or not to participate 
(but not by how much), and ui and ei are jointly normally distributed. 
 
                                                     
55
 Further, if Xi and Zi are not completely independently distributed (ie have variables in common 
or are correlated) the estimated slope coefficients will be biased because omitted variable in the 
regression that is correlated with the Xi. Further, even if the Xi and Zi are independent, the data 
is non-randomly missing, which introduces heteroscedasticity into error term and OLS is not 
efficient. 
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To retain sampling weights in the estimation it is necessary to estimate the model „by 
hand‟ in two separate steps rather than simultaneously using maximum likelihood. 
However, this means that the standard errors in the second stage equation need to be 
corrected by modifying the variance-covariance matrix to correct for bias induced by 
the selection stage of the model (see Greene, 2003; Main and Reilly, 1993; Bellemare 
and Barrett, 2006). However, using the svy: prefix in Stata 11.2 means that it is 
impossible to recover the standard error of the estimation (root mean square error) and 
thus make the necessary modification. Standard errors may be estimated using Jack-
knife (non-parametric) method in compromise, which is easier to apply than bootstrap 
when data are collected using complex sampling structure, such as the multistage 
sampling and varying sampling weights employed in this research. Jack-knife takes 
subsamples of the data, systematically re-estimating the model leaving out one 
observation at a time. 
 
In estimating the Heckman model, in order to identify the model only capital variables 
that proxy for variable transaction costs are used to explain the amount sold, whereas 
both fixed and variable transactions costs variables are used to explain the decision to 
enter the market. 
 
IMR is insignificant in second stage regressions. Just 21 out of 136 households reported 
no crop sales over the survey period, which may explain this. Further, it is not possible 
to achieve convergence when estimating the Heckman model with the data using survey 
weights and instrumental variables. Thus the model can only be estimated under the 
assumption of exogeneity.  Results are given below in Table K.1. 
 
 
K.2 Censored Tobit 
 
 
The underlying theoretical model is similar to the probit threshold model set out in 
equation (K.1) above, where y*i is the latent variable: 
 
iii ey  '* βX   
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(K.3) 
where ei  ~ N(0, 2) and y
*
i ~N ( βxi , 2) and i=1, ........, n 
 
if y
*
i >0, then yi = y
*
i
 
if y
*
i  0, then  yi = 0  
 
The empirical model is therefore: 
 
 iii uy  βX  
(K.4) 
 
This is estimated as an interval regression, left-censored at zero, both with and without 
social networks variables. Parameter estimates are identical to those obtained from a 
censored Tobit but allows us to accommodate complex survey design using the svy: 
prefix. Once again, it was not possible to achieve convergence in estimating the model 
with instrumental variables. Results are given alongside Heckman Selection results in 
Table K.1 below. 
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Table K.1 Heckman Selection Model and Censored Tobit results – assuming regressor 
exogeneity 
  Heckman Selection Model Censored Tobit 
  selection outcome   
  (1) (2)  (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES market logcsold  model 
      
 depend 2.057 -0.528  0.426 
  (1.333) (0.654)  (0.928) 
 loghh_age -4.379*** -0.347  -2.252*** 
  (0.979) (0.462)  (0.689) 
 propkin 0.283 0.801*  1.278 
  (1.031) (0.471)  (0.990) 
 _Icomid_2 -0.309 1.538***  1.245** 
  (0.627) (0.348)  (0.611) 
 _Icomid_3 -0.580 0.083  -0.075 
  (0.595) (0.399)  (0.700) 
 kininf 0.446 0.541*  1.219** 
  (0.419) (0.309)  (0.486) 
 education 1.413 -1.609  -0.334 
  (1.390) (1.118)  (1.956) 
 store 0.395   0.723* 
  (0.577)   (0.404) 
 radio316 6.027***   3.412* 
  (2.038)   (1.971) 
 nfy -0.000 0.000  0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 propmult -2.201 -1.167  -2.556* 
  (1.858) (1.001)  (1.323) 
 agehet -0.004 -0.021  -0.071 
  (0.044) (0.031)  (0.049) 
 propland 3.189** -0.197  1.569** 
  (1.225) (0.428)  (0.764) 
 logsize 1.113** -0.545  0.345 
  (0.552) (0.422)  (0.696) 
 logsizerad -1.855** 0.483***  -0.720 
  (0.791) (0.124)  (0.831) 
 logsizeed2 -0.027 0.854*  0.647 
  (0.662) (0.498)  (0.809) 
 affil 0.299* 0.190*  0.353** 
  (0.168) (0.109)  (0.156) 
 Constant 12.383*** 6.600***  8.770** 
  (3.287) (1.909)  (3.528) 
 mills_3  0.527   
   (0.730)   
 Constant    0.649*** 
     (0.089) 
      
 Observations 133 112  133 
 R-squared  0.586   
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Appendix L: Diagnostic Tests for GMM estimation without social networks 
 
For comparison with the GMM estimation in Table 6.7 in Section 6.6.1 of Chapter 6, the model 
was re-estimated omitting all social networks variables (network size, proportion of kin, 
proportion of multiplex ties, influential kin, age heterogeneity of alters, interactions between 
network size and education and radio ownership) but retaining the group affiliation variable, 
capturing household membership of community level groups and societies in order to test if it is 
important to know more about the network than simply whether a person is a group member or 
not. Diagnostic test results are given in Table L.1. The summary results for first-stage 
regression show that we fail to reject the partial R-squared of excluded instruments and thus we 
have not identified the model and will not learn anything from the IV results. 
 
Table L.1 Summary results of diagnostic tests for instrument relevance and validity: 
GMM without social networks variables 
First-stage regressions Proportion of land 
cultivated 
Group affiliation 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments 0.28 0.27 
F-test of excluded instruments ~F(3,   101)  5.61     1.49     
Under-id Angrist-Pischke Chi-sq(  3) 7.08    1.93 
Weak id Angrist-Pischke F(2,   101) 3.17    0.86 
Underidentification tests 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi-sq(2) Chi-sq(2)=1.40 
Cragg-Donald N*minEval statistic 
Chi-sq(2) 
 
Weak identification statistics 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
H0: equation weakly identified 
0.46 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 0.46 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation. 
Ho: B1=0 and orthogonality conditions are valid:            
F-statistic ~  F(3,101) 3.47 
Chi-sq(3) 11.64 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic Ch—sq(3) 7.69 
Number of observations N 113 
Number of regressors K 11 
Number of endogenous regressors K1 2 
Number of instruments L 12 
Number of excluded instruments L1 3 
Second Stage Estimation: GMM 
F( 10,102)  5.50 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic) 
1.40 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald 
F statistic) 
0.46 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments): Chi-sq(1)  
0.04 
Instrumented: propland affil 
Included instruments: depend loghh_age _Icomid_2 _Icomid_3 education store  radio316 nfy2 
Excluded instruments: areatot logyearcomm tithe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
